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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

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THE PASTORAL LETTER OF THE THIRD PLENARY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

THE grandest ecclesiastical body that ever met on the soil of America has closed its sessions, that lasted for more than a month, in the time-honored Cathedral of Baltimore, and Archbishops, Bishops, Superiors of religious Orders, and learned theologians have departed, each to the scene of his appointed ordinary labors in the Church. The solemnly enacted laws of this great Christian legislature will not be promulgated for some time, not till, like the laws of our national legislature, they receive their final sanction from the Supreme Ruler. But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council did not disperse over the vast continent before they had issued to the Catholic clergy and laity of the United States words full of the spirit of faith, of wisdom, and of prudence, words which are full of lessons for every Catholic, and for every one who loves his country and its institutions, and hopes to see them maintained and upheld by citizens taking as their guide the highest principles of religion and morality.

The pastoral is not a repetition of ideas and words, used over and over again as a stereotyped charge to the people, droned out to drowsy ears. We stand on the brink of an abyss, the hundred years comprising the life of our Constitutional government marking, in Europe, the growth of elements that have steadily, persistently, and with

all the skill and adroitness of perverted ingenuity, aimed to destroy all faith in Christianity, all social order, all sound political ideas. Had the wide ocean that rolls between America and Europe kept all this from our shores, the warning of the Plenary Council would be needless. But such is not the case; the principles of the French Revolution, or rather those of which it was the first great and fearful manifestation, have made literature, science, art, education, vehicles for corrupting mankind, and, under the specious and insidious guise of liberalism, seduced men from the path of right and light into the ways of wrong and obscurity.

The residue of Christianity retained in this country withstood, for a time, the influence of these perverse ideas; but the barriers have gradually broken away, and there is no longer a sound Christian public opinion, no longer the former power in the bodies still claiming to be Christian, either to teach the primary truths of religion or to enforce the clearest rules of morality.

The Catholic Church has become the only one that can boldly avow a belief in God and revelation, defend the integrity and authenticity of the Scriptures, or maintain the superiority of the supernatural over the material. It must become daily more and more distinctly the only institution in the land to which all who continue to believe in God, in redemption through Christ, must gather, as the only one which speaks authoritatively and unwaveringly.

In this view, a fearful responsibility rests on the Catholic Church in this country. Its mission is not only to save the souls actually within the fold, and shield them from the deluge by retaining them in the Ark of Safety, but also to withstand and oppose the torrents, and rescue from their depths all who appeal for aid.

Eighteen years ago the Catholic hierarchy met before in Plenary Council, and their wise and timely legislation has borne fruit. There is nothing for the prelates just assembled to reverse, but in that time, less than a generation, the designs of evil have become clearer, its weapons are better known, and the rulers in the Church of God, acting under His guidance, can take more decisive steps to counteract it.

That the Church has been able to effect its organization over so vast a territory, to develop, as it instinctively does, the great institutions and works that spring from the evangelical counsels, and do this unchecked and almost unimpeded by civil government or popular violence, amid a population imbued for centuries with every form of heretical opinion and prejudice, is, in itself, one of the most remarkable facts in the whole history of the Church. What Cavour said in mockery, when he planned the subjugation of the Church to the caprices of godless civil power—a Free Church in a Free State—while it never has existed in Europe, is

here a reality. In no other country could seventy archbishops and bishops assemble with their theologians, with abbots of St. Benedict and Citeaux, with provincials of the orders founded by St. Augustine, St. Francis, St. Dominic, St. Ignatius, St. Vincent de Paul, St. Alphonsus Liguori, St. Paul of the Cross, with the Sons of Carmel and communities of more recent date, as well as superiors of theological seminaries, and deliberate freely. In many lands, to follow the rule of venerated Saints of God is regarded as a crime like those which consign men to a felon's cell, and the religious is punished by perpetual exile, while the malefactor loses his liberty but for a brief term.

Divine Providence, in thus constituting the Church in this country, like an army arrayed for battle, with the unseen legions of guardian angels of church and religious hall, and of Christian homes, gathered as auxiliaries near at hand, prepared it for some great work; and even among her enemies there must be Balaams who discern that the power of God is with her. Even on our soil the inscrutable ways of Providence have baffled, again and again, the designs and apparent triumphs of men. France, in her day of faith, planted Christianity in the valleys of the two great arteries of our northern continent. Her rulers, sunk in vice, lost to a Protestant power their fair American realm. The Catholic Church seemed doomed; but she was saved in Canada, and the very men who rose in indignation at that unexpected event opened almost all the rest of the Continent to the free action of the Church. Spain, that secured from the Pope such immense power in America for her sovereigns, lost her line of faith-inspired rulers: she lost her American possessions by the very irreligion she fostered. The paltry infidelity of the wretched parodies of our republic oppressed religion, and when provinces fell into the hands of the United States, with its dominant Catholicity-hating Protestantism, Catholicity seemed doomed; but from those very sections came Archbishops and Bishops, representing sees that still retain their Spanish names, to attend the Plenary Council. At the beginning of this century, when a Pope died a prisoner, pulpits in this country resounded with the eloquence of exultation. The Catholic Church was dead. Struck in its very head, it could never rise again. How little did the exulters dream that the closing years of the century would see their organizations powerless, and the Catholic Church pervading the land, greeting, by a means then unsuspected and unknown, a Pope in Rome, as it opened its solemn council, and receiving an instantaneous reply!

Thus has Providence, by a series of surprises, baffling human wisdom and human hopes, brought the Church to her actual condition in this country. And it is surely for a great purpose.

In the pastoral of the Fathers of the third Plenary Council, we are led to look into the future and divine their purpose and the duty incumbent upon all. Three years after the close of the previous Plenary Council, the illustrious Pope Pius IX., as the pastoral notes, assembled the Vatican Council; and many of those who had attended our national synod, with others succeeding them, and who are still alive, took part in the deliberations of that Council, which was the first that represented all quarters of the globe. "Its appointed task," says the pastoral, "was to condemn the most influential and insidious errors of the day, and to complete the legislation on weighty matters of discipline. . . . . During its short session of seven months, the Vatican Council gave solemn authoritative utterance to some great truths which the Church had unvaryingly held from the days of Christ and His apostles; but which she found at once more necessary to recall and inculcate against the widespread skepticism and unbelief of our day. Besides condemning the philosophy, no less wicked than false, and teeming with contradictions, of the last two centuries, and especially of our own times, she had to uphold (such is the lamentable downward course of those who rebelled against her Divine commission to teach all nations) the truth and divinity of the Sacred Books against the very children of those who once appealed to Scripture to disprove her teachings, and to maintain the dignity and value of human reason against the lineal descendants of those who once claimed reason as the supreme and only guide in picking out from her creed what mysteries they would retain, what mysteries they would reject."

The Fathers of the Council say to the flocks confided to their care: "We have no reason to fear that you, beloved brethren, are likely to be carried away by these or other false doctrines condemned by the Vatican Council, such as materialism or the denial of God's power to create, to reveal to mankind His hidden truths, to display by miracles His almighty power in this world, which is the work of His hands. But neither can we close our eyes to the fact that teachers of skepticism and irreligion are at work in our country. They have crept into the leading educational institutions of our non-Catholic fellow-citizens; they have, though rarely, made their appearance in the public press, and even in the pulpit." "When we take into account the daily signs of growing unbelief, and see how its heralds not only seek to mould the youthful minds in our colleges and seats of learning, but are also actively working amongst the masses, we cannot but shudder at the dangers that threaten us in the future. When to this we add the rapid growth of that false civilization which hides its foulness under the name of enlightenment, involving as it does the undis-

guised worship of mammon; the anxious search after every ease, comfort, and luxury for man's physical well-being; the all-absorbing desire to promote his material interests; the unconcern or rather contempt for those of his higher and better nature,—we cannot but feel that out of all this must grow a heartless materialism, which is the best soil to receive the seeds of unbelief and irreligion, which threaten to desolate the country at no distant day. The first thing to perish will be our liberties. For men who know not God or religion can never respect the unalienable rights which man has received from his Creator. The State in such case must become a despotism, whether its power be lodged in the hands of one or many."

That the Fathers are taking no exaggerated view of the condition of the country will be admitted by every observant person. The foundation of our earlier political and educational system was Christianity, but the recognition of its truths is passing away. The exclusion of religion from the general teaching of the young has opened the door to the introduction of materialism and infidelity, for the exclusion of religion is practically infidelity. And where the great fundamental truths of Christianity are not inculcated as a basis and canon for the reasoning of man as he advances from youth to maturity, they never can become a controlling element in the actions of life. The studies from the primary school to the university cannot be colorless; if not Christian, they are certain to be materialistic, naturalistic, or agnostic, if not openly infidel. The more recently established colleges, scientific publications, even the works issued at Washington by the general government, teem with theories and arguments directly at variance with the fundamental truths of the Christian religion; and writers on ethnology and antiquity seem to think that they cannot obtain European recognition except by warping facts and inferences to assail the existence of God and His providence. So indifferent has public opinion become, that this goes on unchecked. While a few were agitating to "put God into the Constitution," they and the rest beheld with indifference the Government Printing Office become the vehicle for disseminating arguments insidiously framed against revelation. In this weakening of the last remnant of faith, this growing indifference, vice and immorality find their fertile soil. Disregard of human life, profligacy, dishonesty in all commercial and fiduciary transactions, increase with a rapidity that is appalling.

The Church has a task of gigantic magnitude to save her flock in this country from the contamination of the world that surrounds it.

Earnestly, then, does the Pastoral exclaim to those who possess the treasure of Catholic faith: "Keep day and night before your eyes the law of God and His teachings through that Holy Church

that He has appointed mother and mistress of all men. Fly the reading of all infidel books, and keep them from your children, as you would the poison of asp or basilisk. Teach them that you and they in listening to Holy Church have the guidance of Him who said: 'I am the way, the truth, and the life.' Let others doubt or deny, but, with the Apostle, you know whom you have believed, and you are certain that He will make good the trust you have reposed in Him."

But the works on every branch of human learning which are insidiously made the vehicles of error are not so easily guarded against, as the evil is not seen by all. Hence the Church must, in the training of her children, arm them to meet the enemies whom they will have to encounter, and enable them to detect and refute the soul-destroying errors that lurk in honeyed phrases.

All this flood of error sprang from the fundamental error of the Reformers, that God revealed forms of words for men to seek amid their mazes in translations for the truths by the light of private judgment, when reason itself would show that God must reveal truths, and must maintain an authority on earth to keep from misconstruction the words of His inspired servants through whom He reveals them. Starting from an erroneous standpoint, making the Scriptures and their translations of them as understood by private interpretation to be absolute truth, the Reformers and their followers have come at last to reject the truth and inspiration of the Scriptures. Their vagaries, from an almost idolatrous honor of the material volume to the utter rejection of its letter and spirit, attest the necessity of an infallible, ever-abiding authority on earth, which could declare what was the truth revealed by God to man. In the designs of Providence it was ordained that when this error of private judgment and denial of a teaching Church had culminated in rejecting the Scriptures, the Infallibility of the Head of the Church, in officially teaching the pastors and flocks confided to him, should be distinctly and unequivocally asserted and maintained as the only safe guide for human reason seeking to know the relations of man to his Maker.

The assertion of this great truth, which had always been practically recognized, excited "a storm of fierce obloquy and reckless vituperation." It is a curious fact, however, that the opposition to it, and to the Church because of it, was greatest where civil liberty was least known, and where governments were most despotic. As the luminous pastoral declares, "the governments by which, three centuries ago, the new tenets of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin had been imposed on reluctant peoples by the sword, were the first, indeed the only ones to unsheath it again against Catholic believers, and especially against bishops and clergy. It was their

purpose to exterminate by degrees the Catholic hierarchy and replace it by a servile priesthood that would subordinate its preaching and ministry to the will of the State." While governments warred on the Church, striking in their folly at the most conservative element in human society, they closed their eyes to the dangers from the principles they had fostered and encouraged, but which the Church had strenuously condemned. Nations were found to be swarming with millions who had learned in secret societies to deny God and His Providence, to deny the authority of civil governments, the rights of property, and marriage as the basis of the family. One ruler assassinated, others constantly menanced, compelled monarchs to pause and consider. Like the handwriting on the wall came the words : " And now, O ye kings, understand, receive instruction, ye who judge the earth." The czar begins to see that the most loyal subjects of his empire are the Catholics whose portion has been Siberia, the knout, unheard-of cruelties. Prussia finds that her dangerous radicals learned their lessons from those most removed from Catholic teachings. France has no hope except in her deliverance from a nest of conspirators who even in power are ever plotting against each other and against the welfare and honor of the nation. Before it is too late, they have begun to cry, " Erravimus." Acknowledging their folly and injustice, " the rulers of Prussia have had to fall back on the patriotism of the Catholic body to stay the threatening march of socialism and revolution." England, which once denounced the Catholic clergy as surpliced ruffians, and loaded them with insult when she could no longer torture or slay, now seeks to aid them in their work, seeing in their beneficent action the safeguard of the constitution menaced by the widespread infidelity among the lower classes in England, but from which the Catholic Church has hitherto saved Ireland.

Men, of course, are slow to admit a truth which they have been trained from the cradle to impeach and deny, but every statesman, every thoughtful student of the political condition of the world is at least forced to admit, even if he has not the courage to avow it, that the safest element in every country is the body true to the teachings of the Catholic Church, with an unerring guide in its faith, its philosophy and its ethics, saving it from infidel and revolutionary tendencies, and guiding it by rules of such clearness and wisdom that they cannot be merely human. Our republic grew out of communities nursed in prejudice and error, and has not altogether thrown off the fetters of colonial days. Some look with fear and jealousy at the Church, but light is spreading even amid souls in the deepest mists and clouds of error. The pastoral puts a truth tersely. " A Catholic finds himself at home in the United

States; for the influence of his church has constantly been exercised in behalf of individual rights and popular liberties. And the right-minded American nowhere finds himself more at home than in the Catholic Church, for nowhere else can he breathe that atmosphere of divine truth which alone can make us free." "The Fathers wisely refute the idea that we Catholics need lay aside any of our love of our country's principles and institutions to be faithful Catholics.

"The spirit of American freedom is not one of anarchy or license." There is a striking proof of this in the apathy of our people at large in regard to the Bartholdi statue of "Liberty enlightening the world." The very conception shocks the mass of the American people. Liberty, as they understand it, is not the liberty of the French Republic, with its denial of God and its deification of reason; it is not the liberty of the Communist and the Nihilist; and the type of the statue is rather that liberty than the spirit of liberty which our fathers taught us to prize. Civil liberty is great in our eyes, but we look higher for the "Light of the World." Americans have not renounced Christ to look to such liberty as the statue typifies, and they do not take heartily to it. The spirit of American freedom "essentially involves love of order, respect for rightful authority and obedience to just laws. There is nothing in the character of the most liberty-loving American which could hinder his reverential submission to the divine authority of our Lord, or to the like authority delegated by Him to His apostles and His Church. Nor are there in the world more devoted adherents of the Catholic Church, the see of Peter and the Vicar of Christ, than the Catholics of the United States."

Passing from the general consideration of the Church in its head, the pastoral comes to the present condition of Pope Leo XIII. His condition as a virtual prisoner in the city which owes its modern life and importance to the care of the Sovereign Pontiff, is clearly stated, and the work of sacrilege in the capital of the Catholic world, where a horde of foreign adventurers have despoiled and scattered the central establishments of the great religious orders, so useful to the Church, and even the property contributed by the Christian world for foreign missions. His heroism in enduring the evils that surround him is equalled by the wisdom with which he has labored to disarm the hostilities of governments in other lands, which have been antagonistic to the Church, as well as to recall to the bosom of unity the ancient oriental churches, which, severed from the divine vine, preserved but a languishing life.

But in all the wide circle of his great responsibility, the progress of the Church in these United States forms in a special manner, both a source of joy and an object of solicitude to the Holy Father.

With loving care his predecessors watched and encouraged her first feeble beginnings. They cheered and fostered her development in the pure atmosphere of freedom, when the name of Carroll shone with equal lustre at the head of her new born hierarchy, and on the roll of our country's patriots. Step by step they directed her progress, as, with marvellous rapidity, the clergy and the dioceses have multiplied, the hundreds of the faithful have increased to thousands and to millions; her churches, schools, asylums, hospitals, academies, and colleges, have covered the land with homes of divine truth and Christian charity. Not yet a century has elapsed since the work was inaugurated by the appointment of the first Bishop of Baltimore in 1789; and as we gaze upon the results already reached, we must exclaim: "By the Lord hath this been done, and it is wonderful in our eyes."

In all this astonishing development, from the rude beginnings of pioneer missionary toil, along the nearer and nearer approaches to the beauteous symmetry of the Church's perfect organization, the advance so gradual, yet so rapid, has been safely guided in the lines of Catholic and Apostolic tradition, by the combined efforts and wisdom of our local hierarchy and of the successors of St. Peter. It was in order to take counsel with the representatives of the American hierarchy concerning the important interests of religion in this country, that the Holy Father, last year, invited the archbishops of the United States to Rome.

In the plenary council which has just held session after session in the Catholic capital of the country, the archbishops and bishops of the country, with the counsel of the most learned men in the secular and regular clergy, coming from seminary, college, and cloister, with priests grown gray in mission labors among the Catholics in all parts of the country, familiar with the wants, the difficulties, and the dangers of all, deliberated patiently and exhaustively to put into practical shape the means of religious improvement which had been suggested or resolved upon in the conferences at Rome.

One of the most serious points was the more thorough education of candidates for the priesthood. The great want of priests to meet the increase by immigration for a long time compelled the bishops to shorten the term of study and training, and to supply the want of regular seminaries as best they could. The multiplied duties devolving on the clergy gave little time to continue or even keep fresh in mind the detail of the teachings of the church in dogma, moral, or canon law. But the time has come when the young levite can go through a more extended course, and acquire the extended and thorough knowledge necessary to enable the priest of God "to show forth worthily the beauty, the superiority,

the necessity of the Christian religion, and to prove that there is nothing in all that God has made to contradict anything that God has taught." The influence of such learned priests ought henceforward to be felt, not only in the church whose walls re-echo his voice, but throughout the land, in the literature, the science, the societies, and organizations of thoughtful men, where many would with thankful hearts receive the clear logical solution of the question before them from those whose superior training was based on the irrefragable principles of an unvarying faith.

To train priests who can thus acquire and thus exercise the learning which natural talents with long study and God's grace are to be acquired, seminaries must be maintained, and institutions created of a higher grade than any that the church yet possesses in this country. A great university is one of the necessities of the church. Canada has one; Mexico and Spanish America till the days of revolution had many. The fathers of the council appeal to the faithful to take to heart this great work of the training of the clergy. They remind those to whom God has been pleased to give wealth, "that it is their duty and their privilege to consider themselves the Lord's stewards, in the use of what his Providence has placed in their hands; that they should be foremost in helping on the work of the Church of Christ during life, and make sure to have God among their heirs when they die;" and the prelates especially recommend to the wealthy the founding of scholarships, either in their diocesan or provincial seminaries, or in the American college at Rome, and in time in our Catholic University. Such burses or foundations were one of the most ordinary pious uses favored by our Catholic ancestors, as the English, Scotch, and Irish colleges on the continent show; but unfortunately one of the rarest adopted in this country, where they are so much needed. The late Dr. Edmund B. O'Callaghan, and his wife who survived him, are among the notable exceptions. All the property of that Catholic historian of New York went to endow scholarships for the education of priests in the Provincial Seminary at Troy, and in the Society of Jesus. Year by year priests educated by the income of that fund will be ordained and begin to offer the holy sacrifice, and who can number the suffrages which these privileged souls will thus obtain? Surely such an example is worthy of imitation.

Reuben R. Springer, of Cincinnati, who has just passed away, remembered to make God his heir, and, among his numerous bequests to religion, gave one hundred thousand dollars, a sum somewhat exceeding that just mentioned, the income to be devoted to the education of priests at Mount St. Mary's of the West.

The due formation of the clergy is a topic that leads to the con-

sideration of the position of the priest after he has been ordained and begun his labors among the flock of Christ. In Europe, after the time of Constantine, a system grew up, recognized in time by all Christian powers, by which the rights, immunities, and privileges of the clergy, their support, and all judicial matters relating to them, and to the church in general, were regulated. This was the canon law, which had its own ecclesiastical tribunals where it was enforced. The immunities secured by the church were the cradle of civil liberty, as from this point the people freed themselves from the rapacity of feudal lords. At times in the long struggle of the church against the attempt to enslave, some concessions would be made to save higher interests, and the whole system became a complex and difficult one.

Within the last hundred years, nearly everything of the earlier organization has been swept away in Europe. The great religious orders have been despoiled and banished; the property of the church has been seized; the tithes, that were once paid to the parish priest for his support, are replaced by a petty salary doled out by the state, subject to be delayed or stopped at any moment.

In Canada there is more of the old organization left than can be generally found in Europe. There the parishes remain as they were instituted in the seventeenth century, the parish priest still receives his tithes, and holds his appointment until a judicial tribunal declares that he has forfeited it by violation of law. It is a bit of old Catholic Europe preserved in our century.

But in this country none of this ever obtained. If there were regular parishes instituted at Detroit, Kaskaskia, Cahokia, St. Louis, Mobile, St. Augustine, and in Louisiana, most of these have lapsed; no tithes are paid, and throughout the country there have been simply missionary priests subject to the bishop of the diocese, who can transfer them from one mission to another, as in his judgment the good of the diocese requires. As the church has consolidated, this condition, temporary in its nature, and liable from hasty or ill-considered action to work injustice, was required to be superseded by one more in harmony with the general policy of the church. To adopt the whole body of canon law, which grew up during many centuries in countries existing under far different conditions, would entail endless confusion. To apply to the church in this country the spirit which underlies all the provisions of canon law, required the greatest wisdom, prudence, knowledge of the country and its needs, and freedom from any bias or prejudice prevailing among the Catholic clergy and people in this country; for, unfortunately, designing men are fanning hostility of Catholic priest and layman against Catholic priest and layman, because they saw the light in different lands.

The Fathers of the Council have endeavored to advance in applying to the Church here the wise fundamental laws which the Church has adopted by the experience of centuries, and which represent the perfection of Church organization. Steps have been taken to form a nucleus of priests in each diocese, who by long and blameless service on the mission shall be entitled to fixity of tenure in their charges, and similar steps to secure to all having care of souls inviolability of their pastoral authority within proper limits. These new regulations, adopted after the practical test of preliminary ordinances, and embodying the result of most serious counsel, cannot fail to benefit religion greatly by preventing to a considerable extent a class of contests which has increased within recent years, dividing the people and giving pain to all who have the real interests of the Church at heart.

The Council appeals to the laity to be loyal in upholding their pastors in the labors undertaken for the good of their souls, and of their children after them. "A grateful and pious flock is sure to make a happy pastor. But if the people do not respond to their pastor's zeal, if they are cold and ungrateful, or disedifying, then, indeed, is his lot sad and pitiable. Since, therefore, the priests of God leave all things to devote themselves to your spiritual welfare, show by your affection, by your co-operation with their efforts for your spiritual improvement, and even by your care for their physical comfort, that you appreciate their devotedness and the reciprocal obligation which it imposes."

One of the hardest and most thankless tasks of the priest in this country is the collecting of money for the parochial wants. A church to be built or enlarged, schools erected and maintained, asylum, cemetery, all require money. Few are the wealthy who ever assume any part, although the number is increasing. Generally the priest must collect, not dollar by dollar, but almost cent by cent, the thousands of dollars needed. He comes to the parish without means; and many a good priest, after by his exertions endowing a parish with a church and schools, departs as poor as he came, broken in health and spirits,—not even rewarded by the gratitude of the flock for whom he has unselfishly labored. The property remains, enabling the people to worship God in the awful sacrifice; to have their children trained for this world, and, what is far more, for heaven, by the doctrines of faith; the cemetery remains, where they can be laid in hallowed earth. What base ingratitude must there be in those who murmur against the poor priest who, uncheered but undaunted, secured these blessings to them! Well does the Council rouse the spirit of faith in the people to regard these things from a proper standpoint. And yet Catholics should

hardly need urging and public entreaty to bring them to act heartily with their clergy in all that is for the common good.

The amount of work to be done to bring a parish to a normal condition often exceeded the means of the congregation, or the amount they chose to contribute. The pastor was forced to borrow, and where this was done, in the times of inflated prices, during and after the late civil war, the shrinkage of values has made these debts very onerous. In some parts, especially in the Southern States, where so much perished during the war, the condition is pitiable. Besides the current expenses of the Church, a vast load of debt, calling for annual interest, makes it necessary that heroic exertions should be made to diminish, if not extinguish, them.

Much debt has been incurred in establishing parochial schools, institutions of paramount necessity, as the public school system is controlled absolutely by Protestants, conducted on Protestant principles, and made an instrument for debauching the faith of Catholic children who enter the walls of State institutions. That they will in time become utterly unchristian seems almost inevitable.

"In days like ours, when error is so pretentious and aggressive, every one needs to be as fully armed as possible with sound knowledge,—not only the clergy, but the people, also,—that they may be able to withstand the noxious influences of the popularized irreligion. In the great coming combat between Faith and Agnosticism, an important part of the fray must be borne by the laity, and woe to them if they are not well-prepared." Religion is excluded from the State schools because a part of the people wish it; but no sound reason, no article of Constitution or law gives this part a right to say that those who wish their children's education imbued with religion shall not have them so trained. The advocates of secular education may ask it for their own children; they have no right to dictate to others in regard to the children of others. But as the public schools are, they are likely to remain; and every new demand of those who oppose religion will be granted, while the wishes of the religiously inclined portion of the community are to be treated as entitled to no respect whatever. Many zealous Protestants, guided only by prejudice against Catholics, gave strength and support to the opponents of all religion, and are now, in view of the fatal results of godless education, endeavoring to restore the old church-schools, once the prevailing ones in the country.

These men, having religion at heart, will read approvingly the words of the Council: "It cannot be desirable or advantageous that religion should be excluded from the school. On the contrary, it ought to be there, to be one of the chief agencies for mould-

ing the young life to all that is true, and virtuous, and holy. To shut religion out of the school, and keep it for home and the church, is, logically, to train up a generation that will consider religion good for home and the church, but not for the practical business of real life. But a more false and pernicious notion could not be imagined. Religion, in order to elevate a people, should inspire their whole life, and rule their relations with one another."

"All religious denominations are now awaking to this great truth, which the Catholic Church has never ceased to maintain. Reason and experience are forcing them to recognize that the only practical way to secure a Christian people is to give the youth a Christian education." "Hence, the cry for Christian education is going up from all religious bodies throughout the land."

We need not wonder, then, that the great senate of Catholic Bishops urges the faithful to maintain and perfect the parochial schools, and supply them where they are still required. The due organization of the schools in each diocese, and the adapting of the course of study to our actual wants, is now a matter of serious consideration. Our schools have in many cases been modeled on the public schools, and the endeavor made to rival them. But we do not seem to have succeeded as well in imbuing our school children with attachment to the Church, with a dread of religious error, with the terrible consequences of a loss of faith, to the extent that Protestants succeed in imbuing their children with a fear and dread of our holy faith, and such an aversion to it, that they grow up to maturity full of a prejudice that makes them shrink from opening a Catholic book, or listening to a Catholic address.

Since our children meet, as soon as they leave school, those who attempt to seduce them, and destroy their faith in the Catholic Church, or in Christianity itself, it seems evident that they should go forth armed and prepared to meet this temptation, and not fall. That they are thus equipped in a majority of cases, it would be rash to assert.

When, a generation ago, the attacks on the faith of the Catholics in Ireland came from the Anglican Church, the peasant of that time, who could but read, as he was taught in a hedge school, had imbibed a stronger love of his faith, and was better able to answer objections to it, better able to retort arguments on his tempter or assailant, than the pupils of many of our schools are, although they are conducted on the most approved systems of pedagogics by teachers trained in normal schools. The young must be taught not in dull dry forms; they must be interested in their religion, and their enthusiasm awakened, so that their hearts shall be strong and their heads supplied with arguments to defend their faith and

put the scoffers to flight. They should be trained never to be ashamed of their faith, but to confess and maintain it.

Christian marriage, as the world has known it, is the creation of the Catholic Church taught by her divine founder. Typifying the union of Christ and his Church, matrimony, raised to a sacrament, rose above the marriage of the Hebrews, and far above the ideas of marriage that prevailed among the most cultured of heathen nations. By Christian marriage woman was exalted from the position of a slave or a chattel to a higher and nobler sphere. One of the objects of the Reformation was to drag her down to the Pagan level, and we see this indicated only too clearly in their almost instantaneous change of the Ten Commandments, rejecting the ordinary and later form of Scripture, to make men learn one that made the wife less than her husband's house and little more than his ox. The Catholic indissolubility of marriage was rejected and divorces were allowed. At first, the causes were few, and restrictions were many; now, as irreligion and impiety advance, attempts are made to make marriage a merely temporary union, voidable at will. To the Catholic no divorce is possible; the union he contracts is indissoluble. Death alone can set either of a married pair free to marry again. No decree of court, no act of parliament or legislature, can justify a Catholic in re-marrying. It is a matter of consolation that, in the many works and articles, now called forth by the terrible license of divorce prevailing in this country, and the no less fearful immorality which must precede these divorces, writers unanimously acknowledge that divorces are almost unknown among Catholics. We have many of our people in this country who, led away by temptation, fall into evil courses, and neglect the worship of God, the sacraments, all religious acts; yet among even these there is a horror of divorce which will bring its reward.

It is one of the great dangers of mixed marriages, that the Catholic party may be abandoned by the non-Catholic, who goes through the form of procuring a State divorce, and re-marries. A sadder position can scarcely be conceived than that of the forsaken Catholic.

The Church always taught her children to love poverty, and by her religious orders, which specially professed it, preached constantly against the making haste to be rich, which is the absorbing passion of men in our time, and leads to a host of the daily crimes around us.

The Church, too, taught the necessity of mortification and self-control, and in her clergy and religious gave living lessons, while she blessed the holy union of man and wife as no other faith has ever done.

The breaking away from this salutary teaching in these two great points, even from the views of political economy, has been productive of so much sin and vice that the wisdom of the Church justifies itself.

Christian marriage leads to the Christian home, and the Council urges all Catholics to sanctify the home by family prayer, by pious reading, by the expulsion of all indelicate ornaments or pictures. A Catholic home should be recognized by all who enter it: the library should be stocked with good books, solid and popular works, to make the members of the family firm in their faith, and proof against the sophistries of the day. The Council especially encourages the cultivation, in families, of American history. "As we desire that the history of the United States should be carefully taught in all our Catholic schools, and have directed that it be especially dwelt upon in the education of the young ecclesiastical students in our preparatory seminaries, so, also, we desire that it form a favorite part of the home library and home reading. We must keep firm and solid the liberties of our country, by keeping fresh the noble memories of the past, and thus sending forth from our Catholic homes, into the arena of public life, not partisans but patriots."

The history of our country was first written by men too ignorant or too biassed to do full justice to the Catholic element; but the truth is becoming clearer, and our history is one that Catholics can read with patriotic pride. The organization of Catholic historical societies at this moment shows that the desire for cultivating the annals of our favored land was felt among the laity, as it was by the asembled Bishops and theologians.

The Council encourages the reading of the Holy Scriptures as translated and annotated by Bishop Challoner and Dr. Haydock; and call upon Catholics to sustain a healthy Catholic press.

The Pastoral ends these exhortations with solemn words. "Beloved Brethren, a great social revolution is sweeping over the world. Its purpose, hidden or avowed, is to dethrone Christ and religion. The ripples of the movement have been observed in our country. God grant that its tidal-wave may not break over us.

"Upon you, Christian parents, it mainly depends whether it shall or not; for such as our homes are, such shall our people be. We beseech you, therefore, to ponder carefully all the various constituents of a true Christian home, and to the utmost of your ability to carry them into effect. And we entreat all pastors of souls to bear unceasingly in mind that upon the Christian school and the Christian homes in their parishes must mainly depend the fruit of their priestly labors. Let them concentrate their efforts on these two points—to make the schools and the homes what they ought to

be; then indeed will they carry to the Lord of the harvest, full and ripe sheaves, and the future generations will bless them for transmitting unimpaired the priceless gifts of faith and religion."

The Council raises its voice against the increasing disregard of the Lord's Day, and while discountenancing the gloomy, puritanical methods of regarding it, urges Catholics to sanctify the day, and to take no part in any movements tending to a relaxation of the observance of Sunday. It especially singles out the sale of liquors, and implores all Catholics never to take part in such Sunday traffic, nor to patronize or countenance it. The temperance cause, indeed, receives its warmest commendation.

The great question of authorized and forbidden societies is brought to a position where its solution is easy, and the words of the Pastoral ought to be at the head of the editorial page of every Catholic newspaper, and in every prayer book and catechism used by the faithful. Of societies not formally condemned by the Church it says:

"If any society's obligation be such as to bind its members to secrecy, even when rightly questioned by competent authority, then such a society puts itself outside the limits of approval; and no one can be a member of it, and at the same time be admitted to the sacraments of the Catholic Church. The same is true of any organization that binds its members to a promise of blind obedience to accept in advance, and to obey whatsoever orders, lawful or unlawful, may emanate from its chief authorities; because such a promise is contrary both to reason and to conscience. And if a society works or plots against the Church, or against lawful authorities, then to be a member of it is to be excluded from the membership of the Catholic Church." These authoritative rules, therefore, ought to be the guide of all Catholics in their relation with societies. No Catholic can conscientiously join, or continue in, a body in which he knows that any of these condemned features exist.

Every encouragement is given to Catholic societies, the pious sodalities and confraternities, the great missionary aid societies, "The Association for the Propagation of the Faith" and the "Holy Childhood," societies for works of charity and education, for encouraging temperance. And in order to acknowledge the great amount of good that the "Catholic Young Men's National Union" has already accomplished, to promote the growth of the Union, and to stimulate its members to greater efforts in the future, the Fathers of the Council cordially bless their aims and endeavors, and recommend the Union to all our Catholic young men.

The Pastoral closes with an appeal to the missionary spirit

among our people to elicit aid for foreign missions, and especially for the conversion of the Indians and Negroes in our own land.

This letter is worthy of the assembled Catholic hierarchy. It meets the great wants and dangers of our time, and especially those which beset the flock committed to their care. Its warnings and counsels are all inspired by faith, and should be pondered and kept by all, for we have fallen upon evil times, and, as the Pastoral truly says: The legislation of the Council is not intended to impose burdens or limitations on the faithful, but, on the contrary, to enlarge, and secure to them "the liberty of the children of God."

WHAT IS A LIBERAL EDUCATION?

THE faculty of Harvard has been the scene of some lively discussions within the last twelve months. The subject of dispute has been liberal education—what it means, and how it works. If its working effects were clearer, its meaning might be plain. Accordingly, the debate in the faculty has taken throughout this practical, every-day shape. What is the good of a liberal education? What does it do?

In the event of its doing less than it assumes, the proposal is made not to modify the name, but, retaining that, to modify the course which the name thus far has denoted. The study of the classics, which thus far have formed the staple of a liberal education, might be judiciously abridged, if not entirely excluded; while a number of practical studies, which have been steadily asserting their claims to recognition, might forthwith be honored with the title of liberal studies, and take rank as elements in a polite education.

In January last the party favoring progress in this direction had made a lively onset upon Greek, which was the more obnoxious element in classical studies, when a new turn was given to the fortunes of the debate by an appeal to recent facts reported from Germany.

The data supplied by the German universities tended to support the cause of Greek and Latin in a manner quite forcible and new. We may have occasion to specify them further on. Meanwhile, the answers put forward to rebut the charges were, that the alleged

experience of the German universities in their ten years' trial of the anti-classical programme was too insignificant an experiment to be really a telling argument; that, even granting the force of the argument for Germany, it held only there, not in America; that in America learning is not worth much if it does not help one to get money; that the classics are unpractical and therefore un-American; and something else can be studied in our colleges at the cost of the same time, but with a yield of more profit. Such were the answers of the anti-Greek part, as we were informed by the Boston *Globe* of that date. Professor Goodwin and John Williams White were the warmest supporters of Greek, and most of the classical instructors agreed with them. President Eliot and Professor J. P. Cooke were strongest in opposition.

A little while afterwards a lecture was delivered by Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard, before the members of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, an institution shaped exactly on the programme advocated by the anti-classical party. And we need scarcely add that the lecture put forward all the claims of the scientists, with all the personal ability of the eminent chemist.

He does not distinguish any heads of argument; but after some preliminaries, he advances the different studies which he should be happy to see favored; he argues in their behalf; and thus establishes his first proposition, "that the number of school and college studies admissible with equal weight or rank," for the degree of B.A., which completes a liberal education, "needs to be much enlarged." From this first proposition two others are easily deduced. "Secondly, that among admissible subjects a considerable range of choice should be allowed from an earlier age than that at which choice is now generally permitted, and thirdly, that the existing order of studies should be changed in important respects."

If we may be allowed to advance our views on the subject of a liberal education, we shall naturally choose to begin with the essential idea conveyed in the term itself. And as this undertaking calls to its aid the traditional support of history which records the enlightened usage of mankind, we shall be quite willing, if space allows, to follow the president into the arena of past history, when he betakes himself thither to invalidate the arguments of the classicists. This, however, must lead us no farther than the state of the question demands.

I.

The term education may be taken to cover two things, which are quite distinct in themselves; but which, distinct as they are, undergo an absolute fusion into one whenever the scientific school uses the term. It means either a general education or a special education; either general formative studies, or specializing profes-

sional studies; either the roots and stem of a mind's complete formation, or the ramifications of specific energies; finally, either the bringing out of essential faculties in a boy's mind, or, letting essential faculties take care of themselves, the shaping of his thoughts and his actions into a certain groove. In the one case, the former of the two, we have a general result, a strengthening of fundamental qualities, a solid sub-structure of the mind for any superstructure of complementary science; in the other case, which is the latter of the two, we have a definite constraining, once for all, towards the purposes of a narrow object. In the former, primary powers are enlarged to receive all subsequent stores; in the latter, they are set at once to gather what they may, in almost all the details of business. A thousand fitnesses are conceived and developed, in the former case, for all thought, labor and life; in the latter, all the potency of the mind is fastened on and fixed, before being rightly unfolded.

> The spring is past, and yet it hath not sprung;
> The fruit is dead, and yet the leaves are green.

If we mistake not, these ideas are pretty distinct; and a clear discernment of the two goes far towards settling the question. One is the general education, which sensitizes the powers for anything; the other is the special training which fixes them for life. The anti-classical school of scientists have heard of this distinction, over and over again; that is clear from the manner of their defence. But it is just as clear that they fail to comprehend it. They use the very words of the objèction, showing that the words at least have made an impression; yet there seems to prevail a general lack of intelligence as to the real distinctness of the distinction alleged; as if the specializing studies might be made to do the work of the general studies; as if the defining work of a particular science might be made to do service for an enlarging general education; and, in short, as if, in the case of a boy, the same work could be done by the same process as in the case of a man who, being already mature, may develop specialities and generalities together. The boy, as being immature, must do one or other at a time: he cannot do both. If he attempts both, he forfeits at least the general education for life.

In the spirit of this confusion the following passage of the lecture was conceived: "We may be sure," says the president of Harvard, "that the controlling intellectual forces of the actual world, century by century, penetrate educational processes, and that languages, literature, philosophies or sciences, which show themselves fruitful and powerful, must win recognition as liberal arts and proper means of mental discipline." The meaning, as determined by the context, is that, because any language, literature, philosophy, or

science becomes fruitful and powerful, that is, professionally useful as a special branch, it has a right to win recognition as a true liberal study, as a proper means of mental discipline, as a genuine course of general education.

This is just the principle underlying the whole plea for admitting political economy, science, modern tongues, and other such elements, into the place and station thus far held by the classics. It is on the assumption that the classics on one side, and such branches on the other as political economy, are all on the same stage, all on the same level; and one set of scenes can be shifted off and another set moved on, without the least modification of the educational scaffolding, without the least fundamental difference to the boy's mind. But we shall undertake to show, after a while, what is meant by the classics; while, if we wish to know what is meant by political economy and the other candidates for office, we shall only have to consult the president's lecture, where he shows them off on their own merits. In the meantime, to dwell upon this point of the scientific confusion which the anti-classical party render singularly conspicuous, the president goes on to say with emphasis: "To my mind, the only justification of any kind of discipline, training, or drill, is the attainment of the appropriate end of that discipline. It is a waste for society, and an outrage upon the individual, to make a boy spend the years when he is most teachable, in a discipline the end of which he can never reach, when he might have spent them in a different discipline which would have been rewarded with achievement. Herein lies the fundamental reason for options." What does this mean? It means simply that general education, which he styles "a discipline, the end of which the boy can never reach," does not yield the results of special studies, which he calls "a discipline that would have been rewarded with achievement;" and it means that if you wish to have the professional achievement resulting from professional studies, you must have professional training. In which passage, it is evident, he ignores any end or achievement except professional, special, partial success; and, naturally enough, since general studies, liberal formation, universal culture does not lead to such a partial end, the classics are put down as "a discipline, the end which the boy can never reach." But here we do not know what to deny, whether we should object to such a definition of the classics or should deprecate such a confusion of the two methods of training. Perhaps we had better do both, and proceed forthwith to set both points in their true and proper light.

We say, then, that the needs existing in a boy's mind call for general education, not for special training. His powers, unfolding in all directions, demand an instrument of development in all di-

rections. If this general unfolding be first secured, and the special training follow after, you will enjoy the results of both; and, what is more, the results of the special training will be intensified in value, while the time and patience expended will be notably abridged, as the recent experiment of the German universities has abundantly proved. But if the special training comes instead of the general culture, and not after it, you will enjoy only the special results, and those stunted, dwarfed, with no amplitude of organic growth, and fair-seeming symmetry of branches and foliage; with no spreading out of roots, under a broad trunk, which then ramifies as its vitality prompts and its surroundings invite. In such a growth of the boy's mind thus unfairly curtailed, there is no suppleness of general powers—we might say, there are no general powers worth speaking of;—no memory cultivated throughout its potential vastness, and capable of every kind of yield; no imagination cultured with all the life and sentiments of humanity, in thought, action and history. The capacious intellect energizes with but a small scattering of seed; though the seeds within reach, and sown in a truly liberal education, are as varied in kind as the lives and thoughts of other men have been manifold and instructive; and though the same seeds give promise of being at least as prolific in the boy's future as all the needs of his mature life can ever be widely exacting. But there is to be none of all this, or very little. Instead, a degree of compression is exerted on the struggling mind, a coercion is put upon it. Its future is shipped as on the track of a railroad, from which it may never more be stirred except at the cost of some catastrophe,—that kind of catastrophe which now we witness every day when minds of the finest powers attempt to reason outside of their own little specialty, and, passing over from science, go floundering about in logic, or making an excursion from chemistry cut singular figures in philosophy, or taking a recess in veterinary surgery utter pronouncements in Christian divinity, or, finally, looking up from political statistics deliver an opinion on classics and belles lettres. There is one mark and stamp about all their unprofessional efforts, and that is narrowness, no matter how unconscious; ineffectiveness, albeit ever so self-sufficient; and conceited feebleness, except in the line of one exaggerated development. We daily behold this only too palpably prominent in the cast of the scientific minds around us. Their shape recalls to the mind a forest-tree, which, having been shut up in a state of duress vile, under the thick shade of its elders, protrudes violently upwards through the leafy canopy of darkness into some solitary hole of the sky.

Using, then, the elegant comparison of Père Cahour, we may say that, in the edifice of the sciences, as in physical constructions, the

foundation is the same for all the orders of architecture. The special form of palaces and of temples, of fortresses and of churches, though intended from the first, does not in effect appear until the edifice rises; and, the higher it is intended to rise, the slower is the laying of that common foundation. Thus it is that the amplitude of science does not develop its characteristics of speciality, save as the result of advancing years. Neither in childhood nor in impressionable boyhood should the mind be constrained by anticipation to that which may yet be the spontaneous outgrowth of its further development. Nor, on the other hand, when nature and art are allowed to have their way, should this amplitude be expected too soon; for then it would fail to be spontaneous and healthy. D'Alembert and the Encyclopædists ran into this error of forcing on the young an encyclopædic vastness; the scientists run into the former error of sacrificing the integrity of a whole body to their fancy about some limb.

Mr. Matthew Arnold, moralizing on this topic in a somewhat pleasant vein, doubts whether his best impressions of history would have been notably improved by learning from distinguished scientists that his ancestors were of the biped kind, probably arboreal in their habits. Even the eminent president of the Royal Society betrays, with all his fixity of view on the physical basis of life and protoplasmic theories generally, that he is not quite dead to the æstheticism of a boy's life, and to the true meaning of culture and general education. Describing how the classics might be taught, he throws no little spirit into the description. He says: "If the classics were taught as they might be taught; if boys and girls were instructed in Latin and Greek not merely as languages, but as illustrations of philological science; if a vivid picture of life on the shores of the Mediterranean, two thousand years ago, were imprinted on the mind of scholars; if ancient history were taught, not as a weary series of feuds and fights, but traced to its causes in such men under such conditions; if, lastly, the study of the classical books were followed in such a manner as to impress boys with their beauties, and with the grand simplicity of their statement of the everlasting problems of human life, instead of with their verbal and grammatical peculiarities—." This, no doubt, is a vivid description from so declared an opponent as Professor Huxley; its shortcomings on the subject of philology and grammar we may touch on hereafter; in the meantime, let us hear the Professor out: these conditions being fulfilled, he still thinks the classics should not form the basis of a liberal education. What, then, should? Here the Professor is not distinct. He leaves it, however, to be understood from the context that commercial statistics and engineering interests would fill up the requirements of a liberal education.

But with a truer appreciation of the question, on its own proper merits, though with as false a philosophy of human life behind it as any of the scientific schools could propound, M. Taine discerns in the pursuit of classical studies some of those genuine elements which constitute their vitality, their actuality on the impressionable mind of youth. In the reading of a Greek tragedy, that frame of mind, he considers, will do justice to it, that liberal conception which realizes the men and the things, the place and the time—those men who lived under a glowing sky, face to face with the most noble landscapes, in sight of the Mediterranean, blue and lustrous as a silken tunic, with islands rising from it like masses of marble; and add to these, he says, "twenty select phrases from Plato and Aristophanes. Behold the Greeks within a lovely landscape, on a bright and laughing sea-coast, enticed to navigation and commerce, exempt from gross cravings of the stomach, inclined from the beginning to social ways, to a settled organization of the state, to feelings and dispositions such as develop the art of oratory, the talent for enjoyment, the inventions of science, letters and arts."

If this sketch, as far as it goes, is a correct literary estimate of certain elements in the study of Greek, we might borrow, in like manner, the exalted appreciation which a philosophical or a diplomatic spirit could form of the Grecian literature. Mr. Allies could explain to us why that little body of states, covering the ground of a modern county or two, described and analyzed in a few books of Thucydides and a few speeches of Demosthenes, have been found adequate to furnish future ages with a philosophy of society and politics, about broad enough to guide a modern president or premier. But, this not being the point before us, we shall pass on from the clear distinction between a general education and a special training; and we take up the discussion next in order. That shall be about the proper instrument wherewith to operate a general or liberal education; whether such instrument is to be a literature or a science; and, if a literature, whether it is to be any other than the Grecian and the Roman.

II.

Here some words of M. Taine may do us the service of introducing us into the question. He says: "Literary works are instructive because they are beautiful; their utility grows with their perfection, and, if they furnish documents, it is because they are monuments. The more a book represents visible sentiments, the more it is a work of literature; for the office of literature is to take note of sentiments. The more a book represents important sentiments, the higher is its place in literature; for it is by representing

the mode of being of a whole nation and of a whole age, that a writer rallies round him the sympathies of an entire age and an entire nation. This is why, amid the writings that set before our eyes the sentiments of preceding generations, a literature, and notably a grand literature, is incomparably the best. It resembles that admirable apparatus of extraordinary sensibility by which physicians disentangle and measure the most recondite and delicate changes of a body."

For the sake of simplicity, we shall establish the two propositions together: that only a literature is the adequate instrument for general or liberal education, and that the classic literatures, notably the Greek, are the choicest amongst all.

A literature is to be distinguished from a language. If the description which is credited to Proudhon is correct, the language of a people is the sum total of its native ideas, the encyclopædia which Providence reveals to it from the first. There is a little anecdote, by the way, that the same atheist, Proudhon, expressed his regret at finding the idea of God so much a native in his own tongue; since he was compelled to use that idea to keep up his style. We say, now, that literature is more than language. To speak precisely, it means not only the language and all the native ways thereof, its turns of thought, idiom and the like, but also the whole product of thought and sentiment which has actually been gathered up in the course of time and vested in the garb of that tongue. To test the reality of this distinction, we have only to translate from one tongue into another. What remains of the former, out of which the translation is made? Nothing whatever of the tongue; but still a large amount of the literature. We say, only a large amount of the literature remains, and not all. For that which is finest and most delicate, that which is most individual, the features, shape, complexion of the thoughts expressed, is unavoidably lost in stripping it of its native garb. Slight as these elements are, they resemble mastertouches in a painting, most difficult to impart, most easy to lose. They are not copied. To be enjoyed they must be seized in the original. But, notwithstanding this loss, the literature is preserved in all that is solid. The process of translating hands over into another tongue all the solid contents of positive truth, proposition, proof. A translation of the finest literary piece may be about as good as the copy of a masterpiece, but no more.

Now all the generations have enjoyed a laugh at the expense of the Consul Mummius, who, on shipping the statues of Corinth to Rome, is reported to have stipulated with the merchantmen that, should any of the statues be injured in the way across the sea, the same should be replaced by others just as good. We do not know

whether the generations shall not have a right to be amused at the wisdom of the scientific school, which now gravely informs us that "the English literature is beyond all comparison the amplest, most various and most splendid literature which the world has ever seen"; and why so? Because "to the original creations of English genius are to be added *translations* into English of all the masterpieces of other literatures, sacred and profane." That is one reason assigned. The other two are interesting; the next being, that the English literature is *immense*. "How does it stand now," asks the president, "with its immense array of poets, philosophers, historians, commentators, critics, satirists, dramatists, novelists, orators?" To our mind, the newspaper alone, especially in America, is superlatively immense. The third reason is that which has a right to cap any climax, a national and utilitarian argument: "It is the native tongue of nations which are preëminent in the world by force of character, enterprise and wealth."

Discarding English as the great lever for elevating the youthful mind, unless it have something more to say for itself than the president has advanced in its behalf, we beg to say a word now for Latin and Greek; which, unfortunately for the credit of our author's estimate on the subject, would seem to have no value whatever, to judge by all that he allows them. It is a presumption in their favor, that prejudice should so clearly be operating against them. And for any chemist or palæontologist, at this stage of the world, lightly to reverse the verdict of the ages in so very essential a matter, is a dangerous part to play—dangerous for his literary credit.

The ancient tongues of Greece and Italy come down to us charged with all the historic memories of antiquity, as well sacred as profane; with all the masterpieces of eloquence and poetry belonging to three great epochs, those of Pericles, Augustus, and the founding of Christianity; with all human philosophy, from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, down to St. Thomas Aquinas, and further down to Leibnitz and Newton, both of them men of classical letters; in fine, these tongues come down to us with all the traditions, all the beliefs, all the divinity of Christendom. Under a literary aspect the eloquence and poetry of Greece were the mistress of Latin excellence. Under a philological aspect, the Latin tongue has been the principal base of our modern languages, as formed in the history of Christendom.

Now, what does education mean? Let us recall what we said above. If it consists in bringing out the undeveloped nature of a boy; in bringing him into contact with various elements of richest thought; in favoring his inquiring eyes with glimpses of human life, individual, social or political; if it is to make him feel the finest springs of human sentiment, as touched by the greatest

masters of expression, and that in a language the most delicately organized and the most perfectly elaborated of all tongues living or extinct,—if this is education, endeavoring to unfold the little capacities of the boy's soul to the measure of mighty minds, and to feed his curious genius with the best product of great thinkers, who will designate an instrument for the purpose to be compared with the classic literature of Greece; or where will an arbiter of that boy's future be found to compare with the master, guiding and measuring, directing and controlling, correcting and supplementing the entire process?

Whether the literature be Latin or Greek, the deadness of the language is a distinct advantage. Even if it be spoken as if it were living, yet the advantage remains; for everything has to be learned by rule and formula. It is not the language of the nursery and of common life; and, therefore, it is not picked up without reflection, by dint of mere instinct. The relations of grammar and of logic must be attended to with deliberation. Thought and judgment are constantly exercised in assigning the exact equivalents in the vernacular for every phrase in the original. The coincidence of construction is too little, and the community of idiomatic thought too remote, for the boy's mind to catch at the idea by force of a preëstablished harmony. Only the law of thought and logic guides him, with a competent teacher to reassure his developing sense. Thus far, and farther still, the mere page of a dead language affords a distinct advantage; and if the lexicon has still to be used by an old professor, as C. F. Adams complained in his own case, that is no discredit either to the language or to him. But to have the dead language spoken is not to lessen the advantage; it is to expedite the work. It is not to make the dead tongue a living one, but to study the dead after the manner of the living, and to retain the advantages of the former without the drawbacks of the latter. This is to be thorough and expeditious together.

With grammar thus understood, or, as Professor Huxley expressed it, with "verbal and grammatical peculiarities" thus mastered, you may hope to have philologists. With the principles of great minds thus deliberately unearthed, you may hope to have philosophers. With so much rational labor expended, you may count on intellectual nerve and sinew. With the rays of all the fine arts streaming in through all the avenues of the finest literatures, you may hope to accomplish a liberal education.

From all this two consequences follow, relative to statements made by the anti-classical school; one with regard to the amount of labor expended; the other with regard to the permanence of any system adopted for conducting a liberal education.

In the first place, it is said, "If a language is to be learned, I

would teach it in the easiest known method, and at the age when it can be easiest learned." To this remark of President Eliot we content ourselves with returning, by way of answer, an equally general observation of Père Daniel: "Easy methods ruin us. If we do not reëstablish the ancient system of teaching in its integrity, at all events let us not open the door to a general do-as-you-like (an American might be permitted to say "letting things slide"); let us not content ourselves in grammatical studies with results just so-so—results inevitable if we deprive these studies of their classical character." We know there are persons amongst us who practically take the anti-classical view, while imagining they are classicists; they say, "How will you control this matter in practice, and prevent us from drifting into the utilitarian principle, or elevate us from the utilitarian practice, if we are lodged there? These theories are high." To which we answer: Never was practice lower than when it strove to bring theory down to itself; for then there is no resurrection. Moreover, we are discussing only theory now; the practice may be considered anon.

In the second place, it is thought that no system of liberal studies can be permanent, or fitted for all times, because, observes the President, "the educational value of any established study, far from being permanently fixed, is constantly changing, as new knowledge accumulates and new sciences come into being." And he considers those who differ from him to be "thoughtless and ignorant people," classing among such the quondam master of Trinity, W. Whewell, who "did not hesitate to apply to these three studies," Latin, Greek and the old mathematics, "the word *permanent*." But, we reply, if the problem is always the same, the answer must be the same; if the one is permanent, so is the other. The problem is, how to develop a human mind. If the human mind is constant, and if its development has a fixed meaning, there must be, morally speaking, some best way, or some approximately best way, of developing that human mind.

III.

Having vindicated our own principles, we can now afford to review the special pleadings of the scientists. This we shall do; but it is worth while first to see their peculiar manner of pleading. The style of logic which they use is an important element, which we may criticise first. Then we shall take up the special subjects for which they plead.

Their style of logic is reduced to one set of principles, utility, money, convenience. Thus, when Whewell condemns, for many reasons, the modern analytical mathematics, and denies its claim to be a permanent study by which the reason of man is to be

educated, and insists that the old geometrical forms of mathematics must be especially preserved and maintained, as essentially requisite for this office, the following brief answer is returned: "The modern analytical mathematics, thus condemned by Whewell, is practically the only mathematics now in common use in the United States." This answer is singularly wide of the mark, unless the question is to be determined by utility, by the mere practical argument, that the use of it is an accomplished fact, and there is an end of the question. What we want just now is something different; it is a rational account, a philosophical reason, an explanation from the "inwardness" of things, why analytical mathematics, if they hold a place, have a right to hold it. But the answer is, they hold it, and that is all. Certainly a practical view!

Such a method of logic explains why we meet with no very troublesome arguments to analyze in the opposition to the classics, nothing but assertion, repetition, and "practical utility." We distinguish practical from liberal utility, as the special from the general, the professional from the broad and fundamental utility, in which alone, as we have tried to show above, true liberal education consists.

That we make no mistake in the value of this distinction between the narrow utilitarianism and the broad utility of a wide fundamental education, is sufficiently evidenced by the unconscious admissions which we meet with here. The president of Harvard admits that to use such a staple of argument as mere practical utilitarianism, is derogatory to the dignity of such a discussion. Thus, when arguing for French and German, he says: "This claim rests not on the *usefulness* of these languages to couriers, tourists, or commercial travellers, but on the magnitude and worth of the literatures, and on the unquestionable fact that facility in reading these languages is absolutely *indispensable* to a scholar, whatever may be his department of study." Then, after dwelling at length on the manifold uses, possible and actual, of French and German, on their "indispensableness" to "philologists, archæologists, metaphysicians, physicians, physicists, naturalists, chemists, economists, engineers, architects, artists, and musicians," he proceeds thus: "I urge no utilitarian argument, but rest the claims of French and German, for admission to complete academic equality, on the copiousness and merit of the literatures, and the *indispensableness* of the languages to all scholars." In short, the eminent chemist urges no utilitarian argument, but he urges the argument of utilitarianism. For, as to the copiousness and merit of the literatures, he says not another word on

either, though that were a legitimate ground on which to rest the question.

Further on, he argues for the introduction into a liberal education of political economy, or public economics. He describes it as being related to three distinct sciences, which, singularly enough, he seems to rank as coördinate—history, the accumulation of wealth, and ethics. This new science of political economy had better, he thinks, be called the science of the health of nations; it includes industrial, social, and political problems; and it is by far the most complex and difficult of the sciences of which modern education has to take account. Indeed, he goes on to say, it requires such exactness of statement, such accurate weighing of premises, and such closeness of reasoning, that many young men of twenty, who have been disciplined by the study of Greek, Latin, and mathematics for six or eight years, find that it tasks their utmost powers. Now, after this forcible description, the president continues: "Neither can it be justly called a material or utilitarian subject; for it is full of grave moral problems, and deals with many questions of public honor and duty." To this remark the most obvious rejoinder is: Neither can it be called anything but a utilitarian and material subject, for it deals with wealth, health, industry, population, and the like, as the writer abundantly shows. If it touches on anything else, as public honor and duty, it is for the same reason that whatever deals with anything human remotely touches all things human, for human nature is always one. But that does not make all sciences one; nor raise a utilitarian statistician to the dignity of an ethical philosopher; nor exalt a New England farmer tilling his fields with great thought and judgment to the dignity of a metaphysician reasoning out a question with profound judgment and thought; nor make a science of public economics precisely the means to develop a boy's mind, cultivate his imagination, and ennoble his heart.

We might exhibit still farther the utilitarian vein of argument and thought, in which alone the members of this anti-classical school know how to indulge. But perhaps their apologetic sensitiveness, lest they be thought thus to indulge, may serve as a full confession that it is not a line of logic admissible on the present topic. This being established as to their style of argumentation, we may consider now what pleas they advance for their new and special branches.

Analytical mathematics comes first. This exact science is, as we have seen, already in possession of the ground; it is found in the curriculum of polite studies. But that need not prevent us from analyzing its merits, and seeing what claim it has to an educational value. We say, then, that a professor of the exact sciences,

taken in general, need not be a man who educates. He may be eminent in his own science; but whether eminent or not, he does not, therefore, educate. If he is eminent, he has a special genius. If he is an ordinarily good professor, for instance in mathematics, he must have a certain sum of natural talents and acquired knowledge. But this sum of qualities, says Père Cahour, is not equal to the sum which makes a good professor of belles lettres. Eloquence and poetry demand a spirit accomplished in point of intelligence, sensibility, and imagination, and, besides, they call for literary, historical, and philosophical knowledge of no small extent. Algebra and geometry, in their ordinary courses, require, on the side of the professor, and impart to the pupil, only penetration and justness of perception; and whatever collateral knowledge is involved may be found within the limits of certain formulas and demonstrations which are contained, cut and dried, in the pages of mathematical books. This one fact shows the value of all that vaunted exactness which, as far as it is an exactness, is an excellence, but as far as it is nothing else, and has nothing to do with anything else, with probabilities for example,—and what is human life but a mass of probabilities and moral possibilities and uncertainties?—is nothing but a narrowness, tending to beget a narrow and stiff habit of thought amid the ever-changing circumstances of life. The practical world has a horror of men who know how to reason only by abstract rules and scientific premises, and who despise with a lofty contempt the uncertain realities of poor human existence,—nay, not poor human existence, but beautiful human existence, with its yielding and obliging moral laws of public and private mutual deference. Only the eternal laws of essential morality are rigid in the anatomy of life. But the stereotyped exactness imparted and learnt in the scientific demonstration would make everything rigid—lines, minds, men, and all existence. There is no development of a boy's humanity about it. The gamut of a peal of bells might as well be taken to represent the thousand inflections and tones of a human voice, as that a mathematical training should be supposed to represent or to effect the education of a human soul. We are prone to compare it with the study of law; and we could imagine Cicero saying to a mathematician what he said to the lawyer Sulpicius, that, if he were provoked any more, he would learn the whole of that science in three days!

And, to say a word in particular of analytical mathematics, it may be that great minds understand the subject, and are educationally helped by its use. But, candidly, we doubt whether, educationally speaking, the minds of ordinary mortals are much assisted that way. They can follow the processes intellectually

only a few paces from shore, through a few coefficients, a power or two, one or other factor, and then—one is beyond depth in a sea of manipulation, among high powers, multifarious factors, involved in a few larger brackets, and the whole wrapped up in a cube radical, with an imaginary or surd to sparkle somewhere in the trappings. What can save a man the credit of any intelligence but fidelity to a blind mechanical manipulation? And only amid the last results may light begin to beam again, when we heave within sight of land, and within reach of some plain and simplified formulas, which we just find breath enough left us to interpret. It is capital work in its results. But, as a process, and an educational process, it reminds us only of those dull-looking compositions which, when rightly tipped and rightly mounted, are able, on the application of a spark, to shoot forth light, color, and brilliancy into the far-off skies of the night. The firmament itself can stand revealed in the final illumination of Kepler's laws. But the manufacture up to that point was anything but an illumination for the intelligence; it was the manipulation of factory work. Now, is this an education for the young? Either, therefore, as Whewell rightly observes, apply the geometry of Euclid, which step by step the boy understands, or let us at least have none of your modern mathematics vaunted as an educational power. It is a mechanism for making machines.

Whence it comes that anything like breadth or depth of view, such as mark profundity and genius, is very much out of place in the ordinary chairs of mathematics; and those only are effective men for preparing students to pass examinations, who are methodical men, in the sense of being men who prefer to repeat the science of others, and are strictly devoted to accepted demonstrations and formulas. They are more successful in their teaching, according as they are more simple in their set of expressions, more unchanging in the proofs commonly employed, more circumscribed in keeping to the stereotyped propositions.

We proceed to the natural sciences. The plea put forward for them is on the ground that natural science investigation "spreads abroad the only spirit in which any kind of knowledge can be prosecuted to a result of lasting intellectual value." This is "the patient, cautious, sincere, self-directing spirit of natural science." We do not venture to deny this. We imagine that every branch of knowledge has something to recommend it, not only in its products, but in its method. And however much personally we might be enamored of a chorus in Æschylus, or a speech in Thucydides, we are still willing to admit that the patient, cautious, sincere, self-directing spirit necessary to guide one through the chorus or the speech, might quite possibly be improved still more

by turning to the natural sciences, and exercising the same virtues on the back of a diatom under the microscope. There is no limit to the exercise of those precious virtues, patience, caution, perseverance. But just at present, in this educational question, we are inquiring whether natural science has anything else to recommend it; and whether boys have all the desirable time for it. Grave persons recommend it as a recreation to distract the minds of hard students. Cardinal Wiseman commended geological excursions for students to exercise themselves in the fresh air. But now we are not talking of recreation; rather of study and education. And this is the place to adduce the experience recently acquired in the German universities. The facts are briefly as follows:

The Prussian *realschulen* of the first rank differ from the *gymnasia* in this, that the realschule entirely dispenses with Greek in its course of study, and reduces the time devoted to Latin by about one-half. They differ besides in other minor respects. In 1869, the royal minister of public instruction issued a decree granting to subjects of Prussia, who had completed the full course of study in a realschule of the first rank, the right to enter the philosophical faculty of the academical department—that is to say, they were admitted into any Prussian university as having matriculated. This decree was issued in spite of general opinion called for by the minister, and communicated by the faculties interested. The faculties opposed the scheme, but they had to submit. Ten years later, in the year 1880, the philosophical faculty of the Royal Frederick William University sends in to the minister a report of such a nature as to be styled by a distinguished American scholar "the most powerful plea ever made on behalf of the classics." There is nothing vague about the testimony of the different professors. The representatives of the mathematical branches say "that the students of mathematics who have been prepared in the gymnasia, in spite of the fact that less time has been given in the gymnasium to this branch than in the realschule, are nevertheless, as a rule, superior to their fellow students from the realschule in scientific impulse and apprehension, and in capacity for a deeper understanding of their science."

Professor Kammelberg's testimony is entirely corroborative. In the study of English the realschuler are not apt, for their Latin is poor; they have no Greek, and they are almost entirely lacking in acuteness of apprehension and independence of judgment. Professor Mullenhoff, of the German department, judges that "it is simply impossible for one who has been prepared in the realschule to acquire a satisfactory scientific education." And Professor Zeller says that the realschuler are often a source of embarrass-

ment to him, as many of his philosophical lectures are unintelligible to those who are not familiar with the Greek language.

Graduates of the realschulen are, almost without exception, found to be overtaken in the later semesters by students from the gymnasia. And the distinguished chemist, Dr. August W. Hofmann, on delivering his inaugural address as rector of the University of Berlin, cites it as his own experience, that he never heard a student from a gymnasium express a wish that he might have received his training at a realschule; but that he often meets young men prepared at a realschule who generally regret that they had never had part in the training of the gymnasium.

These are some of the facts relating to the German universities. And to speak of our own experience in the colleges of this country, the very same verdict must be given, and pretty nearly in all its particulars. The students of commercial courses are intellectually inferior to their compeers in the classical courses, though all other conditions may have been equally favorable. A graduate of a commercial course will lament his chances; or, if not yet finished, may pass over to the classical course. Post-graduate studies are unintelligible and uninviting to him. And, beyond this, there remains nothing to say in behalf of a scientific curriculum which has supplanted a classical formation.

We shall not dwell upon the other topics of the scientist's special pleading. We do but mention them. With respect to the English language, we say briefly that classical scholars are known as a rule to be the better masters of the vernacular. With respect to the English literature, if that is viewed on its utilitarian merits, it does not enter into this question; if it is viewed on its literary and educational merits, we have already seen that no claim is put forward in its behalf which would rank it anywhere near the classics. As to French and German, and other modern languages, we should venture an opinion that they are of such a formation, and such a relative bearing on the classical tongues, as to place them altogether within easy reach of any classical scholar. He can run over them, as surveyors run over a country, by a system of triangulation. Latin and English command French, and then more easily give a passport to Italian and Spanish. German can slip in readily, being remotely a mother tongue. As to political economy, it is, on the scientist's own showing, altogether unfit to be used as an educational power for boys. And yet, strange to say, a classical education will include it, in the way most fitted to boys. As a writer in *Blackwood* observes, commenting some years ago on Lord Lyttleton's letter to the University of Oxford regarding the study of Greek, "the laws of commerce lie in a classical education. Every great historian, as Thucydides, or orator, as Demosthenes,

furnishes countless opportunities for entering into the commercial elements of human association." Finally, history is an every-day element in the classics. Nor should a certain amount of all that is useful, arithmetic, modern languages, geography, and physical science, be omitted from the course. But this belongs to the practical aspect of the question, and that we have not treated.

To conclude, then, we resume with the conclusion of the president's lecture. He says: "If history proves that the staples of education have in fact changed, reason says still more clearly that they must change." To this historical and philosophical appeal of the scientific mind, confident in the integrity of its motives, we answer, confident in the integrity of our demonstration, that, as we might go on to show, history can prove the staples of education never to have changed; and as we have already shown, reason says more clearly still, that they never can change.

All the sciences are sisters, and there is amongst them a community of parentage and a community of resources. If justice is to be done to the sciences, as the means of ulterior progress, let a liberal education first do justice to the great literatures as a means of fundamental progress, and thereby do justice to the powers of the opening mind; in order that, its sensibility and imagination with its reason and intelligence being well cultivated in the time of youth, the opening mind may expand early to the beauty of the ideal world, and breathe in the atmosphere of the infinite; that in the early freshness which develops only in the sunshine of beautiful thought, the plastic soul may readily be formed to live from early years the life of truth. The noblest geometry and the sublimest astronomy will then find a congenial home in such a beautiful mind; for the true science of the exact mind is not divorced from the æsthetic beauties of the liberal mind. This is the permanent law of human development, as the nature of the mind is permanent, as truth is permanent, and religion and morality—all are permanent. They are no functions of the passing hour. Nor is liberal education any function of the latest passing scheme.

ST. THOMAS'S LATEST CRITIC.

The Philosophical System of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. Translated, with a Sketch of the Author's Life, Bibliography, Introduction, and Notes. By Thomas Davidson. London. 1882.

THE work here presented in an English dress is, the translator tells us in his preface, a "resumé of Rosmini's system, compiled by the author for Cantù's *Storia Universale*, accompanying it," he adds, "with explanations of my own and parallel passages from his longer works."

It is to that which is the translator's own, and mainly so much of it as touches upon St. Thomas's doctrine, that I desire to direct attention at present.

To those who, unlike Lessing and Sir William Hamilton, prize truth more than the search after truth, it must be a relief, after traversing the arid wastes of German transcendentalism, English agnosticism, and French positivism, to come into the fertile fields of Italian thought. The translator deserves well of the English reading public for having introduced to them even thus much of Rosmini's works, albeit Rosmini is far from the first of Italian philosophers. But as Dr. Pusey directed many to the pillar and ground of supernatural truth, while he himself was satisfied with a mere shadow, so may Mr. Davidson be instrumental in leading many an earnest inquirer after philosophic truth unto the luminous pages of the Angelic Doctor himself, the while berating scholasticism as a system of absurdities and contradictions.

Mr. Davidson may be a thorough classical scholar, a fair linguist, no mean philologist; but a philosopher he is not, and seems incapable of becoming, as may be seen by the reader anon.

Whoever cannot, from the existence of second causes, see the necessity of positing a first cause, can hardly lay claim to the slightest pretensions to philosophy. It is one thing to discourse glibly upon Greek literature, to give probable reasons for the possible origin and possible changes of words; but another and a very different thing to follow intelligently St. Thomas in his profound researches. St. Thomas deals not with possibilities or probabilities, but with certainties; not with mere words, but with truth.

An enthusiastic admirer of Rosmini, his translator is by no means prepared *jurare in verba magistri*. On page 246, Rosmini shows that, with the principle of causality, the mind cannot rest with second causes, which are all contingent, but must go back till

it arrives at a first cause, a self-existent, necessary Being, in whose essence existence is included, viz., God, adding: "For this reason the existence of God has been admitted in all times and by all peoples of the world." The translator's note on this reads: "This is true, and yet the proof of the existence of God derived from the supposed necessity of positing a first cause is an extremely fallacious one." After proving to his entire satisfaction the palpable fallacy, he concludes: "An innumerable multitude of successive causes is therefore entirely possible, and there is no necessity in thought for positing a first cause."

There is and can be no innumerable multitude of causes or of any entities. Every multitude is numerable, for every multitude is made up of individuals, and every individual counts one, and any multitude of units can be counted or numbered. Again, if there is no necessity in thought for positing a first cause, neither is there in reality; and if there is in reality, there is in thought. The thought cannot be true without a corresponding reality, and every reality is thinkable. It is only in German transcendentalism that ideas are *à priori* necessary forms of the mind, and that thought is merely subjective, the baseless figment of the thinker.

The above statement of Mr. Davidson is tantamount to saying that we may with all reason suppose a chain consisting of an "innumerable multitude" of links, enough, say, to reach to one of the fixed stars, to be suspended in space, without the need of having the topmost link attached to anything, it being quite sufficient for the support of the immense weight to have the lowest link supported by the next above it, and that by the next above, and so on till we come to the highest, this being able to support itself and all below it, because forsooth it is the first of the series and at such an immense distance from the lowest, though of the same nature with it. The link nearest the earth cannot support itself; the farthest off can support the whole chain.

According to this manner of reasoning, if the world were to last an "innumerable multitude" of years, effects for which we are now forced to posit a cause would be to our very distant descendants perfectly intelligible without a cause. The oak would be believed to have sprung up without an acorn, the ship would have launched itself upon the deep without a maker, without the aid of any one. Indeed, Mr. Davidson maintains a more difficult position. For the oak would have had at least the earth to support it, the ship would have had trees from which to make itself; but the case of the farthest back in the series of second causes, even though their multitude were "innumerable," would be far different. That farthest back second cause, which we can certainly reach in thought, would have been absolutely alone, if there were no first

cause, and therefore must have produced itself from nothing, it being, moreover, previous to its existence, itself nothing, as being a second cause, and therefore contingent. In a word, there was an absolute nothing first, if there be no first cause, and then either one entity made itself out of nothing, being itself nothing, and so became primogenitor to the whole race of second causes, call it protoplasm, proteine, or what you like; or an "innumerable multitude" of second causes made themselves out of nothing, themselves being nothing.

Here is how Mr. Davidson shows the fallacy of positing a first cause. "It is quite true that an infinite number is unthinkable, because all number, from its very nature, is finite. But number altogether is an intellective mode of grouping, and does not lie in things themselves. . . . . But it by no means follows that an infinite multitude, beyond any, and therefore beyond all, number, does not exist."

Without stopping to examine the logical validity of inferring all number from any number, this argument simply means that because our intellect is finite, and number is "an intellective mode of grouping," therefore an infinite number cannot be the object of our intellect, is unthinkable; but that there may still be an infinite multitude of things, an infinite succession of caused causes.

Now, it must be clear to every mind that this supposed infinite multitude is the aggregate of individual entities, for things exist in the real ontological order only as concrete individuals. Each individual is *one* entity, for unity is an essential mark of entity. Every entity is necessarily one; and any amount of units can be counted, and consequently are numerable. If, therefore, an infinite multitude of things is thinkable, an infinite number also is thinkable. An infinite number, Mr. Davidson says, is not thinkable, neither then is an infinite multitude thinkable, that is, it is impossible, for the unthinkable is intrinsically impossible. I can think a golden mountain reaching up to the moon. It is perfectly possible, therefore, and might exist, if a sufficiently powerful external cause so willed it. But think a square circle, think two mountains without a valley between, think two and two to be five, I cannot; for it is thinking an entity to be and not to be at the same time, thinking a square to be at once a square and not a square, four to be four and not four. I can in thought conjure up the "innumerable," no, but the perfectly numerable multitude that would be represented by a line of closely written digits, the value of each successive digit increasing tenfold, extending from here to the farthest fixed star, and back to earth as many times as there are stars in the firmament, and this number multiplied by itself as many times as there are digits in the line. This number is think-

able, and the multitude of entities it would represent could exist, and, if the Almighty so willed it, would exist. But an infinite multitude of entities, be they what they may, equally as an infinite number, shocks my intellect, is unthinkable, and therefore impossible. Every multitude of things is numerable, every number is increasable, and therefore every multitude is finite, for the infinite can neither be increased nor diminished. God alone is infinite. Hence the absurdity of supposing any series of second causes, without positing a first cause, is "huge as Olympus."

I have given here the translator's argument in support of his doctrine that there can be second causes without a first cause, partly as proof of his originality and independent thought, partly because the Evolutionists must, as denying a first cause, hold this doctrine, and partly as showing what manner of reasoner he is who charges the Angelic Doctor with giving a handle to the Evolutionists and Darwinians. In his introduction, page 97, Mr. Davidson says: "It will be seen from this that St. Thomas attributes cognition to the senses! Indeed, he elsewhere says that 'Sensus est quædam deficiens participatio intellectus.' What a text for the Evolutionists and Darwinians!"

It were too much to expect Mr. Davidson's unmeasured praise of modern Italian philosophy and his undisguised contempt for the "philosophic romances of Germany," the sensism, subjectivism and skepticism of England, without a counter-balancing offset of some kind. And the Jesuits, of course, are equally available for statesman, politician, philosopher, and critic.

In his *Life of Rosmini*, page 33, Mr. Davidson says: "From that time (1834) until now the persecution of Rosmini and his followers, at the hands of the Jesuits, has never ceased even for a moment." Again: "The natural hostility of the Austrian Government to anything savoring of Ultramontanism was, in Rosmini's case, sharpened by the influence of the Jesuits and their friends, who saw in his enterprises possible dangers to their order."

This is more than strange. The Jesuits persecuted Rosmini for his Ultramontanism! Why, all the world have been charging them with ultra-Ultramontanism! What could they see in an Ultramontanist's "enterprises dangerous to their order"? Where and how has the persecution against Rosmini and his followers been carried on until now by the Jesuits? Perhaps he means that all who beg leave to differ with Rosmini's philosophy and to question its soundness, persecute him. If so, he has had, and is apt still to have, many a persecutor. The writer will count for one. And if his followers and defenders in philosophy are of a class with his translator, Rosmini would have reason to exclaim, "Save me from my friends!" Whatever "universal principle of truth" Mr. David-

son has adopted from Rosmini, it certainly is not that of sufficient reason. Mr. Davidson would profit by practicing the advice of Lord Mansfield to his ermined friend: "In all cases give your judgment freely, but be chary of stating your reasons." Indeed, "if reasons were as plenty as blackberries" with him, he should not give one even "on compulsion."

In his introduction, page 89, Mr. Davidson, after censuring modern thought, "inaugurated in the 17th century," for the mistake it committed in having "revolted entirely from scholasticism," adds: "This revolt, indeed, was almost unavoidable; for a thorough-going temporary breach with scholasticism was necessary, in order to deprive it of that tyrannical and morbid influence which, as the handmaid of theology, it had gained over human intelligence."

Here is a palpable instance of the application of the principle, that evil is to be done that good may come from it, that the end justifies the means. The "mistake" of the revolt is acknowledged, but strangely enough defended. Philosophy, in the hands of the schoolmen, was made the handmaid of theology, was made to minister to religion. This is the head and front of its offending, and therefore any and every mistake or extravagance on the part of the revolt, even to the extent of stultifying thought and dubbing it philosophy, must be condoned, if shame prevents its being applauded.

But why, I would ask the learned translator, call the influence scholasticism had gained over human intelligence "tyrannical"? Nothing but truth can influence intelligence, for truth is the object of intellect, just as color is the object of sight, sound of hearing. You cannot influence the eye by sound, nor the ear by color, nor the intellect by aught else than its object, truth. If there be no colored object presented to the eye, it may be left inactive, but cannot be influenced. In like manner does the intellect remain uninfluenced till truth is presented to it. Error may indeed be dressed up by sophistry in the semblance of truth, and under this false color appeal to passion or prejudice or some low interest, and, through the influence of one or more of these, inveigle the will and thus prevail over man. This ascendency of error may be called a species of tyranny, since it enslaves the noblest faculties in man to animal instincts. And yet the will is always free to resist, and hence its submission is voluntary and therefore criminal. But so far is the intellect from being influenced, that, as soon as it is permitted in the silence of passion and prejudice to investigate the error, it tears off the deceptive garb and casts away the unsightly impostor. When intelligence, therefore, is influenced, it is by truth it is influenced, and this influence, instead of being tyrannical, is

most legitimate; for truth possesses a just and natural right to sway that which it forms. It is truth that forms the intellect, develops, strengthens, and expands the intellect, enabling it to range at large throughout the broad fields of creation, and to mount through nature up to nature's God. Truth itself assures us: "The truth shall make you free." It follows that, since scholasticism, even as "the handmaid of theology," did influence human intelligence, philosophy contains a large share of truth, and to call its influence tyrannical is an appeal to prejudice or passion rather than to reason.

Indeed, the history of error, trace it as far back as we may, shows us on which side tyranny has invariably ranged itself. What final argument was brought against the adamantine logic of Socrates? Hemlock. What reasoning did the Roman Empire make use of to check the influence of early Christianity? Ten persecutions. How did Arianism meet the unanswerable arguments of the great Athanasius? By banishing him. What *novum organon* did Mohammedanism wield? The sword. What was Luther's culminating argument? *Pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide.* How did Henry the Eighth prove his spiritual supremacy? Ask Sir Thomas More and Bishop Fisher. And Queen Elizabeth? By every instrument of torture. And has tyranny changed its colors in our own day? The May Laws in Germany, the exiles from France, the Poles in Siberia, are the answer.

As to the term "morbid" applied to the influence of scholasticism, as the handmaid of theology, over human intelligence, it is no more than might be expected from one who, in his lectures at the Washington University, St. Louis, deplored most pathetically the "blighting and chilling influence of Christianity" upon Grecian civilization and Grecian refinement. When such moral turpitude, varnished though it be by towering genius, as reveals itself in Grecian literature, can fail to elicit a word of censure for pagan civilization and Grecian morals, we may not wonder to hear of the "morbid" influence of scholasticism as the handmaid of theology.

On page 93 of his introduction, Mr. Davidson states Aristotle's doctrine touching matter and form thus: "From all eternity there have existed matter and form in a state of combination. Matter is indeterminate and of itself unknowable," adding, in a foot-note: "According to St. Thomas, it (matter) has not even being, and is therefore a non-being. 'Materia secundum se neque esse habet neque cognoscibilis est.'"

He charges Aristotle's philosophy with having never risen above pantheistic materialism. "Since matter is non-being, the sum of being is God." From the above foot-note he gives us to understand that St. Thomas taught a still more pronounced pantheism.

St. Thomas has been already made to favor the evolutionists and Darwinians, now he is a downright pantheist.

Let us examine a little the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas on matter and form. It is true that both Aristotle and Plato held that matter is eternal. This was the weak point in Aristotle's philosophy, and shows that, with all the ingenuity of his master-mind, he failed to attain to the knowledge of that grand truth—creation from nothing, which the little child, thanks to divine revelation, knows with absolute certainty as soon as it begins to learn its catechism. It shows, too, that peripateticism needed the superior mind of St Thomas to purge it of its errors, supply its deficiencies, and give it its full completion.

But, after all, it is not more unreasonable to hold that matter is eternal than to insist that it can exist without an eternal, self-existing first cause, as Mr. Davidson does. Matter cannot be eternal, for it is changeable, and therefore finite; whereas the eternal is infinite, for what is infinite in one attribute, duration, must be infinite in all its attributes, every way infinite. No attribute can be higher than its source, the essence. If, therefore, eternity be predicated of a being, it is essential to that being to be or exist. If essentially existing, it must be a necessary being, therefore unchangeable, therefore infinite, absolute, self-existing.

If the infinite were changeable, it would be no longer infinite; for every change implies two states, A and B, the state from which and the state to which. Now, A or B must be an actuality, for, leaving the possible state, we necessarily enter the actual state, and as, when A is lost, B is gained, therefore in every change there is an actuality either lost or gained. But the infinite cannot gain an actuality, since it has all; it cannot lose an actuality, since it necessarily has all. The infinite cannot leave the possible state, for it is already in the actual state; it cannot leave the actual state, because its essence is *actus purissimus*, and no entity can change its essence.

But to suppose contingent beings without a necessary being, the finite without the infinite, second causes without a first cause, is too absurd to contemplate. A boy who would dispense with number *one* in the science of arithmetic, an architect who would propose to build a castle without resting it upon the earth, the Hindoo who supports the earth upon the tortoise, leaving the support of the tortoise to foolish inquirers, would be just as reasonable as Mr. Davidson is in saying there can be second causes without a first cause.

According to Aristotle, Mr. Davidson tells us, "matter and form have always existed in a state of combination. Matter is indeterminate, and by itself unknowable."

From this he argues that the Stagirite taught that "matter is non-being, the sum of being is God." How he arrives at this conclusion were difficult to imagine. Aristotle says that matter and form exist in combination, that matter is indeterminate without form, is unknowable without form. Mr. Davidson makes him say that, therefore, it does not exist at all. One says it does not exist except under a certain condition, the other says this is equivalent to saying it does not exist at all. It might with equal reason be said that no house exists, no tree exists, because neither exists by itself independently of the earth which supports them.

When St. Thomas says: "Materia secundum se neque esse habet neque cognoscibilis est," he does not say that "matter has not even being, and is, therefore, a non-being." He only says, what every ordinary observer must see is true, that matter neither exists nor can exist without a substantial form of some kind, and is, therefore, by itself unknowable. Mr. Davidson would persuade us that no leaf exists, because no leaf exists by itself without the branch that supports it; that no color exists, because it does not exist without the object colored; that the image and inscription upon the coin do not exist, because they do not exist without the coin impressed.

If Mr. Davidson can find or name any one material entity existing without some form to *determine* it, I will abandon the contention, admit that he is right, and that Aristotle and St. Thomas spoke nonsense. But matter never did, never will, cannot, in its natural state, exist without form. Destroy one form, another is generated. "Corruptio unius, generatio alterius." If the form be taken from a statue, the statue no longer exists. The matter of it exists, but not without another form or forms, the form of a slab, of a log, of a lump, of wood, of stone, of metal, of something. Destroy the new form, another takes its place. Break the matter into fragments, each fragment has its form. The minutest grain of sand has its form. You can divest matter of form only by annihilating matter. How, then, is it not right to say with Aristotle: "Matter is indeterminate and by itself unknowable," or with St. Thomas: "Materia secundum se neque esse habet neque cognoscibilis est?" If it cannot exist by itself, it surely is indeterminate, unknowable by itself. The impossible is unknowable.

St. Thomas is speaking of *prima materia*, or primordial matter, not of what we sometimes understand by matter—a material entity constituted of matter and form united. Primordial matter can be considered apart abstractly, but cannot exist apart, any more than color can exist apart from the object colored, though we may consider it apart abstractly. But the order of existing is different from the order of our knowing. We know no entity more than

in part, but every entity exists wholly. According to St. Thomas, a material entity or body is made up of matter and form; these constitute its essence, and essence cannot be divided. Matter is the passive, indeterminate, merely perceptive part; form is the active, determining principle. Of this matter, considered apart from its substantial form, St. Augustine says that it is "almost nothing." It is a mere passive potentiality, a perceptivity.

Materia secunda is the material existing entity, the composite substance made up of primordial matter and its substantial form united.

Form is either substantial or accidental, according as it determines an entity in its essence and species, or modifies the entity already determined. The soul is the substantial form of man, the body the matter informed; both constitute man; scientific knowledge is an accidental form of man. The likeness of Washington is the form of his statue; the white or brown color in which it has been painted is the accidental form.

Form again can be either intrinsic or extrinsic, according as it exists in the entity and perfects it, or exists beyond the entity as the exemplar idea according to which it is made. Intrinsic form is either subsisting or non-subsisting, according as it can or cannot exist and act independently of matter. Thus the soul of man is subsisting form, the *anima belluina* is non-subsisting form.

Finally, form is either informant or non-informant, according as it is naturally destined to be united with matter and to form with it a complete species, or is not so destined, but is a complete species in itself. Forms of the latter kind are also called separate forms (formæ separatæ), of which the angels are examples. Each angel, therefore, constitutes a species in itself, and there are as many species of angels as there are angels. The highest form, and the most removed from matter, is God.

As to the vexed question regarding the constituent principles or elements of bodies, suffice it here to say that, however much the scholastic doctrine has been decried by some and ridiculed by others, no equally satisfactory explanation has yet been brought forward, notwithstanding the claim of increased enlightenment put forward by each successive age.

Pure atomism, originating with Leucippus, continued and elaborated by Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, and, with hardly a modification save the denial of the eternity of atoms, reaching down through Gassendi, Descartes, and Malebranche, even to Newton, is now not even seriously thought of. What has extension, gravity, motion, attraction, must be a material entity or body; and we are looking for what constitutes body.

Chemical atomism is not substantially different from what we

have just described. Be they atoms, molecules, simple elements, whatever you please to call them, they are still constituted material entities, endowed with cohesive, attractive, and repulsive qualities, that is, with the qualities of that whose principles we are in search of.

The dynamic system, however understood, is no less unsatisfactory. Leibnitz abandoned his favorite theory of *monads*, and adopted the scholastic doctrine of matter and form. Escaping, he tells us, from the yoke of Aristotle, as he thought, he found himself led on by imagination instead of reason. "There is no principle of unity in material entities left us," he further says, "unless we admit the doctrine of matter and form. Form is this unifying principle."

Neither Wolf, Boscovich, nor Tongiorgi has explained how unextended simple elements can generate extension, nor how that which is not already body can have attraction and repulsion. Besides, how can one and the same element be possessed of contrary qualities—repulsion and attraction?

To return to Mr. Davidson. It would have been much more satisfactory to his readers to have given the very passages in Aristotle which St. Thomas "not unfrequently, partly from ignorance of Greek and partly from prejudice, misinterpreted," than his footnote, "Examples of such misinterpretation might easily be adduced."

It would be highly interesting to institute a comparison, and see how much more St. Thomas has misinterpreted Aristotle, whether from ignorance or prejudice, than Mr. Davidson has misinterpreted both authors, from one or both. It would be difficult to find any misinterpretation of any author go to the extreme of making him say there is no matter, that matter is a non-being, when he simply says that matter by itself, that is, without its substantial form, neither exists nor is knowable.

In his Introduction, p. 96, Mr. Davidson charges St. Thomas with adopting from Aristotle "principles which, if carried to their logical conclusions, are not only incompatible with each other, but fatal to Christian theology," affirming that his system is, "as a whole, without logical completeness," which statement he thinks is amply proved by adding "a fact which is at present only too apparent by the war which has been waging over his meaning, since the recent rehabilitation of his system in the Church through the Papal encyclical—*Æterni Patris*."

Strange proof of so grave a charge! If St. Thomas's principles are contradictory, the whole system built upon them is absurd, and most certainly are they fatal to Christian theology; for Christianity is preëminently reasonable. According to Mr. Davidson's strange

logic, Holy Scripture is full of contradictions, for wars have been waging over its meaning for more than eighteen centuries. What will men not differ about? How many various opinions about the meaning of Tacitus, Thucydides, Horace, Homer, etc.? Did these authors, then, speak nonsense? How many different interpretations of that luminous book of nature, in which some will see no trace of a Creator, others nothing but Deity, or a development of the Infinite, others the result of blind chance, and comparatively few the handwriting of the living God, tracing in miniature some of His infinite perfections? Does nature contradict itself, or is man's mind the measure of truth, the measure of reality? St. Thomas is misunderstood by those who read him to find proofs for *à priori* theories and foregone conclusions; by progressionists, who make novelty in thought the standard of perfection; by semi-Cartesians, who hail singularity of views as a mark of advancement; by Evolutionists, who imagine the magnitude of their pretensions a guarantee of the survival of the fittest; by the various religious sects, who fear the force of his logic will land them in the Catholic Church; finally, by such shallow minds as cannot see the necessity of positing a first cause from the existence of second causes.

No wonder, then, that we find Mr. Davidson, in his Introduction, p. 96, quoting from St. Thomas, as instances of the "palpably false," and as proving that in his system "intelligence and sensation are both impossible," these passages: "The sensible in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act. '*Sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.*'

"Knowledge is assimilation to the thing known, and the known is also the perfection of the knower. '*Scientia est assimilatio ad rem scitam, et scitum est etiam perfectio scientis.*'"

Here it is proper to remark that, as it does not follow that St. Thomas contradicts himself, because of the "war which has been waging over his meaning," so it is no proof that his doctrine here is unintelligible and meaningless, if Mr. Davidson fails to detect its meaning. The short-sightedness of his readers cannot be imputed to the Angelic Doctor as a fault, nor is he to be censured for investigating the profound depths of science, because some minds cannot penetrate below the surface.

Let us analyze a little the process of sensible perception, or sensation. That a sense may be able to perceive its proper object, it must in some way be joined to that object. There is no action on the distant without a medium connecting the agent with the object. The eye cannot see its object without the medium of light connecting one with the other. Now, every perception, whether sensile or intellectual, as the name itself implies, denotes that the

object perceived is in the perceiver in some way. The known is in the knower. It is seized, taken, held by the knower, as the words *apprehension*, *comprehension*, *capacity*, *holding* in mind, *escaping* the memory, etc., signify. But evidently the object does not come itself to the sense, is not received in the sense. The tree you look upon is not in your eye. It must, then, send its representative, for your sense does not leave you to go to the object. This representative from the object is received by the sense, as everybody knows who has any acquaintance with optics. This representative is called *sensible species*, a sort of similitude or likeness of the object, and called *sensible* because received in sense, and also to distinguish it from *intelligible* species. The first act in sensible perception is from the object. This either immediately or through its proper medium impresses the sense, and calls it forth from the possible state into the actual state. This term of the object's action upon sense is called the species *impressa*. The sense so far is passive, merely receptive of the impression. But the sense, as being a vital organ, immediately on the reception of the species *impressa*, reacts upon it, and tending outward and in a manner stretching after the object whence the impression came, its effort to seize and retain it results in the formation of the species *expressa*, through which, as through a telescope, if I be allowed the comparison, it perceives the object.

We will examine this process more closely. Certainly the species *impressa* was nothing more than an affection, a modification of the sense produced by the action of the object. There was no entity there distinct from the sense affected. The sensible species *impressa* is distinguished from the sense only, as form is distinguished from the matter it informs, viz., abstractly or metaphysically, or even as the impression on wax is distinguished from the wax impressed. *A fortiori* was there no entity there distinct from sense in the species *expressa*, for this is merely the result of the action of the sense itself upon the species *impressa*, which was itself but an affection of sense.

Now the species *expressa* is the sense modified and in act, viz., the act of perceiving its object, that is, the sense in act; and the species *expressa* is the *sensible*, because it is in sense and representative of the object of sense. The species *impressa* is passive, as we have seen, on the part of the subject receiving it, being the effect of the action of the object. The species *expressa* is active, being the modification of the sense itself acting upon the species *impressa* and through the species *expressa* perceiving the object. This perception gives us sensible *cognition*, a name which will entitle us to be classed by Mr. Davidson among Evolutionists and Darwinians. Here we see that the "sensible in act," viz., the spe-

cies *expressa*, is the "sense in act," viz., in the act of perceiving. "*Sensibile in actu est sensus in actu.*" In other words, the form informing is the substance informed. Mr. Davidson would do well to study St. Thomas before he undertakes to ridicule him.

From the above we see that in every cognition, sensile as well as intellectual, there is a conformity between the knowing and the known, not that the object known is changed, but its representative is so assimilated to the faculty receiving it that it is finally one with it, even as the impression or form of the dollar-piece is one with the dollar. If the learned critic can come so far as to understand the Angelic Doctor, which is, perhaps, taxing his intelligence overmuch, he may yet be able to see the impossibility of having second causes without positing a first cause.

We will now examine the process of intellection, and see if St. Thomas makes the "subject and object of intelligence one" when he says: "*Intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.*"

After sensation is completed, the sensible representation passes into the hands of memory and imagination. Imagination calls it up for intellect. Thus reproduced, it is called *phantasma*, and is the proper representative of the object of intellect at this stage of the process. But phantasma, as being the product of an organic faculty, is itself organic. It must, therefore, be sublimated or spiritualized, ere it can be received by intellect; for the received must be of the form of the receiver. The active intellect (*intellectus agens*) it is that effects this, viz., renders the phantasma intelligible or capable of reception by the intellect. The active intellect is an intellectual light, *lumen intelligibile*, *lumen rationis*, as St. Thomas calls it, corresponding to what some moderns prefer to call a power of abstraction, which abstracts the spiritual from the material in the phantasma, the universal nature or essence from the concrete particular, the intellectual from the sensible elements.

After the operation of the active intellect upon the phantasma, the result is the intelligible species, now ready for reception by the possible intellect, or intellect proper. It is called possible intellect, because it requires its proper object, the intelligible species, to call it into act, before which it is only in the power to act, just as the sense of sight requires a visible object to inform it, and render it actually seeing, before which it was only in the power of seeing. The intelligible species acts upon the possible intellect, impresses it, and calls it into act, as being its proper object. The intellect receives the intelligible species, and now, no longer in the possible but in the actual state, reacts upon that which brought it into act, and with it forms the conception, which is the term of intellection, the idea through which it perceives the object, the *verbum mentale* by which it affirms to itself that it knows the object.

The idea is not the object perceived in the direct or first act, but that through which the object is perceived, just as the telescope is not that which, but that through which, the eye sees directly. This concept, idea, notion, is the intellect's possession of the object, a true representative of the object, which object primarily, directly, and proportionately to the intellect's present state of union with the body, but not absolutely, is the essence of material entity. But for its present condition of dependence upon organic faculties, the proper object of man's intellect is all truth, every entity, not meaning by this that it could comprehend all truth, for the finite cannot grasp the infinite.

Now, every object known must be in the subject knowing according to the mode of the knowing, and accordingly, in this case, intellectually. For the receiver must contain the received according to the mode of the receiver. This is the reason that the object sends its representative, and the reason of the several transformations that take place between the first act of the external object and the final act of intellect by which it affirms that it knows. The sensible or material object puts on the form of the sensible species *impressa*, in order to be received by sense, not meaning by this that it loses its own form or ceases to be itself. The species *impressa* becomes the species *expressa* ere it can be received by imagination or memory. This again assumes the form of the phantasma before it is presented to the active intellect. After the operation of the active intellect upon the phantasma, there results the intelligible species *impressa*. Finally, the action of the intellect proper upon this latter gives us the idea or *verbum mentale*.

Now, what is the term of intellection? Is the act of intellection immanent or transient? Surely it is immanent. For my knowing an object does not change that object, does not affect or modify it in any way; but I am modified by it, my intellect is informed by it. What! Has the object parted with its form to give it to the intellect? No; there is nothing of the object in my intellect, as an entity distinct from intellect, any more than there is anything of the die on the coin impressed by it, as an entity distinct from the coin, though it is the form of the die that constitutes it such a coin. The act of intellection is therefore immanent, terminating upon the intellect itself in the idea, which is nothing else than a modification of the intellect in act, distinct from intellect only as modification from the thing modified, as accident from the substance which supports it, as the image on the coin from the coin.

Hence the "intelligible in act," that is, the intelligible species actually informing the intellect, "is the intellect in act." For the intellect in act so modified the intelligible species which called it into act, and so assimilated itself to this modification or intelligible

species *expressa*, that finally it identified itself with it. Therefore "the intelligible in act" may well be called "the intellect in act." The intelligible in act is the form of the intellect in act, and the form and informed are one, even as the form and matter of the statue make one statue.

Let us now see how "palpably false," as Mr. Davidson has it, is St. Thomas's doctrine: "Knowledge is assimilation to the thing known, and the known is also the perfection of the knower," and whether it is the doctrine that "fails to render intelligible what it was intended to explain," or Mr. Davidson that fails to grasp its intelligibility.

Knowledge (*scientia*) is the acquisition or possession of truth, and truth is the conformity of the intellect knowing to the object known, the assimilation of the intellect to its object, their adequation. We have seen that this assimilation is effected through means of the intelligible species, which is the representative of the object. Now, the possession of this assimilation, which is knowledge, is assimilation to the thing known, since to be assimilated is to possess the assimilation. Furthermore, it is the intellect that is assimilated, and the assimilation is distinguished from the assimilated only as form from matter. Therefore the assimilated, the assimilation, and the possession of the assimilation, or knowledge, may rightly be called one, and hence "knowledge is assimilation to the thing known."

Again, since it is the intellect that is conformed or assimilated to the object, and not the object to the intellect, as is evident, the object (objective truth) develops and enlarges the intellect by informing it, and consequently perfects it. Therefore it is true that "the known is also the perfection of the knower."

Here we perceive how much we depend upon God's creatures around us for our perfection, and how these unintelligent beings present themselves to us, revealing their several perfections and calling upon us in their own eloquent language: "Know us, and knowing us, know Him that made both us and you; and knowing Him, praise Him for us." *Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei.*

Man cannot have a single thought of himself. How different this doctrine from German Transcendentalism, that baseless fabric of erring thought! Fichte would have each mind create itself and all things else by knowing them. "To-morrow," said he to his pupils, "we will create God." Hegel went a step farther, and affirmed that the absolute idea was the only reality.

To conclude, St. Thomas does not teach what Mr. Davidson says he teaches. He does not identify subject and object, when he says that the subject (intellect) is conformed or assimilated to the object, the thing known.

A man's photograph is a likeness of him, but it is not himself. The impression upon sealing-wax is not the seal, though it is assimilated to it. So also the assimilation of the intellect to the object known is not the object. In no other system of philosophy are subject and object so clearly distinguished, in no other has each its proper part so emphatically assigned to it in the act of intellection.

SOME ASPECTS OF MODERN UNBELIEF.

ALL who have read the Ethics of Aristotle will remember how he asserts the superior happiness of those who know as compared with those who are still engaged in the search after truth.[1] The assertion, at first sight, seems almost a truism. The perplexity of indecision, the intellectual struggle between conflicting opinions, the insecurity which accompanies a state of uncertainty, the practical difficulties which present themselves to him who is compelled to act without the possession of any fixed principles of action, all combine to convince us of the misery of doubt. "Wer hat die Wahl hat die Qual" must surely be true not only of the minor choices of daily life, but also, and to a far greater degree, of the choice of the dogmas—for dogmas of some kind we all must have—which are to be the governing principles of our whole moral and intellectual nature, to fashion for us our course through the world, to determine our relations to other men, to underlie that portion of the world's history which we call our life, and which is of supreme importance to ourselves, and, perhaps, of no small importance to a wider or narrower circle around us.

Yet, in spite of this, doubt has a certain attractiveness. To hurry into hastily formed opinions and to call them knowledge, is so common a danger that the wise man hesitates before he decides, and this hesitation is often, in certain fields of knowledge, lifelong. If, on the one side, it is painful to hesitate, there is yet a consolation in the thought that the long hesitation will, in the end, secure well-grounded opinions. He who confesses his ignorance and does not pretend to be as yet in possession of the facts necessary for decision, has a consciousness of superiority to him who, pos-

[1] Εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.—Arist. Eth. X., viii., 3.

sessing the same or a smaller number of facts, finds in them a sufficient basis of authority, just as the man who declines to accept some plausible tale of distress feels himself the superior of one who listens with too ready a credence. There is also a flavor of intellectual humility in the confession that he is still *in via*, and it implies that he intends to travel further along the Road of Truth than his neighbor who is comfortably satisfied with the conviction that he is already *in termino*. To have already enlisted in one or other of the many armies which claim the possession of truth, involves a loss of liberty from which the free lance instinctively shrinks. Even in matters intellectual there are many who would adopt the well-known words of Horace:

> Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,
> Solaque, quæ possit facere et servare beatum.

And though the lovers of doubt will always be in a minority, they will, nevertheless, be a cultivated and intellectual minority; and those who find themselves content to know or believe that they can know nothing, have not such a bad time of it as might, at first sight, be supposed. If the man of firm convictions talks to them of the misery of doubt, they will answer that doubt is not half so miserable a thing as an obstinate adherence to opinions false or unfounded.

That such men are acting on a principle sound and reasonable, if kept within its due limits, none can deny. There are subjects without end where doubt, or rather the suspension of judgment until a clearer light shall dawn, is a positive duty. If I am asked for an explanation of *thought-reading*, and answer at once that I am convinced that it is the work of the devil, my hypothesis may be a true one, or, at all events, it is not easy to disprove it. But it is rash, silly and superstitious to attribute the phenomena to a diabolical agency until I have some very solid ground for supposing that there are no natural forces which can explain it. The δαίμόνιον of Socrates, the unseen companion of whose presence he was so strongly convinced, and whose voice he used to hear warning, advising, directing him, *may* have been his guardian angel, or an evil spirit, but I decline to adhere firmly to either the one or the other explanation as long as I can possibly account for it by the voice of his practical reason, quick to discern what he ought to do or to shun, and acting on a will prompt in its obedience to the call of duty. In matters such as these I am content to know nothing of the source of the phenomena, and if Aristotle's dictum about the superior happiness of those who know holds true in matters such as these, it is because I am not in their respect a searcher after truth, but deliberately acquiesce in my own ignorance.

But how far is this principle to extend? Is there to be no limit to the wise man's acquiescence in ignorance? Is there or is there not a field where knowledge is not only a privilege but a duty, where ignorance is death, and where contented ignorance is far worse than death? I think I can give an answer to this question to which every reader will yield a willing assent. I imagine that all will agree that this suspension of judgment, this satisfied acquiescence in ignorance, is inadmissible in certain cases which I now proceed to define.

1. No man can, without moral guilt, allow himself to rest in permanent doubt where that doubt affects the practical and immediate duties of life, or the happiness or virtue of himself or others.

2. No man can, without bartering away all pretence to be a lover of truth, allow himself to rest in permanent doubt respecting an hypothesis which embraces and explains all that is most important to the moral and intellectual welfare of mankind, but is bound either to accept that hypothesis or show clear grounds for rejecting it.

3. No man can, without forfeiting all claim to be listened to, assert the intellectual or moral superiority of doubt in any field of research, if the history of mankind shows on the one hand that those who have united in themselves the highest intellectual and moral qualities have invariably condemned any permanent contentment in doubt respecting this field of research; and if, on the other hand, doubt and disbelief in the possibility of attaining truth respecting it has generally been attended by some intellectual perversity or moral degradation.

4. No man can, without forfeiting all claim to be regarded as a lover of truth, as a reasoner whose arguments deserve consideration, or, indeed, as a man capable of any reasoning process at all, adopt any position which involves the simultaneous assertion of two contradictory premises. He who declares it possible that A and not A may be true of the same thing, in the same sense and in respect to the same part of it, excludes himself from the number of rational beings, and declares himself to be qualified only for intellectual intercourse with those who cannot discern between falsehood and truth.

My first proposition will, I think, be conceded by every reader as indisputable. I am going to apply it to the subject of the present article, to the question of the suspension of judgment advocated by many educated men in matters of faith or religious belief. Unfaith, whatever its deficiencies may be, professes to be directly practical. Its contentment in doubt results from its conviction that truth, as to the subjects of which it doubts, is unattainable, and it declines the rôle of the foolish child crying for the

moon. They are as little its concern as the politics of Jupiter or Saturn (if Jupiter and Saturn contain living beings capable of political life). Its rule of life is to perform the duty lying immediately before it, without vain speculation about that which is and ever must remain beyond its ken.

But is this possible? Can it steer its course amid the troublous waters because, forsooth, the stars of heaven are far above our reach, and it is but waste of time to form hypotheses respecting them which may never be realized? Can the professor of unfaith find principles of action apart from the influence, direct or indirect, of the faith that he rejects? Can he supply the wants of human nature and the cravings of the human soul when, on almost every subject save those which concern material phenomena, he must, if he is to be consistent, proclaim that there is no means of satisfying the yearning, longing desire of the hungry spirit which cries out for food? Can he provide a sufficient motive to draw back from the dark gulf of vice or crime one whose feet are already on its slippery threshold? Let us take one or two instances which may bring the difficulty before us in concrete form.

A nurse is watching by the sick bed of a man who is hovering between life and death. For ten long years he has been the curse and bane of all around him; cruel, vicious, idle, unprincipled, a drunkard and a libertine, his cowardly brutality has made his poor wife's existence one protracted martyrdom during the period that she has been his slave rather than his wife. How often the nurse has listened with trembling horror to her poor mistress's cries for mercy! How often has she seen the marks of brutal violence on the fair form that she had fondly nursed in childhood, and in the dawning beauty of whose youth she had so often indulged in day-dreams of a happy, prosperous womanhood—all to be so cruelly disappointed! The love his wife once bore him has turned, if not to hatred, at least to abject terror and an unconquerable repugnance, an instinctive loathing of his presence. His little ones have already begun to look askance upon, and shrink in abject terror from, the vile brute who is their father. And now his coarse excesses have done their work, and he is lying between life and death. The doctor has just pronounced the flame of life to be flickering, and has expressed his opinion that before morning all will be over. There is just a hope that he may be saved if the remedies prescribed be administered almost without intermission; but even if he survives he will be a complete wreck, useless in the battle of life, powerless except as a source of misery to that little circle. As the nurse sits there, the thought occurs to her: Why try to save him? A few drops beyond the dose prescribed from the phial labeled "morphia," and the sleep he sleeps will be a sleep that

knows no waking. In comfort and peaceful happiness the mother whom she fondly loves will be free from the black cloud which has made her life a living death. What does she herself owe him? What has she received from him? Oaths, and curses, and blows too, when she has ventured to say a word for her poor mistress. What motive is to hold her back? Egoism? There is not the faintest chance of detection—what a delicious thought to free her mistress from that cruel bondage! What a happy prospect to live in peace with her and her darlings in some quiet country home! Altruism? The sleep of death is for the sick man a preferable lot to the career of wretchedness and vice which may be prolonged for years; what an act of charity to relieve her mistress of the curse which blights her life! What a mercy for the poor children to be freed from the degrading influence of a villain and reckless libertine! Egoism and altruism combine to prompt her to pour into the glass the two or three extra drops—*just by mistake!* Are not the circumstances exceptional and the end to be gained a laudable and excellent one?

Now, I ask, what sufficient motive can unfaith put forward to prevent that poor woman from the crime of murder? I do not suppose that the professors of unfaith would go so far as to say that the deed she contemplated would be a praiseworthy or even a justifiable one. But if they are consistent, they would say that it was both one and the other. If no law descends from heaven, if there is no legislator who proclaims to us: "Thou shalt not kill," or if His voice cannot reach us from the throne where He sits far above out of our sight, then we must bid her consult her own happiness and the welfare of those little ones, and rid the earth of him who has been their curse. The limit which separates what is a crime from what is right and praiseworthy, the narrow limit, often wide only by a hair's breadth, has been wiped away; and who is to replace it when we have banished the legislator who alone can trace it again upon our hearts?

Or, let me take another and a very different instance. Let me place myself in the position of a professor of unfaith, a "moral, law-abiding, excellent man," whose children are just growing out of the years of early childhood. Fostered under a mother's care, they have as yet been kept safe from all that could taint their innocence. True, it is the innocence of ignorance, but innocence under any form is fair and beautiful to look upon. They have been brought up in the principles of unfaith; once and again they have run to their father with the intelligent curiosity of children: "Father, who made the world?" And the answer, the cruel answer, has been: "We don't know, my boy; perhaps we shall know one day, but how we cannot tell." "Father, is there a God?"

and the answer again, the still more cruel and unnatural answer, has been: "We don't know, my boy; perhaps there is, but we cannot tell; perhaps we may be wiser some day." Yet in spite of this, they have never seriously offended against the law of the God whom they have been trained to ignore.

But at length the time comes when the shelter of the home must be quitted, and the youngsters must embark on the perilous waters of school life. What is to keep them safe, now that the innocence of ignorance soon will become impossible? Are there any influences in the public school which can ward off vice, or furnish the young warrior with an armor to defend him against its insidious attacks? Even the weapons which could aught avail have been torn from his hands by his father's teaching. However feeble the safeguards it provides for youthful purity, the average Protestant religion of our day at least teaches God ever present, and the cruel ingratitude of offending Him, and the need of a struggle against temptation, if God is to be our friend and Heaven our home. But all this the poor boy has been taught to regard as an empty fiction, or at all events a piece of mere vague guesswork! Yet it may be true, even on the showing of the professor of unfaith; and if it is true, then he allows that something more is true, that the whole Christian (and Catholic) system is true, and that its practical teaching, its elaborate care of youthful innocence, its heaven-taught safeguards for manly virtue, are in that case not only almost indispensable if his children are to be kept safe from vice, but rest upon a basis of truth, the acceptance or non-acceptance of which will affect their happiness to an almost unlimited extent, not in this world only, but in a future state of existence which will last to all eternity.

And if this is so, if there is a chance, a fair chance of these beliefs and these safeguards being a *sine quâ non* for the purity and happiness of his children, what can we think of one who is content to know nothing of those things which are essential, which at all events *may be* essential to the temporal and perhaps the eternal welfare of those he loves? What shall we think of him when he turns them out defenceless, knowing with an almost absolute certainty that their virtue is destined soon to perish under the malignant influences which threaten it? Is it that he cares not for their innocence, or recks not that his boys should return to their home scarred and stained with degrading and loathsome vice? If he were a mere materialist, a denier of the existence of the supernatural, he might be content that they should eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, as long as they did not injure body or mind by their debauch and avoided the disgrace of detection. But believing as he does that there *may be* a God, how can he be content to

stand aloof from the two contending armies, when his professed neutrality exposes not only himself, but his young children to what may be the path to eternal death? If there were some distant country on whose sanitary conditions men disputed, if some declared it to be healthy, others full of deadly miasma, would the man who could not gain any sure intelligence respecting it be content in emigrate thither?

I might pile up instances of the guilt of resting content in practical doubt where immediate duties are affected by it. I might picture the professor of unfaith by the deathbed of one tormented by remorse. What would be his immediate duty to such a one? He cannot tell the dying man he need not fear, since death is an eternal sleep, for he feels no certainty about it. He must, if he speaks at all, mock him with the ghastly hope that "*perhaps* there may be no God, no heaven, no hell;" or if these things should unfortunately be realities, that they are out of our ken on earth, and we must wait until the light of another world breaks upon us; in other words, *until it is too late.*

Or I might picture him present in a Catholic church. The bell rings at the consecration, and the faithful adore their God present upon the altar. What is the logical position of him who is content to wait until science shall have settled whether faith or superstition is the mental attitude of those who worship there? If he kneels to adore, it may be a degrading act of superstition; if he refuses to bend the knee, it may be an insult to the King of kings. The sturdy Protestant may sit in peace and pity the poor idolaters around him; but the atheist, he may view with supreme contempt the childish mummery; but the agnostic, he who dares not pronounce Catholic dogma to be false, but only to be an hypothesis incapable of verification, what is his immediate duty in a case like this?

But it is possible that here an escape from the difficulty may be found. It is in the crises of life, the scenes which decide human destiny, that there comes out most clearly the folly of resting content, not "to force the contest prematurely." It is easy in the midst of a busy, prosperous life, in the eager pursuit of a successful profession, when patients crowd the consulting-room, or clients strive for the advocacy of the rising barrister; when fortune smiles and pleasure sparkles in the cup, to be content to postpone the solution of questions which perplex, to cease from crying after the moon. But in the tragic scences which from time to time diversify the lives of most, if not of all; in times when some fierce battle is going on against passion and despair; in times when the sky is black, and no ray of hope reaches through the darkness, unless it be the thought of God and of Heaven, then it is that these ques-

tions clamor for a solution, and not to solve them if we can involves the guilt of moral suicide or moral murder.

2. My second charge against unfaith is based on the characteristics of a tenable hypothesis. I need not remind my reader of the elements which must be combined to form a sound hypothesis; how it must explain all the facts of the case, how it must need no subsidiary hypotheses to back it up, how it must be capable of verification, how it must stand the test of a searching criticism. He who refuses assent to any hypothesis, the adoption or rejection of which intimately affects human well-being, must, if he is a wise man, show cause of his refusal. Until he can do this, he is bound to adhere to it, at least provisionally. He may fairly reject it because it pertains to some special department of knowledge which does not concern him, or because he has no manner of means enabling him to test its truth, or because it is not of any practical importance whether it is true or false, or because he is already in possession of some other hypothesis which satisfies him perfectly. If a scientific man puts before me some new theory respecting the Gulf Stream or the nature of electricity, I decline to give a decided assent, simply because I am not a scientific man and scientific theories do not immediately concern me. If a man of too credulous piety presses on me a theory respecting the intervention of the devil in all cases of magnetic influence, I dismiss his hypothesis as incapable of verification and therefore futile. If I am asked to accept the statement that the author of *Junius' Letters* was Sir Philip Francis, I decline to say yea or nay to what may be interesting as a literary curiosity, but seems utterly unimportant except to historians or lovers of antiquarian research. If I am told that a balloon filled with hydrogen rises into the air because there is an occult connection between the heavenly bodies and certain gases, I answer that I am already in possession of a thoroughly satisfactory theory to account for the fact, and that this imaginary connection is perfectly gratuitous and unnecessary.

But if none of these reasons can be alleged against a theory which is presented to me, if it appertains to a department of knowledge which intimately affects my interests; if I have within my reach means of verifying its claims to acceptance; if it is of the most intense practical importance to myself and to all mankind; and if I have no sort of satisfactory alternative to present, I cannot, if I am a sensible man, set aside the theory. I am bound, from every motive of reason and common sense and positive duty, to accept it, or, at all events, to adopt such means as my own intelligence and the suggestions of the friends or enemies of the theory may propose as tests for its positive acceptance or positive rejection. I cannot, without a grave dereliction of duty, without

suicidal folly, remain neutral. Now, the teaching of Christianity affects not one department of knowledge, but all. It bears upon not only one of the interests most important to me, but all that are of any permanent character. It even affects my material interests, since my health of body, my mere physical activity, my position in the world, my conduct in business or in my profession, are continually influenced, directly or indirectly, by it. It is of the greatest practical importance to all mankind; happiness or unhappiness, content or uneasy disquiet, joyousness or melancholy, cheerfulness or depression, hope and glad expectation or despondency and unsatisfied sadness, are the prizes and penalties which are to be distributed as the results of a successful investigation into an acceptance or non-acceptance of its claims. There is no counter-theory which men agree upon as a tenable alternative—in fact, there is no alternative of even respectable pretensions. What folly, what madness, then, if I do not search and inquire with all diligence whether it be true!

But here, perhaps, I shall be told that I am ignoring the very point at issue. The professor of unfaith will allow all that I am saying, but will tell me that it does not apply to the case of those who hold themselves apart from any sort of religious belief or unbelief. Their case, he will remind me, is that of the inquirer who has a hypothesis presented to him incapable of verification. "You ask me," he will say, "to accept the Christian hypothesis, but you furnish me with no means of verifying it." He will allow that it is beautiful, picturesque, dignified, noble, elevating; but where, he asks, is the touchstone of its Truth? He will grant that it explains the facts of the case, perhaps even that the objections of Protestants to Catholic doctrine are futile, ignorant, unreasonable. He will concede that no other hypothesis ever proposed has superseded it. He allows its intense practical importance to himself and to every man who is born into the world. But he tells us that, all said and done, it is impossible for him to accept it simply because it *is* an hypothesis, and must, so far as we can see, ever remain so. It is up in the air, and, climb as high as we can, it is out of our reach, and so we must acquiesce in our inevitable destiny; we must be content to doubt.

To answer this objection would require a volume. But it is the central objection of all professors of unfaith, and I must bring them to look on a single point. No thoughtful, careful student of Christianity can fail to admire the character of Christ. No man of unbiassed intelligence can doubt that He was a real person and trod this earth and preached in the towns and villages of Palestine. No one who has not lost all sense of moral beauty can fail to admire, with an admiration passing all bounds, the exquisite, unap-

proachable loveliness of the teaching and character of Christ. No one can deny its power for good over the hearts of men. No one can paint, in his wildest day-dreams, any possible doctrine higher than the doctrine of Christ, or any person who ever presented to us, as He did, the ideal man. Now, if there is one thing which Jesus Christ claimed, it was to be not only divine, but God. He, humble and meek of heart, nevertheless claims to be King in His own right of heaven and earth. What is the professor of unfaith to assert respecting Him? That He was a deluded fanatic, or a conscious impostor? It is not a happy alternative.

Nor is this all; in proof of His divine mission and consequent credibility, He adduces His resurrection from the grave. It is on the resurrection that the truth of Christianity takes its stand. It is here that every possible hypothesis, except the true one, breaks down and makes him who urges it ridiculous. The swoon-theory and the theory of a pseudo-Christ after the resurrection are equally futile and silly. To hold oneself aloof from any opinion about it is a position untenable for one who loves the words and the character of Christ. It involves an endless holding aloof on a thousand matters of history which at last becomes impossible. Are we to form no opinion about St. Paul and St. John and all the other contemporaries of Christ whose teaching is the reflex of the teaching of their Master? A man who is in his senses must have some theory about Christ and Christianity and miracles, in order to explain what are allowed as matters of history. Every other theory but the true one leads to some puerile absurdity that no one would ever admit unless he was hopelessly biassed beforehand. Perhaps the most puerile of all absurd theories is Comte's assertion that the Christ of the Gospels is an ideal whom His subsequent followers constructed out of their own consciousness.

I say nothing here of miracles, ancient and modern, which are practical and matter-of-fact tests within the reach of all who are men of good will. If the only mode of egress for the professor of unfaith, from facts which he cannot deny, is the childish hypothesis of powers of nature, hitherto latent, of which no hint or sign has ever appeared since the beginning of the world even until now, surely he will be pursuing a more scientific course in at least investigating the claims of the Christian hypothesis than in inventing an explanation of the scientific absurdity of which none can be more conscious than himself.

If Christianity, then, starts with these advantages (and I might enumerate a thousand more, *e.g.*, its value as a practical rule of life; its calm indifference to material prosperity; its joyousness amid suffering and misfortune; its exclusive success in guarding innocence; its *admitted* power in raising the fallen; its doctrine of self-

sacrificing charity and practical altruism; the supreme, intense, inimitable cheerfulness and lightheartedness of those who throw themselves wholly and without reserve into the spirit of its teaching), if it possesses, I say, the sole right to these and other magnificent prizes, what folly to be satisfied to stand aloof from a contest in which the strife is about such high stakes as these! It does not ask for acceptance without trial; it offers as its credentials miracles, and the one great central miracle of the resurrection and the teaching and character of its Founder, the unity of its doctrine, the holiness of its saints, the continuity of its unbroken existence as a corporate body. At least you can verify these. They are historical facts. If Christ be not raised, says St. Paul, your faith is vain and our hope is also vain. Limiting myself merely to Christ and the resurrection, I challenge my opponents on historical grounds. If you find every explanation of a historical fact and of a historical character break down save one, and this one is consistent throughout, backed by incontrovertible evidence and explaining all the phenomena of the case, surely you are bound in common sense to accept that explanation, unless you can clearly show that in one way or other it leads to a positive contradiction. And this no one has ever shown and no one can ever show of Catholic Christianity.

3. My third proposition I need not linger over except for a moment. The respective characters of the adherents and adversaries of Christianity is again a matter of historical inquiry. I will not attempt to enumerate either the one or the other, either its friends or its foes. But this all must in fairness admit, that if they were looking for instances of all that is generous, noble, heroic in human nature, for self-sacrificing devotion, for self-denial without hope of earthly reward, for unflinching loyalty of heart, for innocence unstained and unspotted from the cradle to the grave, for singleness of purpose and purity of intention and life-long benevolence and patient, uncomplaining endurance of evil and all else that in our inmost souls we most admire and recognize as approximating to a perfect, a divine ideal—it would not be among the professors of unfaith ("moral, law-abiding, excellent" men though they be), nor among those who give in their allegiance to the various bungling, half-hearted, inconsistent forms of a spurious Christianity; nor yet among those who limit their beliefs to a deity who has set the world a-going and now leaves it to fufil its mechanical destiny; least of all among those who positively deny the existence of Him who created them and wage active war against Himself and all that is dear to Him—but in Catholic Christianity and nowhere else.

And on the other hand, if they were looking for instances of all

that is proud, rebellious, independent, for instances of degraded morality, of antisocial theories, of an insidious teaching which undermines, or tends to undermine, all those virtues which appeal most strongly to our higher instincts, it would be among those who have for some reason or other thrown off all their allegiance to God, shrieked the shriek of liberty, proclaimed themselves apostles of free thought, made it the object of their lives to "*écraser l'Infâme.*" Many are the names which rise to my mind of men living and dead—it is needless to mention them. The saints of God need no praise—the names of the devil's heroes shall not disfigure my paper.

4. But my fourth and last proposition is the most important of all; I have discussed it from one and another point of view elsewhere.[1] But I am bound, in order that my present argument may be complete, at least to indicate the internal contradictions which I find in the theory of those who, "fearing to force the impending contest," hold themselves aloof alike from Christianity and from atheism.

The skeptic *putus et purus* needs no refutation. If he doubts of everything, he cannot be certain even that he doubts, and so puts himself out of court without delay. The professor of unfaith is not a skeptic *putus et purus.* But he is a modified skeptic; he declines to accept anything which goes by the name of the supernatural, anything which cannot possibly be matter as a function of matter. About the material as being subject to our senses, and about the material alone, does he feel certain; all else he declares to be pure speculation, a prying into that which is out of the sphere of human knowledge, an attempt after certainty where certainty is unattainable. You may frame, he says, beautiful hypotheses, but how can they be tested? You may build up a fair structure, but who is to know whether it is not a castle in the air. You may assert a Supreme, Omnipotent Ruler, Lord of heaven and earth, the God and Father of us all, but with what magic power have you risen from this poor world into the regions where you say God reigns supreme in ceaseless contemplation? You *may* be right; it may be that the theistic hypothesis, the Catholic hypothesis, is the true one; but I cannot see it, and, therefore, I cannot accept it. I think this is a not unfair statement of the position of the educated agnostic. It is plausible, and has that semblance of cultivated impartiality which allures the modern searcher after truth. But none the less does it contain an inherent contradiction.

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[1] Vide the Month, November 1882, art. "Some more Agnostic Fallacies."

When the agnostic, or professor of unfaith (for I am using the two expressions as identical or almost identical), allows that the Christian hypothesis *may* be true, but cannot be verified in our present state of existence, he is asserting A and not A with the same breath. For if Christianity is true (and the same holds good if we limit our belief to theism), God, such as Christianity declares Him, is a really existent being. He is consequently God of truth, God who has revealed Himself to man, God who claims our obedience and our love, God who tells us in clear, plain, unmistakable terms, that in Him we live and move and have our being, that the invisible things of Him, His eternal power also and divinity, may be clearly seen by the things He has made, and, consequently, that those who refuse to acknowledge Him are inexcusable. When, therefore, a man says: God may possibly exist; of this I cannot form an opinion, it is altogether beyond my reach, he says in other words: It *may* be that there is a God who is a God of truth; who says, and therefore says with truth, that the knowledge of Him is within the reach of all His rational creatures; and He *may*, therefore, since I am one of His creatures, be within my reach. But at the same time I have tried in vain to find Him, and therefore I know He is not within my reach. The agnostic, inasmuch as he holds himself aloof from atheism, thereby admits the former proposition: *God is perhaps within my reach* (A). The agnostic, inasmuch as he holds himself aloof from theism, thereby asserts the latter proposition, which is clearly and directly contradictory of the former: *God is not within my reach* (not A). By his very profession of impartiality he declares implicitly: It may be that God is cognizable by man; by the very same profession he declares explicitly: It cannot be that God is cognizable by man. Could self-contradiction be more self-contradictory than this? We who are Christians and Catholics throw down the gauntlet before the modern agnostics, before the professors of unfaith. They are men of ability; let them, if they can, clear themselves of this very serious charge which we bring against them, not only against their logic, but against their very reason. We charge them with an implicit self-contradiction, which makes their position untenable and their arguments worthless; which vitiates all their fair professions of being lovers of truth. We charge them with blowing hot and cold with the same breath. We charge them with being intellectual charlatans, inasmuch as their whole system—if system it can be called—is based on a contradiction. At the root of the specious but poisonous tree of their philosophy, there is a canker-worm which warns, or ought to warn, away all earnest seekers after the tree of life. In spite of all their fancied liberty, no true

freedom is there for their soul, since they are unable or unwilling to perceive that "perhaps there is a lie in their right hand."[1]

The reader who has followed my argument will, I imagine, now perceive why I assert that theism and Christianity are not subjects in which a continuance of suspended judgment is either lawful, wise, or possible. They enter so minutely into every detail of our life, our motives and actions are so constantly influenced by our belief or unbelief in them, that doubt never ceases to clamor for a speedy solution. Not only are we ourselves hampered and perplexed at every step by the absence of fixed principles of action, but it tells even more ruinously on the best interests of the young, the weak, and the tempted. In times of prosperity and good fortune we may hush the craving of our souls, but in adversity, sickness, physical or moral suffering, how cruel the lot of one who, as he sinks beneath the waters, feels, and feels in vain, for some ground beneath his feet! The interests concerned are so all-important, so supreme, that we are madmen if we sit content to doubt, with our hands folded, in guilty indecision. We *must*, if we think at all, form some hypothesis respecting virtue and vice, ethical and social questions, the means of advancing the welfare of our fellows, and in each and all of these the religious question must needs enter. The opposing camps present to us their respective champions, and to declare ourselves unable to choose our part is strange indeed, when on the one side are assembled the chosen heroes of humanity, and on the other the very scum and refuse of the moral world. But strange above all is a hesitation which involves an inherent contradiction and confesses itself to have no share or lot in truth.

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[1] Non liberabit animam suam, neque dicet: Forte mendacium est in dextera mea. Is. 44, 20.

THE CORRELATION OF AGNOSTICISM AND POSITIVISM.

Agnostic Metaphysics. By Fred. Harrison, Nineteenth Century, 1884.

Religion, a Retrospect and a Prospect. By Herbert Spencer, Nineteenth Century, 1884.

Creed of a Layman. By Fred. Harrison, Nineteenth Century, 1881.

Creeds, Old and New. By Fred. Harrison, Nineteenth Century, 1880.

The Ghost of Religion. By Fred. Harrison, Nineteenth Century, 1884.

Last Words about Agnosticism. By Herbert Spencer, Nineteenth Century, 1884.

THE two most prominent schools of modern English thought were for the first time directly arrayed against each other during the year which has just ended. In January, 1884, the first direct clashing of arms took place; and the controversy continued, with but short intervals, during the whole twelvemonth. The year closed with the respective positions apparently unchanged, an indication that this controversy had ended as most contests of that kind generally do, without having advanced the cause it was intended to advance. But this is not the case. I quite agree with Mr. Harrison, that in this instance controversy did not prove an unqualified evil; and I go further, even, because to my mind the crossing of swords between two men like Mr. Herbert Spencer, the great sociologist and leader of the Agnostic school of thought, and Mr. Fred. Harrison, the apostle of the creed of Humanity and acknowledged leader of Positivism, forms a most important, if not perhaps *the* most important event that the intellectual world was called upon to witness during the past year. It seems to me as if even the apparent loss of temper which colors more or less their controversial writings, and the very marked acerbity of feeling which both occasionally manifest, had served, this time, a good purpose. For, the use of weapons with keen edges helped to bring out their points of agreement as well as their points of disagreement, so that both speculative theories stand now in clear outlines before the world of thought. The real issues are no longer concealed; society can no longer plead a misunderstanding of Mr. Herbert Spencer's position, or of Mr. Fred. Harrison's creed of Humanity. The friction of diamond against diamond emitted some brilliant sparks, and removed, thereby, that most important of all problems of the day, religion, from the region of darkness; and since

whatever tends to help towards a final solution of this, to many, so perplexing enigma deserves a hearty welcome at the hand of all thinking and reflecting minds; this intellectual struggle between the two schools possesses, I take it, great and unquestionable merit.

I do not attempt to deny that Agnostics and Positivists view the results of their labors as diametrically opposed to each other; for the one school of thought asserts as necessary elements of religious belief *what* the other strenuously denies as such. Each side has fortified its position by arguments which the other side in vain tried to override rough-shod. Nor can it be said that the narrow groove of strongly preconceived opinions, to the formation of which they have given years of arduous labor and incessant study, incapacitates the leaders from looking through other glasses than those turned out in their own laboratories; for it is not tenacity of purpose, nor an unwillingness to part with a cherished idol of years, that prevents them from abandoning their respective positions. Far from it. Their firmness rests upon much higher ground; it is based upon the consciousness that what each system postulates is true; and this consciousness grew into a conviction, this conviction gradually acquired full virility, and came thus to be turned into a stern belief. The unfailing courage, the earnestness, the force displayed in the defence of their respective attitudes, can only be accounted for as proceeding from a sincere belief that the only true and correct and possible basis of religion is furnished by their systems. To presume that less worthy motives actuated and vitalized their writings would be unjust in the highest degree. It must, moreover, be admitted that the postulates of both schools of thought contain a large share, though they do not contain the fulness, of truth. But, while all this is true, it is not less true that, though making for the same goal, they have worked on entirely different lines. Mr. Spencer, like Mr. Harrison, endeavored to penetrate the mystery of religion, and to discover its vital elements. Both made valuable discoveries; both have, indeed, unearthed some vital elements of religious belief; but neither have they discovered the same, nor have they unearthed all. They addressed themselves to certain aspects of the subject, rather than to its entirety; they took no pains to ascertain whether other elements besides those of their own discovery must not be taken into account before any final verdict can be rendered. They failed to perceive that the antagonism between their systems is not real, but apparent only, and disappears as soon as they are properly integrated in those grand and truly Catholic religious truths which no human theorizing will ever succeed in upsetting. For true religion, after all, covers, as they are bound to admit, only those

truths which, having outlived the strife of ages in the past, will survive even the present confusion of thought, and serve to future generations as headlights, shining with the brilliancy of perennial youth to the very end of time. What is absolutely true is so only and solely on condition that it is eternally so. It is obvious, therefore, that whatever truth there is contained in the proposition of Agnosticism cannot collide with any truth uncovered by Positivism, and *vice versa*. Positivists and Agnostics wrestle, therefore, over a phantom which has no existence outside of their own chain of reasoning, and vanishes out of sight by assigning to their respective postulates their proper places in the domain of religion. And now that, thanks to the late controversy, the positions of both are clearly defined, it is possible to balance accounts and debit and credit the proper sides of the ledger without running the risk of having the accounts disputed afterwards. A sober analysis of the evidence of both sides, and a readiness to bid a gladsome welcome to truth wherever found, will readily establish how far they stand on solid ground.

The Agnostic school of thought, as is well known, follows the many winding footpaths of science, while the Positivists march on the broad highway of common sense and experience. It is well to keep this distinctive character of the two schools clearly before our mental vision. Now Mr. Herbert Spencer, after carefully travelling over the roads of science, endeavors to solve the enigma of religion by science, comes forward and announces that the only object of religion which he can discover is what he calls "the Unknowable." This Unknowable he defines as an "Infinite and Eternal Energy by which all things are created and sustained," making it thus the First as well as the Final Cause of the universe. This, he says, is the epitome of the philosophy of science, and the last word that can be spoken by a scientist about an intellectual basis of religion. He contends, moreover, that this is also the last dictum of philosophy. Mr. Fred. Harrison, on the other hand, maintains that a religion that begins and ends with the mystery of the Unknowable, is no religion at all, but "a mere logician's formula." He thinks that religion can not rest upon something that is "unknowable, inconceivable, and in no way to be understood," and claims for religion "an intelligible object of reverence, the field of feeling and of conduct as well as of awe." These are, briefly stated, the attitudes of Agnosticism and Positivism, attitudes, I am constrained to admit, that appear to me, with certain limitations which I shall presently point out, incontrovertibly true. The restriction with which I am prepared to accept Mr. Herbert Spencer's basis of religious belief is this, that I accept it as the result of science, and even of the philosophy of science, but not of philosophy

proper. For I find it impossible to concede, as Mr. Harrison does, that the great sociologist is also the philosopher *par excellence* of our age. And the limitation with which I wish to surround Mr. Fred. Harrison's view, is simply this, that I am unable to accept Humanity, even if spelt with a big "H," as an adequate object of religion. And with these reservations, it seems to me, no candid-minded and thinking person can experience any difficulty in admitting both to be right, for the simple reason that the basis of religion furnished by science and the basis of religion furnished by life cannot be expected to be the same. Religion in the hand of Agnosticism is an entirely different instrument from religion in the hand of Positivism. Why, then, should these two different instruments produce only one, and that the identical sound?

Mr. Spencer is, beyond all question, right, in demanding, as the final result of all science, the recognition of an Allbeing which is at the same time Creative Power and First and Final Cause, and which is no fiction, but a reality. When he asserts that the recognition of this mysterious Power above and beyond the comprehension of science forms the cardinal point of every religious system, I find it quite impossible to differ with him, because the consciousness of such an infinite reality underlies, indeed, every sort of religious belief. That our vision of it through the glass of science alone remains dim and obscure, and that science is incapable of telling us more about it, is not in the least surprising. It is perfectly natural, and cannot well be otherwise, because the existence of the lesser of course postulates the greater, but beyond affirming its necessity it can say nothing. When Mr. Spencer ascribes to the Unknowable not a negative, but a positive character, he simply proves the consistency and soundness of his reasoning. So far, I contend, even the most orthodox theologian can follow the Agnostics, for so far they stand on perfectly unassailable ground.

As regards the Positivists, they claim that they, and in point of fact they do, concern themselves with religion only as it affects the lives of men and women and children in this world. They assert, and I think rightly so, that religion must be more than a mere intellectual speculation, that it must be able to furnish a basis for duty. They hold, with the late Mr. George H. Lewes, that "deeply as we may feel the mysteries of the universe, and the limitations of our faculties, the foundations of a creed can rest only on the Known and the Knowable." When Mr. Harrison insists that the "Unknowable" must needs remain a perfectly unintelligible quantity to the ordinary public, I find it impossible to disagree with him, and so far, again, I hold, orthodox theology can fall into line and say Amen. For, if the study of human nature and the contem-

plation of life compels us to give our unqualified assent to one proposition, it is this, that the object of religious worship must be a definite object, known as such to the worshipper, one towards which he may entertain feelings, and which, in turn, is able to generate in the worshipper sentiments that will issue forth in action,—an object, therefore, to which the terms personality, will, intelligence, can be applied without becoming, thereby, meaningless phrases. I quite agree with Mr. Harrison, that religion, in order to deserve that name, should take hold of human nature and become a law for the regulation of conduct; and he perceives that as an axiomatic truth.

From this very condensed synopsis of the two systems, the marked divergence of opinion, on nominally one and the same subject, by two men who deservedly rank amongst our foremost thinkers, and I am tempted to add, also amongst our foremost writers, is quite apparent. It is also apparent that their differences are not altogether attributable to the entirely different standpoints from which they view religion, but rather to the fact that they have entirely different ideals in their minds when they discuss that subject. To the one, religion presents itself as a purely scientific, as a mental, problem; to the other, as a practical problem, a problem of life. The one understands by it the sum and substance of what abstract science can say about it, while the other consults life and experience, and draws from their study his conclusions. Now, if we view the situation in that light which I believe to be the only fair and equitable standpoint for judging the intrinsic merit of both attitudes, it ceases, of course, to be surprising that the results of these two sets of observations are not alike. Nor is this all. We are driven to further acknowledge that, inasmuch as the views of both schools are, in the main, true, they neither can nor do clash with each other; for truth, *ipsissima natura*, can never clash with, or contradict, truth. And this consideration forces upon us the conclusion that a way out of this perplexing dilemma does exist. In what direction, however, that road may lie, that is the question.

It has already been stated that "nature" (science) and "man" (life) form the chief objects of the investigations of Messrs. Spencer and Harrison, for the one moves along on the road of science, whose primary object consists in nature and natural facts, and the other moves along life, whose central figure is man. Nature, as well as man, stands out in all intellectual systems of the world as a main term of human knowledge. Both are recognized as such by Atheist and Pagan, by Catholic and Protestant, by Agnostic and Positivist, in fact, by every thinking mind of every age and every clime. But, let it be emphasized, nature and man, main terms

of human knowledge though they be, are, nevertheless, not the only main terms of it. There is one more, upon which both depend, to which both, of necessity, lead, and without which the great mystery of religion can never be satisfactorily understood, and that third, or, rather first, main term, is God. I am well aware that Agnostics and Positivists alike deny that term, at least in the Christian acceptation of the word. But what I insist upon is this: that Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. Fred. Harrison, clear-headed and powerful intellects as they are, each advancing on a well-defined though different line, inasmuch as they announce religion (I use here the word in the sense in which it is acceptable to both schools) to be a rational postulate of the study of science and of the study of life, have no right, on their own testimony, to deny the existence of that other term of knowledge upon which alone sound religion can rest, with which countless generations before us have dealt, with which, as a matter of fact, Positivists and Agnostics, all verbal protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, deal even now, and with which future generations will likewise deal.

To say that "God," in the Christian meaning of the word, is not an equivalent for this last and first term of knowledge, is one thing; to deny its existence, is another. Both have done the former; neither has been foolhardy enough to do the latter. It remains to be seen, however, whether their denial of the God of Christianity, as the proper equivalent of that disputed main term of knowledge, rests upon solid and unassailable ground; it remains to be seen whether it does not amount to a mere play of words, a verbal assertion, without any weight; it remains to be seen whether their own writings do not contain ample proofs that this personal triune Deity of Christianity offers, after all, the only rational solution of the religious problem; it remains, lastly, to be seen whether their own definitions, and their own statements as regards necessary elements of religion, do not at least point to, if they do not proclaim, the necessity of a God-man, Christ, and whether, by integrating their systems in Christian theology, they do not lose their antagonism, become harmonious, and dispel forever the notion that they cannot be both correct. All this remains to be seen, and whilst I have no hesitancy in asserting that Mr. Herbert Spencer's Unknowable and Mr. Fred. Harrison's personal object of reverence merge into one, and are completed and harmonized and perfected only in the God-man of Christianity, I assert also that only upon Him religion can be built, and that through relation to Him nature and life become not less intelligible than the very postulates of science and of life themselves.

I deem it quite unnecessary to enter upon any elaborate argument to support the statement I have made, that three great prob-

lems, namely, God, man, and nature, have confronted Humanity at all times. This is evident from the most superficial knowledge of the records of the past. They are found in all philosophies, in all theologies, in Virgil, in Homer, in the Bible, and in the sacred books of the east; and I have no intention of insulting the intelligence of cultured society. Suffice it to say that, up to our own time, no systematized effort has ever been made to reduce these three main terms of knowledge to two. In our own days, however, this is being attempted, and modern advanced thought has deluded itself into the belief that there are but two, simply because only two, nature and man, fall under the direct observation of our senses. The elimination of the third, under the application of this narrow gauge, appeared, of course, not altogether irrational. Add to it the wonderful progress of science, which I am far from gainsaying, and the not less wonderful success crowning its efforts, and conditions are given well calculated to lead men to believe that science is the only really omnipotent goddess, fairer than Venus and mightier than Zeus, and abundantly able to throw the calcium-light of truth upon any and all objects, no matter how subtle or how deep. Thus it came to pass that the science of nature and the science of man were expected to illumine also the mystery of religion, and to render a final and infallible verdict in regard to it. And why not? Had not science pressed heretofore unknown forces into service? had not every new-comer, after a careful analysis, been successfully subdued? Why, then, should science fail in dealing with a force as old as religion? Some such reasoning seems, no doubt, plausible enough, and may possess convincing power for those who are too lazy to think for themselves, and who are ever ready to assent, without any questioning, to any proposition that comes from the fashionable headquarters of the Agnostic or the Positivist school. Be that as it may, it is quite certain that the negation of a third term of knowledge, and particularly of the God of Christianity as its equivalent, is made in a summary and rather unceremonious way by Agnostics and Positivists. This being the case, the duty devolves upon us to examine Mr. Herbert Spencer's and Mr. Fred. Harrison's systems, and to see how far their own teaching and their own writing sustain their denial.

Well, the foremost philosophical intellect of the school of strictly scientific research tells us, to use his own words, "the nature of the Reality transcending appearances cannot be known, yet its existence is necessarily implied;" and, again, "this inscrutable Existence science, in the last resort, is compelled to recognize as unreached by its deepest analyses of matter, motion, thought, and feeling." He says, furthermore, that personality, will, and intelligence can

neither be affirmed of nor denied to the Unknowable, which he defines as an "Infinite and Eternal Energy by which all things are created and sustained." Now this very clear, precise, and emphatic announcement of science invalidates, it seems to me, once for all any denial of the existence of what is generally understood by the term "God." If the quotations just given do not contain a pretty correct definition of what average minds understand under the word God, namely, a Power above us, the Creator and Sustainer of all, a Power both real and necessary, then I, for one, confess to having completely misunderstood every definition of God ever made by either philosopher or theologian. Nor do I think I stand alone. The vast majority of mankind, I imagine, if asked what word in any language is the equivalent for an "infinite and eternal energy, both real and necessary, by which all things are created and sustained," will return as reply the word "God." Thus, if I insist that science does not destroy, but establish, that first term of human knowledge which human short-sightedness and human pride tried to eliminate from the intellectual systems of the future, I simply defend common-sense, and refuse to be misled by an unmeaning play of words. I quite agree with Mr. Spencer that science proper can make no further admissions; science cannot furnish another or a better definition of God, nor another or a better basis for religious belief. When it has uttered that definition, it has uttered all it can utter. Its office ends by pointing out the reality and the necessity of a Power above, which established nature and all its wondrous laws all its marvellous harmony, and sustains all. This, let it be fully understood, is, indeed, the alpha and omega of science. Science should not give us less, but it can never give us more. So far, then, as Agnosticism is concerned, an unprejudiced examination of that system reveals to us that it does not abolish God, and that religion, based upon God, has not only nothing to fear from scientific investigations, but should, on the contrary, hail further explorations, because the more new ground is broken, the more new fields are brought under cultivation, the greater will be the cumulative evidence for the reality and necessity of a term outside of nature and of man, and the greater will also be the certainty that beyond the precincts of natural facts science remains forever silent. We have to go, however, one step further before dismissing Agnosticism. Science not only establishes God (I use here the word as the equivalent of the scientific equation: "Unknowable—Infinite and Eternal Energy, etc."); but it establishes, moreover, the *possibility* of the existence of the God of Christianity, with all the attributes with which that faith has equipped Him. For, while science admits that Personality, Will, Intelligence, etc., cannot be affirmed of the Unknowable, it also admits

that these time-hallowed attributes of Deity cannot be denied. Thus, it is no stretching and straining to plainly assert that Agnosticism, as exposed by Mr. Herbert Spencer, furnishes mankind with the only correct scientific definition of God that science ever can make, is altogether impotent to deny the God of Christianity, and honest enough to tell us that the scientific definition is not full and exhaustive, since more may be predicated of the Unknowable than Agnostics feel warranted to predicate. And here I rest the case of Agnosticism for the present.

Turning now to Positivism, the attempt of this school consists in evolving by a careful study of man and of life in all its ramifications those highest ultimate truths of religion which force themselves upon the acceptance of every intelligent mind. I would be wanting in candor did I fail to state here that Mr. Harrison's ideas on the mission and functions of religion display an uncommonly keen sense of penetration and a really surprising appreciation and realization of the wants of human nature. When, therefore, he defines religion as "simply morality fused with social devotion, and enlightened by sound philosophy," and when he asserts that "Humanity is neither the shadow of God, nor the substitute for God, nor has it any analogy with God," he simply oversteps the boundaries of his own teaching and writing, and contradicts himself. He is much too clear-sighted not to perceive that these assertions in no way conform to the views which he develops and lays down with as much force as ability in "Creeds: Old and New," and in the "Creed of a Layman." These papers contain, besides, an irresistible refutation of the view, advanced by him lately, that an abstract notion can ever furnish an adequate object of religion. Thus I shall let Mr. Harrison refute Mr. Harrison, and shall be careful to use as far as possible his own words, so that no charge of misrepresenting him in any way can be lodged against me. In the Creed of a Layman Mr. Harrison explains what he understands by the true and real meaning of religion, and says "that meaning of religion is this. It is a scheme of thought and life whereby the whole nature of individual men and societies of men are concentrated in common and reciprocal activity with reference to a Superior Power which men and societies alike may serve. In popular use the latter phrase alone in the definition has survived, and that in a particular aspect only." "When various qualities of a man, and of masses of men, can be brought to work together to a great common object of Devotion—then you have religion." "The essence of the idea is that the faculties can all be brought by it into harmony and proper relation; that it binds up great multitudes in one feeling and one thought." "The non-theologial schools of the day are for the most part content to trust

for this: either to some purely intellectual doctrine or doctrines, some say Science, some say Truth, some vaguely say Free Thought, some say the principle of Evolution or logical examination, the Spirit of Inquiry, the right of Private Judgment, some mystical gift for always being right of which we have never learned the secret." "Trusting to luck, or chance, or the ultimate triumph of what is called Truth, almost all the non-theological schools, Disciples of Science, of Free Thought, of Democracy, of Secularism, and the like, repudiate anything like an organized attempt to reduce life as a whole to harmony by a central principle of life; they reject systematic discipline of life; they start back from Worship, from any formal appeal to the Feelings, from the very idea of Devotion of spirit to a great Power—in a word, they turn with disgust or mockery from Religion." "Not, indeed, that they have ever proved this to be the sum of Philosophy, or the true teaching of history. Far from it, they assume it; they affect to know it by the light of Nature as an intuitive truth. Mention to them *worship*, *devotion*, *religion*, the discipline of heart and practice in the continuous service of the object of devotion—in a word, utter the word Religion, and they smile in a superior and satisfied way." On all this all rational and serious persons, at least, are, indeed, fully agreed. For, unless brain, heart, and will are taken hold of by religion, we have no religion at all.

It is further true that wherever around us to-day we see a beautiful character and a noble life, there we see something more than a set of opinions and implicit reliance on the principle of free inquiry. What is it that we do see? We always find a passionate resolve to make life answer in fact to some end that is deeply believed to be right. We have the three things—belief, enthusiasm, practice. Hence Mr. Harrison insists that belief, discipline, and worship constitute the very essence of religion, and in this assertion he announces merely what every human being instinctively feels to be true. Nor can anybody disagree with him when he says: "Man has a mind, and an enormous accumulation of knowledge. We have to satisfy that mind, and give order to that knowledge. Man has energies; we must give them full scope, and yet keep them in due bounds. Man has a soul, fitted for great devotion; we must fill that soul with a worthy object of devotion, strengthen it, purify it by constant exercise. If we leave out one of these sides, human nature is cramped, harmony destroyed. And, what is more, not only must all three sides be appealed to alike, but they must be appealed to by some great principle that can inspire them in one work." This, I fully agree with Mr. Harrison, forms, indeed, the true mission of religion, and, "since human nature calls out for religion, religion it must have or else die," and, "all

else is of little moment till we have it." Further than this, Mr. Harrison is certainly not wrong when he says, "it is mockery to talk about science, enlightenment, progress, free thought, to the myriads of men and women, and to tell them that these ought to serve them." I believe with him that "the children, wandering forlorn and unkempt into rough life, cannot be comforted and sustained by science and enlightenment; that human nature is not a thing so docile and intellectual that it can be tamed by fine thoughts; and that society is not amenable to pure ideas." "It is playing with the question," as he says, "to offer us anything less than a systematic philosophy, a grand and overmastering object of reverence, a resolute scheme of social and personal practice." It is this clear perception of what religion should be, and should do, that leads him to the rejection of Agnosticism, and to emphasize that "we need something that we conceive able to reach our human sympathies, to be of nature akin to our own, something that we can really commune with in a moral union—something living, not dead." Yes, in all this Mr. Harrison is quite right, for only the Unknowable, as defined by science, that is to say, God, rendered human and personal by Christianity, can ever be the adequate object of a religion, satisfy human nature, appeal to brain, heart and will, and correlate society. "Humanity," separated from the Unknowable, is merely an empty phrase, a high-sounding abstract notion, but dead like all abstract notions, hence impotent to kindle enthusiasm. The Deity, foreshadowed by science, rendered "human," and hence an adequate object of religion, an object of worship, of discipline, and of belief, and nothing short of it, will ever harmonize Agnosticism and Positivism. But I anticipate here, somewhat, Mr. Harrison, and so I will retrace my steps, and follow closely his analysis of the necessary elements of religion. I shall also co-ordinate each element with those collateral truths to which he neither does nor can take exception, because, by doing so the necessity of integrating Agnosticism as well as Positivism in Christianity will be best brought out.

"First, of course," says Mr. Harrison, "religion implies belief. We always except the religion of Nature, and of the Unknowable, or the religion of the Infinite—which are mere phrases—meaning only that the supposed believer would like to believe something, if he could only make up his mind. But all serious religion implies belief." Quite right; there is no doubt about the necessity of belief as one, as, in fact, the central and most essential, element of religion. But I am compelled to take exception to Mr. Harrison's exception. And I do so because I hold that belief, whatever it may be, must be rational. Now, if science points with an irresistible force to the recognition of an Infinite and Eternal Energy by

which all things are created and sustained, and if the recognition of that mysterious, though real and necessary Power, above the comprehension of science, must be conceded as the cardinal point of any creed whatever, then the scientific equation of God, as I call it for brevity's sake, must, at all events, be comprised in this belief. Mr. Harrison acknowledges this scientific equation as a correct result of the philosophy of science, and cannot, consequently, well dismiss it without forfeiting the claim to rational and logical reasoning. Religion implies belief, and belief implies, in turn, the recognition of that Infinite and Eternal Energy which is real as well as necessary. There is no getting round it. Mr. Harrison is free to say that, as yet, the object of religion of his conception is not brought out in such shape and form as to be that full and adequate object on which he insists, and on which he is quite right in insisting. But it will not do to say that the ultimate conclusion to which any intelligent search on the part of science must needs lead us, namely, that there is an Infinite, Real, and Necessary Being, is wrong, merely because that definition does not comprise all the elements which he believes it must contain. *That* knowledge, confirming as it does an innate human consciousness, forms, at all events, the cornerstone of any rational religious belief. Belief is recognized by Mr. Harrison as the fundamental essence of religion, and he has evidently no right to refuse to accept what light science is able to throw on that necessary cornerstone of belief. To be sure, the structure of religion is as yet far from being complete. But there is no gainsaying the fact that belief in the Unknowable, as defined by Mr. Spencer, instead of being in continual conflict with reason, is a rational postulate of reason itself. And since "man needs every shred of real knowledge attainable," as Mr. Harrison assures us, since this bit of knowledge cannot be disputed as real knowledge, and is, besides, attainable also, it seems to me entirely unwarranted to suppose that it can possibly be left out. As first element of religion, we have, then, a belief, which under all circumstances must cover all that Agnosticism uncovers to us as a rational, because strictly scientific basis of belief. Belief may cover more, it never can cover less. As the next element of religion, Mr. Harrison enumerates "Worship," some kind of external devotion; "the outward expression, the visible emotion of veneration, and of self-surrender to a power or being that we love and serve." I readily accept that definition, because worship is essential to religion, and is an "irrepressible appeal to emotion." He claims, rightly, the field of feeling for religion, for it is true that "man cannot forego the expression of noble feeling, if he is to have noble feeling at all." And for this reason does Mr. Harrison say: "Away, then, with the peevish

paradox of pedants and cynics, that mankind has outgrown worship." When he holds that only a power, or a being, which we can love and serve, can form the object of worship, he is but one out of millions and millions who harbor that same belief. The analysis of the third element of religion brings out this point more fully still, as will be presently seen.

"Thought and feeling," says Mr. Harrison, "are not enough. We need practice—action. Hence, the elements of religion are not only belief, that is, an intellectual scheme, and worship, an appeal to the highest feeling, but Discipline (or scheme of life)." "How," he asks, "is the Unknowable, or Infinity, or the Universal Mind, to be made the basis of practical energy?" And how, I ask, can humanity become that basis if humanity has no real, intelligible equivalent; if it is merely a vague word like infinity, and, as such, unintelligible to the average mind of the masses? "Is anything at all worth trying, unless it can assert its power over the intellectual world, the moral world, and the practical world?" Quite so; and for that very reason I hold that "humanity," a "general term," as Mr. Harrison himself defines it, cannot fill the high office of serving as motive power for the threefold mission of religion. How, in all candor, can a general term be loved, and served, and exercise such tremendous power over brain, heart, and will? How can an indefinite, general term be the adequate object of religion, when the much more definite term "Unknowable" is debarred as not definite enough? Let us not deceive ourselves. The object of religion must, indeed, be "akin to our nature," but it must also partake of that nature with which the Unknowable can only be conceived. Sever humanity from Deity, sever personality from the First and Final Cause, and religious fervor is chilled into the stolid contemplation of an abstraction. Hence it is that humanity, divorced from Godhood, ceases to be a rational and a possible basis for any creed. It is true that "in humanity human life meets and rests at last," but, only in the humanity of the Unknowable; that is, in a God-man, in that Real, Infinite, and Eternal Energy become Man.

"What this age wants, what the deeper hearts are silently and sadly yearning for," so Mr. Harrison tells us, "is this—a key to man's whole complete being, entire history." This key he looks for in "Creeds, Old and New." Humanism he dismisses as a "toy." Of Protestantism he says "that it never returns, never revives, has no afterglow, no resurrection. In a philosophical survey of religion, Protestantism no longer exists. It is not in the field; it is a mere historical expression; it is no longer one of the competing creeds, any more than Judaism is or Arianism. It is neither a church, nor a creed, nor a religion." Deism he dismisses

as "a form of metaphysics." For, "to have a vague hypothesis, not easily reduced to words, is certainly not to have a religion." "Any man," he says, "calls himself a Theist who thinks that on balance of probabilities as a philosophical problem, there is reason to assume that the Universe had some kind of First Cause." And, he goes on to question: "Is this to have a religion, a scheme of life and duty, of a supreme end? In what sense this First Cause is a 'Person,' with what kind of qualities endowed, how formed, how related to man, demanding what of man, all this is left perfectly vague. Let who will, be it in piety, or in utter bewilderment, erect altars to the Unknown God. It may be a graceful thing to do; it may be a soothing relief to the feelings. But let no man imagine that it is in any sense to have a religion." This, most assuredly, leaves no room for doubt as to "the intelligible object of reverence," having to be "personal" or a "Person." Then, he continues, "to have a religion resting on the belief in God, you must have a deep sense of the reality of His being, an inward consciousness that you can understand His will, and can rest in peace and love upon His heart;" because, he says, "a grand 'Perhaps' is not God." Yes, a grand Perhaps is not God, nor, let me add, Humanity, even with a capital H. "The first and last business of religion," he assures us, "is to inspire men and women with a desire to do their duty, to show them what their duty is, to hold out a common end which harmonizes and sanctifies their efforts towards duty, and knits them together in close bonds as they struggle onward towards it." "That," he says, "is religion, the most abiding and the most fruitful of all the social forces." Again, "philosophy and science have given us priceless things, but they have given us no religion, no Providence, no Supreme Centre of our thoughts and our lives." "Man," he contends, "presents us not only with the phenomena of Law, but also with the phenomena of Will, Thought, Love, of sympathy and providence, and trust, and hope, phenomena that are not at all ultimately reducible to sequence and evolution." The human element in the complete synthesis of religion cannot, therefore, be left out. "A true synthesis," Mr. Harrison writes, "must, if it is to concentrate human life, be co-extensive with human nature; it must needs be real; it must perfectly submit to logical verification; it must directly appeal to the whole range of thought, of affection, of energy; it must harmonize all these to one end; and, finally, that one end must be such as can inspire our noblest emotions of Love and Veneration. These tests and qualities are presented by one ideal alone, the ideal of a transfigured Humanity, in which the Past and the Future are bound up, in which the life of each one of us is incorporated and dignified, by which its fruits may be

indefinitely continued." Does not this passage outline Christ, the centre of religious thought, religious enthusiasm, religious devotion? Or, does Mr. Harrison seriously pretend that this Power, human, real, demonstrable, and loveable, this object that can "stir all our intellectual efforts, and reduce them to a system," and which, at the same time, can "dignify and justify our best active exertions, transcending in perpetuity and power, in unimaginable proportions, the utmost duration and power of any single human life," is nothing else but a mere intellectual abstraction, like "Humanity"? Does he, in all earnestness, mean that the culture of that word can "appeal to our noblest affections and sympathies"? That we can look upon it "with Veneration, Attachment, Gratitude, so that our devotional instincts grow to be the dominant motives of our lives"? Does he really fail to perceive that only the "transfigured humanity" of the God-man of Christianity is that "real and beneficent Power which sheds throughout the complex scheme of human organizations harmony, complete and stable, and that gives, at length, peace, the child of harmony alone, to the spirit of the individual man, and to progress throughout the ages of human society"? What else but a God-man can "bind up thought and life into one centre of all ideas, and all activities, by presenting to us the image of one towards whom *all* thoughts can turn, and in serving whom *all* faculties can work"? Let us ask, honestly, who is humanity, what is humanity, and let us consider whether this abstract notion can "inspire men and women with a sense of duty, teach them their duty, and sustain their flagging hearts"; let us ask of humanity "the origin of moral evil, the sense of sin in man's heart, the conflict of self and not-self within us." "Humanity," the central force of Mr. Harrison's creed, is, according to his own words, "a collective notion"; it is "nothing but the sum and substance of all the forces of individual men and women," hence an abstract idea, a term, and as such, of course, unconscious, dead, inert, real, at best, only within the few who can rise to that abstract, collective notion, but forever unintelligible to the "millions in the rude plains of Asia and Africa, where the Hindoo struggles to rear an honest household in his plot of ricefield, and the Fellah yields to the will of heaven with sublime patience." Let it not be forgotten that "the majority of mankind," as Mr. Harrison admits with Sir James Stephen, cannot read, and that they devote their time to nothing but daily labor. How, then, can that "collective notion, Humanity," which "nothing will induce Mr. Harrison to address as a conscious being, or in any way whatever to treat as a Person," be an object of Veneration and Gratitude to these uncultured multitudes? Again, how does Mr. Harrison expect to instill into children "the idealized sum of those human feelings and

duties which all decent men acknowledge in detail and in fact," this being, in his own words, the equivalent of humanity? How, after all Mr. Harrison has said about the indispensable characteristics of the central force of religion, can he expect us to be simple-minded and credulous enough to entertain, for a moment, that something which is neither real, nor a person, nor intelligible; in short, "a collective notion," is able to be the very kernel of religion? Humanity, he must concede, is a fabric woven by imagination out of a correct perception of what the fundamental element of religion should be; add on to humanity what the Unknowable is, give it Personality, Divinity, Omnipresence, and then an adequate object of worship, discipline, and belief stands before us, else it is bound to fade hopelessly out of sight. It is, indeed, incomprehensible to me how so clear-headed an intellect as Mr. Harrison, whose ideas about the very life-essence of religion are so full, so precise, so correct, can fail to see that the truths of Positivism, and the truths of Agnosticism, the postulates of nature and man, of science and life, must be correlated before we can talk about a satisfactory and rational basis of religion. Of course, the moment we correlate these postulates of two entirely independent sets of admirable observations, we are driven to recognize that Christianity, instead of wearing the garb of impossibility any longer, is rendered the one and the only means of harmonizing these otherwise irreconcilable truths, and of understanding the inherent yearning of human nature for religion, that is, for a complete synthesis of life with an adequate object of belief, worship, and discipline. Then church, sacraments, education, priesthood, sacrifice, become at once, from incongruous, if not absurd appendages of any creed, the instrumentalities and channels through which alone religion can hope to be the patrimony of all. Mr. Harrison truly remarks: "Common-sense is too overwhelming to be resisted." And it is common-sense which forbids me to accept, in the face of his lucid teaching, a collective notion as corner-stone of any creed. With full and unstinted measure do I endorse all that Mr. Harrison says religion must be and religion must do. But, because I believe that he outlines, with wondrous perspicuity, the genuine requirements of religion; because his eloquent words bear the mark of truth on their very face; because of all this do I find it utterly impossible to subscribe to "Humanity" as either a rational or a possible basis of religion. "Surely civilized society, with its complex arrangements and involved processes, its multitudinous material products and almost magical instruments, its language, science, literature, art, must be credited to some agency or other," as Mr. Spencer says. Did humanity, a collective notion, unconscious and impersonal, act as that agency? Did this question never suggest

itself to the distinguished apostle of Positivism? So much about "Humanity" as the object of religion.

Leaving out, however, this error, and judging Mr. Harrison's writing only in reference to the practical side of religion, nobody can deny that his perspective discloses many, and these very valuable, truths. Religion, without the element of Humanity and Personality in its central object, appears, henceforth, as irrational as religion without a First and Final Cause, real and necessary, in its central object. Grouping these essentials together, recognizing the necessity of both, recognizing co-existence as a necessary relationship between them, we arrive at the conclusion that religion with a God-man alone comes up to the irrefutable postulates of science, as expounded by the leader of Agnosticism, and the irresistible postulates of life, as expounded by the apostle of Positivism, and this, of course, lands us at the door of that truly Catholic religion against which all forces of the earth, combined together for well-nigh two thousand years, proved absolutely powerless.

Agnosticism, by insisting upon the recognition of God, though piously shrinking from naming the Unknowable so, insists upon what is true, upon what is rational. Positivism, by insisting that the vitalizing force of religion must be human, and that the mission and function of religion lies mainly in the sphere of morality, insists likewise upon what is true, upon what is rational. Thus the postulates, unearthed as the ultimate result of the study of the two main terms of human knowledge, "nature" and "man," lead us to another term, not God simply and purely, as of old, but a God and Man, "Christ." God by Himself remains, indeed, unknowable; God remains too far removed from mankind; God is separated from man by an abyss which man can never cross. Alone by Himself, God, therefore, is not an adequate object of religion. "Humanity," as we have seen, calls out for religion, calls for belief in one of the reality of whose being we have a deep sense and an inward consciousness that we can understand his will and rest in peace and love upon his heart. Thus Positivism declares the adequate object must be human in the true sense of the word, must partake of our nature, etc. Thus, while the object must be Man, it must also be more than Man alone, it must be Christ, Real God and Real Man. Unless there is a God-man, true religion must forever remain a dream. Mr. Harrison does not hesitate to acknowledge that he cannot "speak with indifference, or coldness, much less with contempt," of what he calls "the magnificent conception of an Almighty, All-good, All-loving God." And he sees the dilemma, "How is that conception to be made the basis of a purely human and rational religion?" Certainly not by denying

Christianity's God-man, for without Christ no religious system can be erected that will command not only the respect and assent of cultured men, but also the fervent adhesion of the masses.

The correlation of undisputed truths puts us, then, in this position. Mr. Herbert Spencer, the philosopher of science, says: Science does not furnish an equivalent for "God" in the Christian acceptation of that word, but it establishes that the necessary basis of any rational belief consists in the recognition of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, which is Real and Necessary, and of which science is impotent to deny Personality, Will and Intelligence. As long as this postulate stands as true—I am inclined to think that its truth will outlast even the æons of time this globe may perhaps continue to exist—we have a perfect right to say that any creed which rests on belief in *less* than this scientific equation of the Unknowable is irrational. Agnosticism addresses us thus: "No religion is sound that stands on less than what we call the Unknowable; examine creeds by our definition, and wherever you find the God of a religion to be less than what Agnosticism says the Unknowable is, know that you are cruelly deceived. You must believe in the Unknowable to believe at all." This is all science pretends and claims to say about religion, and most assuredly science is right. On the other hand, Positivism accosts us, and says: "You must believe in much more than the Unknowable. Belief in the Unknowable does not suffice. You must believe in what can be a practical basis of religion, one that men and women and children can readily accept and assimilate." And, again, Positivism's postulates cannot be found fault with, for such an object alone can ever be a really vitalizing force of religion, and in these demands rests the strength of Positivism. Without a positive God, who is yet all human, religion ceases to be a possible structure. That much Mr. Harrison makes perfectly clear, and he has rendered a most signal service to society by lighting up hitherto obscure fields, by establishing with as much force as ability that our highest and noblest emotions, the whole field of action and the whole field of morality, can rest only upon a basis which satisfies heart, brain, and will alike, and can directly appeal to our nature, because akin in nature to our own. This essential basis of religion must, however, be added on to that other basis which reason on the part of science imperatively demands. And what, let us ask, is the result of this rational operation? We find Agnosticism and Positivism no longer out of joint; we find the postulates of both systems harmonized and correlated; we find science and life integrated in a higher order of knowledge, not obtainable by science or by life, but by revelation, by Christ. We find that Christianity, in offering us in the Person of Christ a perfect union of divine and

human elements, offers us the one and only possible real and truly adequate object of religious belief. He is all that science predicates of the Unknownable; He is all that the study of life bids us seek in an adequate object of religion. Religion, from being irrational, becomes rational through revelation. For Christ has spoken, He has revealed Himself, His laws are not unknown; He is at once God, Infinite, Eternal, Omnipresent, All-powerful, an object of awe, of reverence, and also Man, loving fellow-man and beloved, living and the cause of life, and ever ready to listen to a heartfelt prayer for light.

Our age is not inclined to go back to superstition, its tendency is onward and forward. What is untrue is discarded along the whole line of thought, religious, moral, intellectual, scientific. And in this progress we must simply be candid and honest, conceding what must be conceded, and steadfastly denying what outrages our reason. Though Agnosticism cannot give us Christ, though Positivism likewise cannot give us Christ, both systems give us *truths*, and their correlation foreshadows the God-man. Beyond science looms up a faint vision of God; beyond life looms up a faint vision of a transfigured Humanity. The elements of Divinity and the elements of Humanity must be combined to give us an adequate basis of religion, and since they are only combined in Christ, the soundness, the solidity, the unshaken and unshakable firmness of Christianity is once for all established; for without Christ we cannot hope for a religion equally in accordance with science and with life, with "nature" and with "man," and yet centering and integrated in God.

MR. WEBB'S HISTORY OF CATHOLICITY IN KENTUCKY.

The Centenary of Catholicity in Kentucky. By Hon. Ben. J. Webb. One vol. octavo, pp. 594. Louisville: Charles A Rogers. 1884.

WHATEVER the future may have in store for the Catholic Church in the United States, it may be safely said that the first chapter of its history, now drawing to a close, will ever awaken the keenest interest of coming generations. It tells a glorious tale.

A century ago the Church had no organized existence in the United States. The number of Catholics was exceedingly small; they had but few churches, no schools, no colleges, no hierarchy; in short, none of the elements that enter into the fabric of a religious body, except an earnest faith in God and in the divine life and creative power of the Church. Now we count our numbers by millions; flourishing schools, colleges, and academies abound in every State of the Union; our priesthood, ever zealous and devoted, is daily developing its capabilities for its sublime work by striving after a higher standard of ecclesiastical education. Our hierarchy commands the admiration of the world. We are to-day a power in the land, that cannot be ignored and will not brook to be stayed in its progress. The divine vitality of the Church was, of course, the primary cause of this magnificent growth and development. Freedom from that bane of Catholic life, state-interference, and immunity from questionable customs to which, in other countries, a hoary antiquity gives the sanction of law, had much to do with it. The spread of intelligence, the fairmindedness of the American people, the increased facilities for intercourse, come in for their share of credit. But, after all, we must bow in lowly reverence to the heroic men of the olden time, to the pioneers of the faith. They sowed the seed. They nurtured it in its early growth; and now that the seed has grown into a mighty tree, we who enjoy its shelter may well say of them: "Going, they went and wept, casting their seeds; but coming, they shall come with joyfulness, carrying their sheaves." Our nineteenth century is often and deservedly berated for its materialistic tendencies, its frantic struggles to cast off the yoke of the Lord, and its consequent hatred of the Church. It has been, all in all, a very wicked century. But it is neither advisable nor comforting to take too gloomy a view of one's own times. The

very fact that the uglier features of our age are continually paraded before our gaze, makes us sometimes grow despondent and weary. Yet this very century has given us examples of heroic devotion and self-sacrifice that recall the days of the Apostles. It has produced works that rival the brightest achievements of the "ages of faith." For every blasphemy that was uttered, a prayer went up to Heaven. For every blow struck at the Church, brave men and women made ample reparation by countless acts of living faith and love. While this holds good of the Church in general, it is emphatically true of it in our own country.

All history, sacred and profane, opens with the heroic period. The philosophy of history requires that it should be so. The founders of society, the pioneers of faith and civilization, must be heroes. Weak, timid souls can have no part in the work. It requires too much self-denial, too much strength of heart and will, too much confidence in a brilliant future, as contrasted with present cheerlessness, for any but the bravest souls. Such were the men who laid the foundations of the Church in the United States. They laid them broad and deep. Verily may we say of them, and posterity will endorse our verdict: "There were giants in those days!"

It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that every portion of our early history should be carefully preserved. The time has not come to write a general history of the Church in this country. The causes that lie at the bottom of its splendid growth and development have not yet worked out all their legitimate effects. Until then we must perforce content ourselves with local histories, biographies, and kindred monographs. It is a healthy sign of the times that such publications are meeting with a fair measure of success. It is a proof that we hold our predecessors in grateful remembrance, and that we are trying, as far as we can, to follow in their footsteps. Much has already been done in the way of preserving our early history. The late Archbishop Spalding, in his *Sketches of the Early Missions in Kentucky*, and in his *Life of Bishop Flaget*, led the way in this work of love. The late Archbishop Bayley, in his *Life of Bishop Bruté*, and other writings, worked in the same field. It is needless to recall here the invaluable services of John Gilmary Shea, LL.D. Within the last few years Dr. Maes, the newly elected bishop of Covington, in his *Life of Father Charles Nerinckx*, Father Alerding, in his *History of the Diocese of Vincennes*, and Father Lambing, in his researches into the history of the diocese of Pittsburgh, have brought out very valuable contributions to our early Church History. In the *Centenary of Catholicity in Kentucky*, by the Hon. B. J. Webb, we welcome a fresh addition, of incalculable value to our historical literature.

With some authors the writing of history is an effort to marshal an array of facts in support of some preconceived theory; with others it is a matter of love. To this latter class Mr. Webb belongs. He was eminently fitted for the work. It is safe to say that no other man, in or out of Kentucky, could have done it as well. He has been for half a century the veritable guardian of Catholic traditions in Kentucky. Born and brought up in that State, he was, in his youth and early manhood, on terms of intimate acquaintance with the mighty pioneers, the story of whose lives and labors he was destined to recall. As the publisher, and later as the editor, of the first Catholic paper published in Kentucky, he had exceptional means of acquiring knowledge not generally accessible to the public. His terms of service in the Senate of Kentucky threw him into contact with the brightest minds of the State, and widely enlarged the circle of his acquaintance. If we add to all this a thoroughly disciplined mind, a singularly retentive memory, and, above all, an ardent faith and love of the Church, we cannot but acknowledge the thorough fitness of the man for his work.

Mr. Webb is well and favorably known to the Catholic reading public of the country. As editor of the *Guardian* and *Catholic Advocate* newspapers, he secured for himself years ago an enviable position. During the dark days of Knownothingism, when it required both talent and courage to defend the Church, he boldly entered the lists against that brilliant but unscrupulous journalist, George D. Prentice, and in his "Letters of a Kentucky Catholic" dealt such telling blows as to discredit Knownothingism and its mouthpiece forever in Kentucky, and, we may add, throughout the country.

Mr. Webb wields a vigorous pen. His style is easy and graceful, equally free from any labored attempt at fine writing and from those unpleasant familiarities with language so common to old newspaper men. Whenever it is possible, he allows the actors in the scenes through which he leads his reader to tell their story in their own words. This agreeably diversifies the narrative, and relieves it of that dryness and monotony we meet with so often in historical writings. It may be objected by some that too much space is given to the mere recital of names of early Catholic settlers, names unimportant in themselves, and having no direct bearing upon noteworthy historical matters. The author anticipates this objection with the remark, that, as the descendants of men noted for wordly wisdom take pride in their ancestors, the children of Catholic pioneers have reason to be proud of forefathers "best known in their day and generation for their adherence to Catholic truth, and by their compliance with the precepts inculcated by their religion." (Pref., p. 10.) The numerous anecdotes

with which the work is interspersed would, of course, ill befit the dignity of a general history; but as they invariably serve to illustrate the times or the characters of the men portrayed, they have, at least, a secondary value, and are no more out of place in a local history than in a biography. They throw a flood of light on the every-day home life of a hundred years ago, and to know something of the intimate social life of the rugged men and women struggling for existence amid the dangers of the wilderness is, if not solemnly instructive, at least charmingly interesting.

Had Mr. Webb dealt out unstinted praise to all the early Catholic settlers, and to all their spiritual guides, he would have thrown himself open to well-merited suspicion. It would be something bordering on the miraculous if every member of the various Catholic settlements had been a model of Christian perfection; it would be still more strange if every one of the early missionaries had been a type of heroic virtue. Among them there were some, happily very few, whose lives were unworthy of their sublime calling, and whose dark deeds and shameful falls were made more dark and hideous by the brilliant examples of holiness that surrounded them. The evil they wrought in their day survived them, and in tracing effects to their causes the historian is at times reluctantly compelled to drag them from the grave of oblivion. The worst historian is the panegyrist. Truth has its claims as well as charity. It is one thing to gloat over these deplorable deeds, another to set them down as historical facts and as the frightful causes of disaster. Mr. Webb has done the latter; nothing more. It is evident that he has even been at great pains to blend truth and charity together. Could the most fastidious reader demand more? Nor have we any fault to find with Mr. Webb's strictures on ecclesiastical financiering. His short but vigorous lay-sermon on the subject (pp. 310, 311) can give no offence to any one who knows and observes the stringent laws of the Church in this respect.

Serious objections may, however, be made to Mr. Webb's arrangement of his materials. He follows, indeed, the chronological order of events, particularly in the opening chapters of his work. But as noteworthy characters arise, and various institutions come into being, he interrupts too often, in our opinion, the general narrative, to give place to particular sketches, which carry the reader either too far back or too far in advance of the period then described. The result is that we meet at times a series of sketches and biographies, all well, and some of them admirably, written, but too much detached from the thread of the general narrative. But it must be borne in mind that Mr. Webb did not have well-appointed libraries at his disposal, in which to arrange and digest his materials. He had to gather them from far and

near, as best he could, often depending on the time and good will of others. The mere work of collating these materials, and of judging of their relative value, was of itself a heavy task. To make them always dovetail easily into each other, would have been, under the circumstances, well-nigh impossible. A historical work must indeed bristle with facts; but must they invariably be presented in serried ranks of mathematical exactness? Young people, to whom Mr. Webb's work deserves to be specially commended, are usually averse to reading a severely dry chronological array of facts. They want entertainment as well as instruction. They require play for the lighter faculties of their minds, even in their severer studies. The work before us affords them all this, together with those sterner lessons taught by history itself.

The material growth of the Church in Kentucky differs in many points from its development in other States. The early settlers brought with them the almost patriarchal habits of life in which they had been brought up in Maryland and Virginia. They fought manfully, and against fearful odds, to establish their homes in the wilds of the "dark and bloody ground"; but the first hardships once overcome, they settled down to a life of ease and comfort, trusting to time and the natural increase of population for the further advancement of their State. That the system of slavery had much to do with this wide-spread and totally un-American indifference to material progress, cannot be denied. It kept the more energetic and wide-awake citizens of the free eastern and northern States away from Kentucky. The mere fact of its existence was enough to warn off European emigration. This comparative isolation did not, however, mar the happiness of the occupants of the land. They recognized that their lives were cast in pleasant places, and they were content. It led them to cling with something like religious reverence to family histories and old traditions. While in the States north of the Ohio river the waves of immigration literally overwhelmed the descendants of the earlier settlers, and almost blotted out their memory, the Kentuckian cherished in peace, as something sacred, all that relates to the lives and times of his pioneer forefathers. Hence spring that peculiar type of character and that wealth of tradition and folk-lore of the native population, all as strongly marked and characteristic in its way as those we meet with in the more remote localities of New England. Hence, also, arises the fact at which strangers often wonder, that the Catholic congregations in the rural districts of Kentucky are almost exclusively composed of native Americans.

But if the material growth of the Church in Kentucky was slow, its spiritual growth was rapid. It was marvellous. The first priest that set foot on Kentucky soil, the Rev. W. Whelan, an Irish

Franciscan, commenced his labors in 1787. Six years later, the first priest ever ordained in the United States, the Apostle of Kentucky, the Rev. Stephen Theodore Badin, entered upon his missionary career. The first Bishop of Bardstown was appointed in 1808, and consecrated in 1810. An ecclesiastical seminary was at once established; two religious communities were founded; a college and a free school came into being; a stately Cathedral was built; churches sprang up in various parts of the State. Thus, within less than twenty-five years after the arrival of the first missionary, the Church of Kentucky,—the Mother Church of the West,—stood forth complete in its appointments, full of life and eager hope. What more striking proof of the faith and devotion of the early Catholic settlers need we seek? Without their co-operation the Bishop and his priests could not have attained such results. They might have labored, and suffered, and prayed; had not the hearts of their people beat in unison with their own, had the flock not taken pattern from its chief pastor, very little could have been accomplished.

We are convinced that it was the ready appreciation of the fact that he had to deal with a people endowed with sterling virtues, that led Bishop Flaget to establish the ecclesiastical seminary, immediately after his arrival in Kentucky. As a rule, we do not look for ecclesiastical vocations among a people struggling in a wilderness and hampered with the difficulties incident to the rudimentary stages of society. They usually manifest themselves in thoroughly organized communities where the beauties of God's house can be leisurely studied and taken to heart, and where the faint whispering of grace may not be drowned amid the all-engrossing cares of every-day life. Bishop Flaget had the keen insight of a saint. He understood his people. He felt sure that among the children of those whose faith, hope, and charity showed such wonderful life, he would surely find some called by God to the service of the altar. He was not mistaken. A band of sturdy young men came from the forests and fields of Kentucky, and gathered around their saintly Bishop. Hardship and toil had been their portion from childhood. They looked for nothing else in the seminary. The transition from the discipline of a Christian home to that of the seminary was to them natural and easy. To these first-fruits of Catholicity in Kentucky must, in justice, be added a number of young men who, like Abraham of old, went forth out of their country and from their kindred, to work for the salvation of souls in the distant wilds of Kentucky. France and Germany, Belgium and Ireland, sent thither some of their noblest sons. Under the watchful eye of their Bishop, and with his example continually before their eyes, these youthful Levites

studied, and labored, and prayed. A good and holy man has said that the seminarian is the priest in embryo. Bishop Flaget's seminarians illustrated the truth of this saying. With but very few exceptions, they proved themselves men of unbounded devotion and self-sacrifice, men admirably suited for their times, men of God. The most pathetic pages in Mr. Webb's work are those which tell the story of Bishop Flaget's seminary.

In the establishment and conduct of his seminary Bishop Flaget was powerfully seconded by his intimate friend, Father David, who became his coadjutor in 1819. The following pen picture is given of him by Mr. Webb: "Father David was of average stature, possibly five and a half feet in height, of moderately full habit, deliberate in his speech, and retiring in his manners. He had little of the vivacity that is supposed to be a distinguishing characteristic of the French people, and in this particular he presented a strong contrast to his countryman and fellow-worker of the Kentucky mission, Rev. S. T. Badin. He rarely went into society, and never without a motive that had reference to the good of others, and not personal gratification. He could talk, and he could reason, eloquently and logically, but he gave his tongue no license except in the pulpit, in the class-room, and in the lecture-field. With the exception, possibly, of Rev. Charles Nerinckx, Father David showed more tendency to asceticism than any ecclesiastic that has appeared in Kentucky up to the present day. I have no remembrance of any occasion on which he was seen to laugh. He could smile, however, but his smiles were always for the encouragement of those who had previously laid open to him their spiritual or bodily miseries. Without being in any degree repulsive, his manners, so far as the general public were concerned, lacked the attractiveness that was so pleasing a characteristic in those of Bishop Flaget. To others than those with whom his intercourse was constant and intimate, he appeared as one who was too much occupied with serious matters to warrant interruptions, except for a better object than the pleasure to be derived from his conversations. It was not so with his seminarians, nor with his penitents. These feared not to approach him, because they were able to fathom the depths of his humility. To their eyes he presented an image of his Great Master, whose voice sounded in their ears as he spoke: 'Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.'"

Bishop David was a man of commanding ability. He was often, though reluctantly, drawn into controversy with the Protestant preachers of his day. To defeat them was easy enough, for they were almost invariably densely ignorant, not only of Catholic doctrine and practice, but even of the tenets of their own sects. The reader of to-day is less astonished at the depth of learning dis-

played by the Bishop in his controversial writings than by the never-failing patience and boundless charity displayed towards his opponents. His Catechisms of Christian Doctrine have gone through innumerable editions, are still in general use, and are, in the opinion of many, the best we have in the United States. That he was a thorough master of the spiritual life is evinced in his eight-days' "Retreat," written for the Sisters of Charity of Nazareth, and edited and published about twenty years ago by the late Archbishop Spalding.

It is a wide-spread opinion that most of the early missionaries trained by Bishop David were wofully deficient in learning. It is true, indeed, that many a one among them could truthfully say with the poet of old: "I ken but little Latin and no Greek." But to be a good theologian one need not necessarily be an accomplished classical scholar. Because they dressed in homespun, despised social shams, cared little for the refinement and elegance of later days, and spoke the homely language of their people, it does not follow that they were deficient in theological lore. Some of the most profound theological arguments the writer ever listened to fell from the lips of some of the early missionaries of Kentucky. The very knowledge of the fact that their seminary career had been exceedingly short impelled them to earnest study in after years. Besides, they had for a long time in their midst such men as the late Archbishops Kenrick and Spalding, and the late Bishop McGill, of Richmond, Va., men whose profound learning exercised a most salutary influence on their less favored brethren. While on this subject we may note the singular fact that a considerable number of Bishop David's seminarians found their way into the Society of Jesus, into which as a rule none but men of marked ability are admitted.

The establishment of a diocesan seminary in the very earliest days of the church in Kentucky led to two noteworthy results. In the first place, it gave the clergy a homogeneity vainly looked for in places where the priests have not been brought up together, and have little in common, except the sacerdotal character and similarity of occupation. Their seminary career welded the priests of Kentucky into a band of brothers. This spirit of union and love was carefully fostered by Bishops Flaget and David. We find ample evidence of it on almost every page of Mr. Webb's work. Long after these good and holy men had gone to their reward, the fraternal spirit they had infused into their students survived. When the old theological seminary ceased to exist, it was transplanted to the preparatory seminary of St. Thomas. We do not hesitate to assert, and there are many priests in every part of the country who will bear us out in the statement, that the ties of

Christian union and charity were nowhere stronger or more tenderly cherished than at St. Thomas'. The students felt that no other spirits could predominate in a place hallowed by Bishops Flaget and David. They had much to endure, and were occasionally loud in their complaints. But they never lost sight of the fact that, however much they might have to suffer, they were infinitely better off than their predecessors, better and holier men than themselves had ever been. This single thought was usually sufficient to silence all complaints. Much credit is due to the late Very Rev. Francis Chambige, for many years superior of St. Thomas', and himself a worthy disciple of Bishop David, for his untiring efforts to keep alive among his students the sacred spirit of the olden time. It is to be regretted that Mr. Webb's biographical sketch of this good man is so very brief and meagre. He probably was unable to find the requisite materials, for Father Chambige was as modest and retiring as he was learned and zealous.

To the establishment of the seminary is also due the rapid development of higher secular education in Kentucky. St. Joseph's College, St. Mary's, and the whilom flourishing Institute of Mt. Merino, owe their origin to it. For more than a quarter of a century after its foundation the Catholic Colleges of Kentucky were almost the only centres of literary activity in the West. What Mt. St. Mary's, near Emmittsburg, Maryland, did for the East, was done for the West and Southwest by St. Mary's and St. Joseph's colleges. Bishops Flaget and David, and in later years Bishop Spalding, directed all their energies to this great work. It would indeed be difficult to determine whether they labored more in the immediate field of their high ministry, or in the spread of education. At an early day they summoned to their assistance the Jesuit Fathers, and their united efforts placed the Catholic educational establishments of the State in the very front rank of literary institutions—a position which, we are happy to say, they hold even in our day.

The same spirit of ardent faith which built Bishop Flaget's seminary, also founded two religious female communities. The infant Church of Kentucky was yet struggling for existence when a few noble women, all native Kentuckians, conceived the thought of consecrating themselves to God in the religious life. That a few women, without resources, without experience, without powerful friends, in short, without a single human prerequisite to success, should dream, in an humble log hut, and in a society yet in its formative stages, of establishing lasting and powerful communities, may seem strange and absurd to the world. But nothing is impossible to faith. Of these devoted ladies not one had ever seen a convent or a religious. God gave them, however, wise and prudent guides. "The Friends of Mary at the Foot of the Cross," better

known as the Sisters of Loretto, were organized into a religious community by Father Nerinckx. In his admirable Life of that holy man, Bishop Maes gives the full history of this sisterhood. The Sisters of Charity of Nazareth were organized, the same year as those of Loretto (1812), by Bishop David. We would but mar the beauty of the story of these sisterhoods if we allowed ourselves to sketch an outline of it. Suffice it to say that they were the first religious communities founded west of the Allegheny mountains, that the humble log huts that first gave them shelter have grown into grand convents and academies, and that they have done, and are still doing, more good than tongue or pen can ever tell. Had Mr. Webb done nothing more than unfold the wondrous history of these two communities, he would have rendered an incalculable service to the Catholic history of our country.

Two among the early missionaries, Fathers Stephen T. Badin and Robert Abell, claim the special attention of Mr. Webb throughout his work. He dwells lovingly on every detail of their lives and labors. For this he gives a satisfactory reason in his preface. We may emphasize this reason by the single statement that he could not have written the history of the Church in Kentucky without giving them special prominence. They were grand and good men, typical pioneers of the Faith. Their zeal was boundless, their powers of endurance enormous. They loved the wilderness with all its hardships—one by the law of adaptation, the other by that of his very nature. Around them cluster nearly all the old Catholic traditions of Kentucky. The lonely life they were obliged to lead never made them morose or soured their temper. Father Abell was brimful of wit and good humor, even in his extreme old age. Though he was not a profound theologian, he could display to advantage all he knew. He was an orator by nature. It is even said that in his prime he fairly disputed the palm for popular eloquence with Kentucky's "Great Commoner"—Henry Clay. Father Badin, though genial and kind, had a less sunny temperament. He was a strict disciplinarian. He never failed to make the wayward of his flock feel that the way of the transgressor is hard. Strange tales are told of the penances he used to inflict in the confessional—penances which would make the hair of the penitents of our day stand on end. It has even been hinted that he was somewhat affected by that Jansenistic rigor, the remnants of which still lingered in the schools of France at the time he was a student. This is certainly untrue. We find the true explanation of his course in the fact that he suffered heroically for his Divine Master, and he therefore naturally concluded that those under his charge were also willing and able to suffer for His sake.

He was an accomplished scholar. His poem on the Blessed Trinity, which Mr. Webb gives in the appendix of his work, is a model of classical latinity. A metrical translation by one of Mr. Webb's clerical friends is appended. Though not devoid of merit, it is, in loftiness of sentiment and beauty of expression, far inferior to the original.

Nearly all the early missionaries of Kentucky have gone to their reward. Two or three, only, remain, providentially left us to be eye-witnesses of the glorious results of a century's work. Cardinal Newman, writing to a gentleman who had sent him a copy of Mr. Webb's book, says: "You could not give me a gift more interesting to me than the work of the Hon. B. J. Webb. I take the greatest pleasure in reading the accounts given by old priests here of the state of religion a century ago, when zealous and able missionaries saw in their lifetime no or little fruit of their labors; and the same feelings of sympathy and triumph are excited by various parts of Mr. Webb's narrative." These sentiments of the great English Cardinal will no doubt be shared by thousands of Mr. Webb's readers. He undertook his task with diffidence, worked at it conscientiously, and, in spite of many difficulties and discouragements, has brought it to a successful close. He well deserves the thanks and practical encouragement of the Catholic public, not only in Kentucky, but throughout the country. His work will undoubtedly ever be one of the chief sources from which the material for the future general history of the Church in the United States will be drawn.

FREE THOUGHT IN NEW ENGLAND.

Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. Boston: Houghton & Co. 1885.

Poems. By R. W. Emerson. Boston: Monroe & Co. 1847.

Proceedings at a Reception in Honor of Rev. O. B. Frothingham. New York: Putnam's Sons. 1879.

History of the People of the United States. By John Bach McMaster. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1883.

The Blue Laws of Connecticut and New Haven, etc. By Trumbull. Hartford. 1876.

The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, Containing the Confession of Faith, etc. Philadelphia: Haswell & Co. 1838.

Self-culture. By W. E. Channing. Boston. 1839.

Three Sermons of Lyman Beecher, on his Trial before the Presbytery and Synod of Cincinnati. Boston. 1852.

The Works of Jonathan Edwards. By S. E. Dwight. New York: Converse. 1829.

THE five millions or so of Americans who live in that part of the United States known as New England, and who are vulgarly called "Yankees," have probably the most interesting history in our great republic. Living in a cold, and not the most fertile, climate, their natural energy and astuteness have been stimulated by their physical environment. Their forefathers, exiles from England on account of stubborn hostility to the forms of its national creed and aristocracy, imparted to their posterity all the doggedness of the lower orders of the Saxon race. Sojourners for a time in clean, persistent, industrious, and Calvinistic Holland, they carried to Massachusetts the spirit and manners of the Dutch republic, and the theology of the Synod of Dort. Always unyielding when conscience prompted rebellion, the crop-haired Puritan showed the same stubbornness in his secular life that he manifested in his theological opinions. He fought well, whether against the king and church at home, or against the Indian in the colony; as he dug hard with the spade to force the reluctant soil to yield him sustenance, or as he studied deeply and applied his intellectual powers to industrial and mechanical pursuits, so, in course of time, he became a fierce and subtle polemist, a successful farmer, a good

soldier, and a great inventor. That a character thus formed, by persecution at home and by hard labor abroad, should be somewhat narrow and intolerant was to be expected ; for none are so severe on others as they who spare no weakness of their own, unless an elevated charity should intervene. But no such charity pervaded the Puritan community. Their theology was essentially intolerant and vindictive, for it was the theology of John Calvin in its most unmitigated form. Stern, unrelenting, dark, and bloody was the theological system of the iron ruler of Geneva—the executioner of Michael Servetus. It brooded over the Puritan community like a bird of ill omen, whose sable wings kept the sunlight of true charity out of the Puritan heart. It was a re-establishment, after sixteen hundred years of broadening Christianity, of the strict literalism and exclusiveness of the Mosaic theocracy, necessitated once for the protection of the faith and morals of the people of God by the unnatural vices and degrading idolatry of the neighboring Moabite, Amalekite, and Philistine. The Puritan seemed to study the Old rather than the New Testament. His theology went back three thousand years—to Moses rather than to Christ. He leaped over the Gospels, and their spirit of Christian benevolence, to study Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers; and these he perused by night and by day, until he became a Jew in religious spirit, although a Christian in name. " He seemed to worship God for spite," as Hudibras puts it. His commonwealth became a Mosaic theocracy, in its laws, ordinances, and customs, in everything except in its ritual and ceremonies. For these he had no mercy. They were identified in his mind with prelacy and persecution. They had driven him into exile from the green meadows and hawthorn hedges of pleasant England to the swamps and dykes of Holland, to the rugged rocks of Plymouth and the inhospitable banks of the Connecticut. Therefore did he hate a bishop as a child of the devil, lawn sleeves and a surplice as Moabitish idolatry, and Christian holidays as an invention of Satan; although he might have found in the same Mosaic law from which he drew his political inspiration and his respect for the Sabbath, a ceremonial as rich and holy days nearly as many as existed in the prelatical church of England or the Papal church of Rome. But logical as is the Calvinistic theology, if you once admit its premises, and logical as the old New Englander naturally was, and consequently narrow,—for all logic is rigid,—his hatred of the oppressing church got the better of his reason. He took, therefore, from Moses what pleased him, and ignored what was hostile to his prejudices. He united church and state in a strict alliance, allowed no one to vote in the state who was not in good standing in the church, enacted ordinances against heresy and blasphemy, adopted the penal code

of the Pentateuch, and improved on it with a spirit worthy of Draco, while he rejected all ceremonies as heathenish no matter what might be the Bible warrant for their use:

> "For his religion it was fit
> To match his learning and his wit,
> 'Twas Presbyterian true blue."[1]

"He held it an abomination to read a novel, to see a play, to go to a dance, to make a jest, to sing a comic song, to eat a dinner cooked on Sunday, or to give a present on Christmas day."[2] Among these Puritans "religion and law were almost identical, and in their character both were so thoroughly infused that the mildest and the severest acts of public discipline were alike made venerable and awful. Meagre, indeed, and cold, was the sympathy that a transgressor might look for from such bystanders at the scaffold; on the other hand, a penalty which, in our days, would infer a degree of mocking infamy and ridicule, might then be invested with almost as stern a dignity as the punishment of death itself."[3] To each of the laws of Massachusetts imposing the death penalty a text or texts of Scripture were appended in justification of the punishment.

Throughout the New England colonies this Mosaic severity pervaded the whole legislation. A burglar, for the first offence, was branded on the forehead with the letter B; for the second, branded and whipped; for the third offence, put to death. If the first offence were done on the Lord's day, he was condemned to have an ear cut off in addition to being branded. A child of sixteen years of age, or over, convicted of striking a parent, was put to death. It was death to practice idolatry. Witches, blasphemers, or those who cursed God or were guilty of bestiality, were punished with death. Sodomy, adultery,[4] rape, and perjury which resulted in taking away another's life, were also capital offences. In Connecticut, an incorrigible child, if sixteen years old, could be brought by his parents before the magistrate and, on conviction, be condemed to death.

An "open contemner" of the Gospel was obliged, on conviction, to stand two hours on a stool four feet high, on a lecture day, with a paper on his breast specifying his crime. A fine of five shillings was imposed on those who stayed away from church without just cause. If an Indian stole he had to pay double; and if he com-

[1] Hudibras.

[2] A History, etc., John Bach McMaster, p. 20.

[3] The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne, p. 60.

[4] The reader may remember the punishment for this crime inflicted on Hester Prynne, as described in Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter, probably the best of our American novels, and the best description of the habits of the early Puritans.

mitted some crime against the person, he was punished by the *lex talionis*, "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." No one was allowed to remain in a liquor store or inn after 9 P.M., or to drink more than half a pint of wine at once, or to stay more than half an hour in any inn or public house. Those who violated these laws were fined, or put in the stocks for three hours. A liar, if over fourteen years old, was fined ten shillings for the first lie, or condemned to stand three hours in the stocks; for the second offence, he was whipped, or fined twenty shillings; and for the third sin, he received thirty strokes of the lash on the bare back. A similar punishment was inflicted on slanderers; and female culprits were not exempted from the ignominy. Swearing was punished by the penalty of three hours' standing in the stocks; smoking publicly, by a fine of sixpence, and the habit was not permitted even privately to those under twenty years of age. This law was the same both in Massachusetts and in Connecticut.[1] It was even forbidden to play cards or dice in private families.

Philip Ratcliffe was fined forty pounds, whipped, and had his ears cut off for slandering the church of Salem. Robert Shorthouse, for swearing by the blood of God, was sentenced to have his tongue *put into a cleft stick* "and to stand so by the space of half an hour."[2] There were laws in Massachusetts against extravagance in dress, against the use of silver, gold, silk laces, girdles, and hatbands, and even against the wearing of long hair.

In the New Haven colony heresy was severely punished, and incest was punished with death. For sending a love-letter without the girl's parents' consent, the love-sick swain was fined forty shillings. In this colony, breaking the Sabbath "proudly and presumptuously" *was punished with death*, and the Scripture warrant, Numb. xv., from 30th to 36th verses, is given for the penalty.[3]

As late as the middle of the seventeenth century, A.D. 1638, Elizabeth, wife of Thomas Aplegate, was condemned to have her tongue put in a cleft stick, and "so to stand for half an hour," for swearing; and Robert Bartlet, for a similar crime, had to undergo a similar punishment. These evidences of early Puritan rigor are not taken from Peters's work on the *Blue Laws of New England*, which contains much that is fictitious, but from Trumbull's more recent book, written expressly to correct Peters's mistakes, and by one whose whole aim is to apologize for Puritan severity and extenuate the rigor of the early legislation of the New England colonists.

Yet, much as we may now condemn the harshness of these early laws, we must admire the deep religiosity and austere morality of the misguided lawgivers. Their very failings resulted from the

[1] Trumbull's Blue Laws, etc. [2] Ibid., p. 334. [3] Ibid., p. 343.

exaggeration of God's providence, before which they sacrificed human free will; from a superstitious extolling of grace, before which they immolated nature; and from a blind adoration of the Bible, whose plenary inspiration they extended to every letter and even comma in the vernacular version, and whose expressions they misinterpreted by the baldest and most rigorous verbalism. They forgot that free will and reason are the works of God as well as grace and the Bible. They sinned by excess rather than by defect. The Bible was their exclusive law, infallible in every word, inspired in every letter, and each Puritan was its high priest, sharing its inspiration and its infallibility by a communication which he believed he directly received from the Holy Spirit in its perusal. He conned it over and over. He knew it by heart. He forced his children to learn it by rote. He named them after its names, and formed them after its ordinances. He punished lying, unchastity, and swearing with great severity, and he strove to bring up a God-fearing and a Sabbath-respecting race. "The discipline of the family in those days was of a far more rigid kind than now. The frown, the harsh rebuke, the frequent application of the rod, enjoined by Scriptural authority, were used not merely in the way of punishment for actual offences, but as a wholesome regimen for the growth and promotion of all childish virtues."[1] The education of the children was essentially Christian. The early New Englander was not a believer in godless education. In the preamble of the colonial decrees, ordering the establishment of schools, the motive is always given, namely, that the children may learn the grounds of Christian faith and know how to read the Scriptures. This is true not only of the primary schools, but also of the colleges and universities. In 1701, Yale College was incorporated for the "upholding and propagating of the Christian Protestant religion by a succession of learned and *orthodox* men." The same spirit of religion pervaded their whole system. No doubt, the system was too severe. The Puritan's house, especially on the Sabbath, became a dungeon. From sundown on Saturday to sundown on Sunday the children were tortured by their Puritan parents. No romping, no play, no recreation; but gloom, religion, and study for the young culprits who had the misfortune to be born of parents who believed in "total depravity" and in Calvin's doctrine of election and reprobation. Woe to the young maiden who dared to receive a love-letter without her parents' knowledge, and double woe to the youth who sent it, if he were found out. The Puritan protected the purity of his home. He put the adulterer or the adulteress to death. He insisted on the publication of the banns, for eight days before marriage, with a severity greater

[1] Scarlet Letter, p. 105. 15th edition. New York: Houghton.

than that of the Catholic Church; and although he did not believe that marriage is a sacrament, still he respected it as a holy ordinance, and, consequently, divorce was not frequent in the colonies so long as the old Puritan legislation and spirit held sway.

But this could not be for a long time. The severity was abnormal. Puritan cohesion had an essential element of dissolution in the principle of private interpretation of the Bible; and ultra-Calvinistic theology was too repugnant to reason and nature to be able long to hold its own against the army of liberals and skeptics who soon assailed it under the banner of liberalism and *free thought.* The children grew tired of the burdens imposed on them, especially on the Sabbath. They cursed the day, and the system that enforces its observance with such rigor. "Mother," pleaded a little Puritan boy, "since science tells us that the sun goes down eight minutes before its beams disappear in the horizon, the Sabbath ought to end eight minutes earlier than you make it." "In that case, my son," replied the pious Puritan lady, "we must begin the Sabbath eight minutes earlier on Saturday." "I cursed the day," said the boy, now a distinguished Catholic priest, "and made up my mind that when I became a man I would never go to church at all; and I resolved that, if ever I had children, I would not let them go to church." "How did the children spend Saturday evening?" "In silence, reading Sunday-school lessons, and kicking one another's shins under the table." This excessive repression of the child's nature has driven many a man out of the Puritan church. Some, by the grace of God, have become Catholics; others, yielding to the spirit of doubt and the devil,—and alas! they are the most numerous class,—have gone into Unitarianism, rationalism, and infidelity.[1] Calvinism slowly dissolved in New England until at length only scattered fragments of it were left, like the patches of snow seen in the fields after a February thaw. The change in New England theology was by no means a sudden event. Even in the days of the most orthodox Puritanism, bickerings, dissensions, and quarrels were frequent. Even the great Jonathan Edwards was obliged to separate from his congregation at Northampton owing to theological disagreement with his flock, long before he wrote on "*free-will*" and "*original sin.*" It would be long and difficult to trace the various shades of opinion and of school into which the Congregational churches divided long before Whitefield preached in Massachusetts, or Taylor, Fitch, and Goodrich innovated in New Haven, or Lyman Beecher was tried for those anti-Calvinistic doctrines which Catharine Beecher taught with impunity. There is even now a variety of hue rivalling the chameleon among the opin-

[1] Ingersoll, in his lectures, publicly states one of the causes of his apostasy from Christianity to be the reaction from this Calvinistic rigor.

ions not only of New England Christians, but even of New England transcendentalists, from superstitious Cotton Mather to irreverent Henry Ward Beecher, from Theodore Parker to Emerson and O. B. Frothingham, from the Andover *Review* to the *New Englander* and the *Atlantic Monthly*. We may, however, consider this change in two stages of its development, the one represented by the giving up of the old Calvinistic doctrines regarding election and reprobation, free-will and total depravity; the transition from the old to the new school Presbyterians; the other marked by a complete negation of the supernatural, of the divinity of Christ, and of all revealed religion; by a denial first proceeding to Socinianism or Unitarianism, and thence to "transcendentalism," which is but a polite name for skepticism, pantheism, and sheer atheism. In these two stages of religious, or rather irreligious, progress the prominent figures of Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo Emerson loom up as coryphei, around whom lesser lights group, not in chronological order, but certainly in subordination of intelligence and leadership. "There were brave men before Agamemnon," but there were no abler exponents of new school Presbyterianism before Edwards, nor of New England transcendentalism before Emerson.

Jonathan Edwards was born at East Windsor, Connecticut, in A.D. 1703, at a time when John Calvin's theology was still the prevailing system of the New England Protestant churches. This system, in which Edwards was at first a bigoted believer, but which he afterwards considerably modified, contained the following fundamental principles.

According to Calvin, God created from all eternity some men for the purpose of making them eternally happy, and others for eternal damnation, irrespective of any personal merit or demerit. The elect show forth His goodness; the reprobate glorify His justice. If it be objected to this harsh doctrine that God could not be glorified by creating men for the purpose of eternally torturing them, it is answered that the objection is impertinent. God is absolute Master, bound by no law, and can take out of the same tree one part to ornament His house and another to burn. God causes the reprobate to commit sin that He may show forth His justice in their punishment. He does not merely permit sin, as Catholics hold, but He really ordains and decrees its commission. But, although He is thus the author of sin, it is no sin for Him; for, as He is above all law, He cannot be held responsible for what is a violation of law! In other words, it is sin for man, although he is in it by a leaden necessity, and it is not for God, because He is bound by no law. A necessary consequence of this theory of election and predestination is that man has no free-will. Calvin, in his treatise on the *Slave Will*, distinctly teaches this. Man has no

power to act or not to act, to do good or to do evil, and everything in him proceeds necessarily from the decree of God, in whose hand he is but potter's clay or a leaden mass. Man is essentially corrupt in all his faculties by Adam's sin. He is totally depraved, incapable of good; iniquity from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot. Salvation is not possible to all men, but to the elect only; and, though others may be externally called, they cannot be saved, because they have been foreordained to evil by God. Christ died, not for all, but only for the elect. The reprobate receive none of His grace whatsoever. The elect receive it, and are necessitated by it to do good, for it would be impious to suppose that men could resist divine grace. The commandments of God are in many cases impossible both for the just and for the wicked. Men are not saved for keeping them, nor damned for breaking them. The elect are kept humble by God's causing them to fall into sin; and the wicked, being destitute of all grace, and predestined to the eternal fires of hell, of course are unable to keep any of God's ordinances. Justification is purely an external act of God, and man has neither act nor part in it. It is a covering up of his iniquities by the cloak of divine election, and not the washing out of sin by free human acts, prompted and aided by divine grace.

A revolt against this doctrine was made as early as the latter end of the sixteenth century, in Holland by Hermanzoon, or Arminius, the renowned preacher of Amsterdam; but even a slight modification of it was slow in coming to the grim-visaged and hard-hearted New England Puritans. To this doctrine, more like to pagan fatalism and Turkish predestination than to a teaching of the merciful and just God of the Christians, even the great intellect of Edwards paid early homage. "From my childhood up," he writes, "my mind had been full of objection against the doctrine of God's sovereignty in choosing whom He would to eternal life, and rejecting whom He pleased; leaving them eternally to perish and be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me."[1] He goes on to state, however, that at last he found in this doctrine great consolation and even "delight," until maturer years had brought to him the convictions which he gives in his treatise on "*Original Sin*." This work was published in A.D. 1759, and although in it the author is far removed from the liberal opinions of Arminius and from Catholic truth, yet there is considerable change from the old and degrading theory of Calvin on the same subject. In it the author maintains that although there is in human nature a prevailing and effectual tendency to that sin which implies the utter ruin of all, and which comes from

[1] Life and works of Edwards, in ten volumes, S. E. Dwight, vol. i., p. 60.

Adam, yet that human appetites and passions are in themselves "innocent." He further denies the positive agency of God in producing sin. The innocent principles of nature are passions like love, hatred, fear, desire, joy, sorrow, etc., and are not sin, but only a propensity to it.[1] But in an earlier work, entitled "*A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notion of that Freedom of the Will which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue, Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame*," published in 1754, Edwards came out boldly against the slavery of the will as maintained by Calvin, and strongly marked the line between the new and the old schools in New England Presbyterianism and Congregationalism. Edwards had evidently been studying Quesnel, Baius, and the Jansenists, and in fact his theology, still the prevailing one regarding free-will among Presbyterians, holds the same relationship to the old New England theology that Jansenism holds to Calvinism in the eyes of Catholic theologians. He teaches that the mere power of choosing or willing constitutes freedom, and that man has the *natural* ability to choose, but that accompanying it there is a *moral* inability to elect contrary to the predominant motive or sufficient reason. He says there is no necessity from without compelling a man to choose this rather than that; but there is a certainty from within that he will choose this rather than that, because he must choose for a sufficient cause. This teaching is far from the Arminian, and certainly far from that of the Council of Trent. The trite quotation, "*sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas*," aptly renders the true doctrine to be held on this subject. The will is free to act for a reason or for none at all, with or without a sufficient cause; and the inner consciousness of every sane and mature human being attests the existence of such a faculty. Nothing is clearer to man than that he can think or believe as he pleases. His freedom to act depends on external circumstances alone.

Nor was the logical New England intellect slow to push farther on than Edwards in this line of progress. The free-thinking Yankee began to investigate more closely the texts invoked by the Presbyterians for their theories of Total Depravity. His nature, essentially energetic and manly, revolted against this doctrine. He felt free-will throbbing in his bosom. He loved political freedom and free discussion. He was daily conquering the reluctant glebe and the dense forest with spade and axe. He felt in himself the force of nature and the force of will, certain natural good qualities which had no direct connection with the Church, the parson, or theology; and living in a climate which continually stimulated to labor and energy, fatalism and the fetich of Total Depravity gradu-

[1] Ibid., p. 557.

ally disappeared from his religious belief. He became in course of time an out-and-out Pelagian. He who felt how much the forces of nature and natural talent could do in secular life in reclaiming waste lands or producing new inventions, gradually came to judge that they could be equally efficacious in the domain of religion. So he gave up Calvin's theory of necessitating grace; gave up belief in grace altogether. A free man in politics, he could not brook to be a slave in theology; and so, step by step, he marched from Jonathan Edwards and liberal Presbyterianism to William Ellery Channing and Socinianism, to Theodore Parker, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Transcendentalism. The heresy of Socinus kept pace with the opinions of Arminius in undermining New England orthodoxy. The spirit of Arius and Pelagius was abroad among the Puritans. Emerson, in an article published in the *Atlantic Monthly* for November, 1883, though written long before, speaking of Dr. Ripley, his grandfather, writes: "He was identified with the ideas and forms of the New England Church which expired about the same time with him, so that he and his coevals seemed the rear guard of the great camp and army of the Puritans, which, however, in its last days declining into formalism, in the heyday of its strength had planted and liberated America."[1] This was at the beginning of the present century; but long before it Unitarianism had made inroads on Calvinian orthodoxy. The Church of England, too, had increased in numbers. "The true high-caste religions of that day," the beginning of this century, "were white-handed Unitarianism and ruffled-shirt Episcopalianism."[2] Nothing better indicates the weakening of the hold of Puritanism on the New England mind than the introduction of the theatre and stage plays into New England cities. Yet it was "not till the close of Washington's first administration that a company of players dared to show themselves in the town" of Boston[3]; yet in A.D. 1804 Unitarian liberalism had so fermented in the Puritan mass that the "*Anthology*," a New England magazine, and the literary precursor of the *North American Review*, could publish with impunity a prospectus which stated that "the child," meaning the new periodical, "shall not be destitute of the manners of a gentleman, nor a stranger to genteel amusements. He shall attend Theatres, Museums, Balls, and whatever polite diversions the town shall furnish."[4] Unitarianism became in the early part of this century the ruling form of belief among the cultivated classes of both of the two great New England centres, the town of Boston and the University of Cambridge. Kirkland was head of the college, and the names of Ware,

[1] Life of Emerson, p. 15.
[2] Life of Emerson, p. 34.
[3] McMaster, p. 93.
[4] Life of Emerson, p. 30.

Norton, Palfrey, Freeman, Lowell, Buckminster, Everett, and above all William Ellery Channing, shine out as the most aggressive and the most able New England disciples of Arius and Socinus. But their Unitarianism was old-fashioned compared to what afterwards became the system of transcendentalists and the philosophers of the "Brook Farm." From Jonathan Edwards the descent was easy to Mayhew, from him to Channing, and then to Emerson, Theodore Parker, Thoreau, and O. B. Frothingham.

"The passage is like that which leads from the highest lock of a canal to the ocean level. It is impossible for human nature to remain permanently shut up in the highest lock of Calvinism. If the gates are not opened, the mere leakage of belief or unbelief will before long fill the next compartment, and the freight of doctrine finds itself on the lower level of Arminianism or Pelagianism, or even subsides to Arianism. From this level to that of Unitarianism the outlet is freer, and the subsidence more rapid. And from Unitarianism to Christian Theism the passage is largely open for such as cannot accept the evidence of the supernatural in the history of the Church."[1] Free thought in New England did not, however, stop at the mere denial of the supernatural. It denied the existence of God. It became pantheistic, socialistic, skeptical. It gave up the Bible for Spinosa, Plato, Porphyry, and Plotinus. It became a dreamy, watery metaphysicism, without dogma or purpose, and it has brought the New England mind to the verge of absolute atheism. No one has had more influence in this direction than Emerson. Theodore Parker is more aggressive, but, therefore, the less winning. O. B. Frothingham is, at best, only an echo of the great Transcendentalist prophet. Thoreau, of Walden Cottage fame, is but a savage of the school. Margaret Fuller, A. Bronson Alcott, George Ripley, James Freeman Clarke, Eliot Cabot, John S. Dwight, C. P. Cranch, and most of the other writers for the Transcendentalist organ, the *Dial*, are but Emerson's pupils or echoes, while George Ripley and the other Philansterians of "Brook Farm" were rather disciples of the Frenchmen, Le Roux and St. Simon, than of the Yankee poet and philosopher. In fact, he rather discouraged the project, and somewhat mocked it in his writings. "It was a noble and generous movement," he says, "in the projectors to try an experiment of better living. One would say that impulse was the rule in the society, without centripetal balance; perhaps it would not be severe to say, intellectual sansculottism, an impatience of the formal, routinary character of our educational, religious, social, and economical life in

[1] Life of Emerson, by Holmes, p. 51, himself a fair specimen of the modern New England freethinker.

Massachusetts."[1] And again, speaking of the opposition of the married women to the "Philanstery," he writes in his "*Historic Notes*": "It was to them like the brassy and lacquered life in hotels. The common school was well enough, but to the common nursery they had grave objections. Eggs might be hatched in ovens, but the hen, on her own account, much preferred the old way. A hen without her chickens was but half a hen."[2] Again: "The founders of the 'Brook Farm'[3] should have this praise, that they made what all people try to make, an agreeable place to live in. . . . . The art of letter-writing, it is said, was immensely cultivated. Letters were always flying, not only from house to house, but from room to room. It was a perpetual pic-nic, a French Revolution in small, an Age of Reason in a patty-pan."[4] The "Philanstery," the only organization which New England freethinkers ever erected, was burned down in 1846, and never rebuilt. From that date to the present New England free thought, true to history all over the world, has been engaged in destroying and not in building up. It is ever iconoclastic or nothing. It is simply a radical protest against everything religious, and social, and traditional. Emerson, at first an "orthodox" Unitarian, like William Ellery Channing, and an associate preacher with Rev. Henry Ware, minister of the Second Church in Boston, adhered for a time to the old Socinian views. Although Christ's divinity was denied by them, still the "orthodox" Unitarians respected Him as a divinified man. They respected the Bible. They were, like the Semi-Arians, believers in the *homoiousity*, in the similarity of Christ to God, although denying His identity of substance with the Eternal Father. They even observed the forms of the Lord's Supper, and administered it like other Protestant sectaries. But Emerson broke with them in 1832. He then preached against the observance of these forms, and left the Unitarians to become a Transcendentalist.

What is meant by this he tells us in one of his lectures: "What is popularly called Transcendentalism among us, is Idealism; Idealism as it appears in 1842." This definition, however, is only a polite cover for what the system really is. It rejects churches and dogmas, and all external authority of creeds and systems. It builds a system on the *Me*, and its very name is borrowed from Schelling's "*System of Transcendental Idealism*." Emerson had travelled in Europe, where he made the acquaintance of Carlyle and Goethe, both of whom were impregnated with the philosophy of Kant and Fichte. He became a convert to their system,

[1] Life by Holmes, p. 164. [2] Ibid., p. 165.
[3] It was called, properly, "The West Roxbury Association," founded in 1840.
[4] Life, p. 166.

and dressed it up in Yankee clothes when he returned to his home. The identification of the subjective and the objective in the order of thought; the *me* producing the *not me;* the perfect identity of the external world with the thinking subject; these features of Fichteism are found all through Emerson's writings. The *absolute*, as the resultant identity of the subject and the object of the *me* and the *not me*, of the real and the ideal, of knowledge and existence, of unity and plurality of form and matter, which is the ruling principle of all Schelling's system, runs through the whole of Emerson's prose and verse. The German psychologists, who had captured Jouffroy and Cousin, easily captured the imaginative New Englander, full of an apostate's hate for Calvinism and formalism, and full of a convert's zeal for the new lights of a very old philosophy. For the German metaphysicians who won Emerson were simply Brahmins and Buddhists, transplanting Oriental pantheism into the atmosphere of Europe; neo-Platonists, interpreting in Wittenberg, Jena, and Königsberg, in the eighteenth and nineteenth, what Porphyry and Plotinus taught at Rome and Alexandria in the third, or what the Dutch Jew, Spinosa, taught in the seventeenth century of the Christian era. In fact, the *me* of Fichte, which is identified with the *not me;* the *absolute* of Schelling, which is identical with the *relative;* and the *idea* of Hegel, which is the same in all things, and which is purely subjective, are but other expressions for Spinosa's universal substance, of which all things are but forms and modifications. That the views of these pantheists were predominant in Emerson's mind, as they are to-day forming the intelligence of New England freethinkers, is evidenced by various passages in his and their writings. In "Each and All," an essay, he writes: "Truth and goodness and beauty are but different faces of the same All." In "Nature," another of his essays, he speaks of all as being nothing; he loses himself in nature in Universal Being, and becomes "a part or particle of God." This is Hegelian or Spinosan, as the reader may elect. In "Idealism," another essay, he says: "It is a sufficient account of that appearance we call the world, that God will teach a human mind, and so make it the receiver of a certain number of consequent sensations which we call sun and moon, man and woman, house and trade. In my utter impotence to test the authenticity of the report of my senses, to know whether the impressions they make on me correspond with outlying objects, what difference does it make whether Orion is up there in heaven or some god paints the image in the firmament of the soul?"

This skepticism is as old as Pyrrho. There is no novelty in this doubting of the testimony of the senses, for George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, held it, and the Hegelians preached it long

before the European steamers carried it to Boston and Concord. Emerson reiterates the same Berkeleyism in an essay on "Spirit," with a strong infusion of Hegelian pantheism. "But when we come to inquire whence is matter, and whence so many truths arise to us out of the recesses of consciousness, we learn that the highest is present to the soul of man; that the dread universal essence, which is not wisdom, or love, or beauty, or power, but *all* in *one*, and *each entirely*, is that for which all things exist, and that by which they are." This is only an echo of Schelling. "It is one soul which animates all men," says Emerson, in an oration on the "American Scholar," thus borrowing a strain from Plato's muse. Seek the infinite in "the meal in the firkin; the milk in the pan," is his recommendation to the young men of Harvard College. "True Christianity," he says, "is faith in the infinitude of man."[1] Dr. Ware, his former colleague in the Unitarian ministry, attacked him for leaving out the idea of personality in his philosophy; and the charge was well founded, for Emerson wrote: "The great Pan of old, who was clothed in a leopard-skin, to signify the beautiful variety of things, and the firmament his coat of stars, was but the representative of thee, O rich and various man;" and again: "Are there not moments in the history of heaven when the human race was not counted by individuals, but was only the influenced; was God in distribution, God rushing into manifold benefit?"[2] In the same address we have a passage which is thoroughly Hegelian: "We can point nowhere to anything final but tendency; but tendency appears on all hands; planet, system, constellation, total nature is growing like a field of maize in July; is becoming something else; is in rapid metamorphosis. . . . . There is in nature *no private will*, no rebel leaf or limb, but the whole is oppressed by one superincumbent *tendency*." This is the *to fieri* of Hegel; *le devenir*, *das ewige werden*, almost to the very letter. In fact, Emerson's philosophy was all plagiarized. Even his doctrine of the "*over-soul*" is borrowed from the neo-Platonists, and is the *sovra-intelligenza* of the ultra-Italian ontologists. His theory of the "*piu nell' uno*," the identification of plurality in unity, is Brahminism, which taught that the whole world is but a manifestation of Vishnu, who is identical with all things, and differs not from the wise, but is the same as themselves. "All is for the soul, and the soul is Vishnu; and animals and stars are transient paintings, and light is whitewash, and durations are deceptive, and form is imprisonment, and heaven itself a decoy." This doctrine is asserted in Emerson's poem, "Brahma;" yet he often impresses Chris-

[1] Life of Edwards, p. 122.

[2] Address on the Method of Nature, delivered before the Society of the Adelphi in Waterville College, Maine, August 11th, 1841.

tian truths, and his teaching is often so contradictory and confused that it is impossible to get at his real meaning. Mr. Bowen, the Professor of Natural Theology and Moral Philosophy in Harvard University,[1] expresses our own judgment of the whole transcendental school in these words reviewing Emerson's "Nature" in the *Christian Examiner* in 1837: "On reviewing what we have already said of this singular work, the criticism seems to be couched in contradictory terms; we can only allege in excuse the fact that the book is a contradiction in itself." Carlyle, writing of the *Dial*, the organ of the Transcendentalists, says: "You seem to me in danger of dividing yourselves from the fact of this present universe, in which alone, ugly as it is, can I find any anchorage, and soaring away after ideas, beliefs, revelations, and such like, into perilous altitudes."[2] Indeed, they were and are dreamers, these same Transcendentalists. Margaret Fuller was their Priscilla, and Thoreau their Montanus. Their projects for reforming the world were as wild and varied as the dreams of an opium-eater. They paid no attention to facts, nor common sense, nor tradition. There was an utter absence of logic or method in all their plans, except in that of the "Brook Farm," which soon collapsed by the weight of its own impracticability. Logic and method were foreign to Emerson's mind. He tells us this himself in his answer to Henry Ward: "I have always been, from my very incapacity of methodical writing, a chartered 'libertine'—free to worship and free to rail—lucky when I could make myself understood, but never esteemed near enough to the institutions and mind of society to deserve the notice of the masters of literature and religion. . . . . I could not give an account of myself if challenged. I could not possibly give you one of the arguments you cruelly hint at, on which any doctrine of mine stands, for I do not know what arguments are in reference to any expression of a thought. I delight in telling what I think; but if you ask me how I dare say so, or why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men."[3]

This is certainly a humiliating admission for a man to make who undertook to overthrow all the old systems of belief. A syllogism would have put him into convulsions. He was simply a prophet inspired by God, and must be accepted as another Mahomet by New England advanced thinkers. Surely, some reason should be given for throwing away everything hitherto held sacred in New England—Bible, Christ, Church, and formulæ of belief. Any lunatic may rail thus against existing institutions; may thus throw

[1] He is the author of "Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann." New York: Scribner's Sons, 1877.

[2] Life of Emerson, p. 163.

[3] Letter to Dr. Ware, his former colleague in the Unitarian ministry, Oct. 8th, 1838.

off his clothes and dance in his skin. But such conduct is neither rational nor decent. Nor were the followers of the Concord messiah more logical or consistent than the leader whom they worshipped. Emerson's description of them in his lecture on "New England Reformers," in 1844, is still applicable to their successors. "They defied each other like a congress of kings, each of whom had a realm to rule and a way of his own that made concert unprofitable. What a fertility of projects for the salvation of the world! One apostle thought all men should go to farming; and another that no man should buy or sell, that the use of money was the cardinal evil; another, that the mischief was in our diet, that we eat and drink damnation. These made unleavened bread, and were foes to the death to fermentation. . . . . They wish the pure wheat, and will die, but it shall not ferment. . . . . Others attacked the system of agriculture, the use of animal manures in farming, and the tyranny of man over brute nature; these abuses polluted his food. The ox must be taken from the plough, and the horse from the cart; the hundred acres of the farm must be spaded, and the man must walk wherever boats and locomotives will not carry him. Even the insect world was to be defended; that had been too long neglected, and a society for the protection of ground worms, slugs, and mosquitoes,[1] was to be incorporated without delay. With these appeared the adepts of homœopathy, of hydropathy, of mesmerism, of phrenology, and their wonderful theories of the Christian miracles!" Shade of Cotton Mather! are these the sons of the sturdy Puritans who, in thy days, burned witches, butchered Indians, sold slaves, and exiled Christians who would not believe in the rigid dogmas of John Calvin? And is this the result of Calvinism in less than a century on the intelligence of New England? to make it a dreamer of absurdities, an analyzer of manures, a debater about bugs and mosquitoes, instead of an advocate of the Bible and of the divinity of the Redeemer of the world!

A false system of æstheticism is the natural outcome of this pantheistic New England philosophy. For the New England poet beauty is relative, not absolute. For him there is no absolute criterion of taste or standard of criticism. The beautiful is but the projection or creation of the human soul, just as religion is but the product of each man's individual consciousness. Emerson's poems show this

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1 The New England sophists thus discussing bugs and mosquitoes remind us of their Athenian prototypes whom Aristophanes, in "The Clouds," ridicules for debating as an important question "whether gnats sing with their heads or with their tails."

"Ἀνήρετ' αὐτὸν Χαιρεφῶν ὁ Σφήττιος
Ὁπότερα τὴν γνώμην ἔχο', τὰς ἐμπίδας
Κατὰ το στόμ' ᾄδειν ἢ κατα τοὐρροπύγιον."—Verses 158, κ. τ. λ.

subjectivism more strikingly even than his prose. While they are beautiful in form, often elevated in sentiment, and original in the manner of presenting old thoughts, they are frequently false and tainted with immorality in their tendencies; not with the coarse immorality of Whitman or Zola, but with an immorality that flows logically from the false in conception. Indeed, we cannot say of the leading New England freethinkers that they are immoral in their private lives, like the French, of one of whom, and "*ab uno disce omnes*," the pungent Veuillot wrote in his "*Libres Penseurs*," "*Monsieur ——, âgé de quatre-vingt ans et concubinaire.*" Of Emerson, his great contemporary and, for a time, fellow freethinker, Brownson wrote in 1847: "We know Mr. Emerson; we have shared his generous hospitality and enjoyed the charms of his conversation; as a friend and neighbor, in all the ordinary relations of social and domestic life, he is one it is not easy to help loving and admiring." Yet, in his poetry the same Emerson teaches devil worship, and degrades man as much as ever hated Calvinism had done:

"But man crouches and blushes,
Absconds and conceals;
He creepeth and peepeth,
He palters and steals;
Infirm, melancholy,
Jealous, glancing around,
An oaf, an accomplice,
He poisons the ground."[1]

Why, even the old pagan had a better opinion of human nature than this:

"*Os homini sublime dedit erectos ad sidera tollere vultus cœlumque tueri.*"

"Pride ruined the angels,
Their shame them restores,
And the joy that is sweetest
Lurks in stings of remorse."

Remorse is pleasure, pain is pleasure, joy is sorrow, and the devil is God; for all things are one, and each is in all! Such is the poetry of New England free thought.

"The fiend that man harries
Is love of the Best."

The aspiration for perfection is a vain desire; the Christian love of God, who is the all-perfect, truth, goodness, and beauty; the personal God Who created us and redeemed us, and Whom we long to see, and Who loves to unite Himself to us, is only "a fiend who harries us," and deceives us:

[1] "The Sphinx."

"Thou art the unanswered question;
Couldst see thy proper eye,
Alway it asketh, asketh,
And each answer is a lie.
So take thy quest through nature,
It through thousand natures ply;
Ask on, thou clothed eternity;
Time is the false reply."

No dogma, no certainty, no truth. "Each answer is a lie;" and the lie and the truth are one and the same. There is no rest for investigation. Man must always seek and never find. There is no ark upon which the poor bird can rest its wings wearied with flying over the desolate waste of waters. There is no Church, and no personal God:

"Ask on, thou clothed eternity,
Time is the false reply."

There is even no resurrection, no immortality in this new theology. Standing over the grave of his dead son, Emerson finds no consolation in the future. He will never meet again the boy whom he loved. His darling has been absorbed in the infinite, a particle in an immensity of dust:

"What is excellent
As God lives is permanent,
Hearts are dust, heart's loves remain;
Heart's love will meet thee again."[1]

"House and tenant go to ground,
Lost in God, in Godhead found."

Remember, that in the Emersonian style god and godhead are only names for the *to pan* of the Brahmins, Giordano Bruno, and the Hegelians. No wonder that the sturdy Brownson, in commenting on these poems, calls them "hymns to the devil." "They are not sacred chants; they are hymns to the devil. Not God, but Satan, do they praise, and they can be relished only by devil-worshippers."[2] Surely old Calvinism, with its vigorous code of morals and iron-clad dogma, was preferable to this watery and loose transcendentalism which has washed it out of the old home of the Pilgrim Fathers.

And yet, strange as it may seem, the New England rationalists revolted against Calvinism on ethical as well as on rational grounds. They wanted to reform the world and introduce a new system of ethics. They have even sent out colonies for the purpose. "Brook Farm" and the "Philansterians" of West Roxbury have their imitators, even in New York. The Rev. O. B. Frothingham, of the New England school, for twenty years tried to convert New York

[1] "Threnody."

[2] Brownson's Review, April, 1847.

from its wicked Christian ways, to abolish its churches and schools and its Trinitarian belief in order to put transcendental theology in their place. His system, indeed, would multiply the churches indefinitely; for, according to it every man's hat is his own church steeple. There would be as many churches as individuals in the world. Chadwick, in Brooklyn, and May, in Philadelphia, have been struggling with the same Quixotic purpose to make every man his own church and religious law. All the transcendental "birds," or "clouds" or "fogs," whichever of the Aristophanian choruses you may choose to name them by, assembled in 1879 to honor the New York Socrates of the sect. He was going on a vacation to Europe, and all flocked to bid him good-bye. Champions of women's rights led by Col. T. W. Higginson, haters of church organizations like George W. Curtis, and out-and-out skeptics like Stedman, were there; and the *brekekex koax, koax* was loud and long. The name of God was hardly mentioned, and even when it was it had no meaning or a pantheistic one. In this chorus of birds Felix Adler played the leading part of *Epops*, and he still remains king of the feathered tribe in New York, although he is not a New Englander. But his philosophy is, and so he conducts a school of "ethical culture" on the principles of the Concord School of Philosophy; and after twenty-five years of reform, he and his followers have founded a "*kindergarten*" for the conversion of the world to transcendental principles! This "*kindergarten*" is the great substitute for Christian churches and schools. Whether it will last as long as the "Brook Farm" experiment remains to be seen; but so far these are the only institutions founded by the apostles of the new evangel of individualism and free thought in America. They are still behind the Mormons in zeal and productiveness; and in many respects their teaching has brought about consequences more injurious to public morals and the physical health of humanity than the doctrines of the deluded followers of Joe Smith. The Mormons at least have dogmas, and dogmas are the tonics of human intelligence. The Mormons do not destroy their children. Fœticide is almost unknown among them; and although they are fanatics, they are not hypocrites.

The moral and physical decadence of New England have been in proportion to the progress of free thought among the sons of the Puritans. Hawthorne, himself a New England freethinker, thus speaks of the deterioration, which has been growing worse and worse since the period which he is describing. "Morally, as well as materially, there was a coarser fibre in those wives and maidens of old English birth and breeding than in their fair descendants, separated from them by a series of six or seven generations; for throughout that chain of ancestry, every successive

mother has transmitted to her child a fainter bloom, a more delicate and briefer beauty, and a slighter physical frame, if not a character of less force and solidity, than her own."[1] To-day the New Englanders are a race of invalids. They have become worn and sapless. The vice of fœticide is notoriously common among them. Physicians have been warning them that the Puritan stock is dying out from free vice, the natural consequence of free thought. "I see very few children in this village," remarked a traveller recently to a resident of a New England town whose brogue betrayed his origin. "Come with me, sir, and I'll show you plenty of them," was the reply; and he brought the stranger to a part of the town called "Dublin." There the children swarmed. Their stout limbs were not well clothed, and there was a sad need of pocket-handkerchiefs among them; but there was plenty of bone, flesh, and pugnacity. At the rate of decay now going on among the Puritans and the increase of foreign stock, "New England" will soon become "New Ireland." The secularization of education, and the destruction of religious belief in God or in rewards and punishments hereafter, have taken away all sanction to ethical training. It is vain to talk about duty and disinterestedness and self-sacrifice and love and justice when God and heaven and hell have disappeared from the Catechism. A switch is as necessary as the alphabet to train a child; a jail is as important as a magistrate for good order in society. But New England freethinkers, by abolishing God, Church, Bible, heaven and hell, have undertaken the impracticable task of keeping discipline without a sanction to enforce it. They are trying to do what Emerson extravagantly describes, in one of his poems, as sowing "the sun and moon for seeds." New England has been trying "to hitch her wagon to a star," to borrow another Emersonian expression, but the star is Lucifer, and the wagon has become as dilapidated as Oliver Wendell Holmes's "one-horse shay." Hypocrisy may endeavor to hide the true state of the case; but statistics show the reality.

Take divorce in New England, for example. "Listen to some statistics taken from the shameful record of the New England States, which seem to be the centre of this moral cesspool. In the State of Massachusetts in 1860 there were five causes for which divorce could be obtained, and a ratio of one divorce to fifty-one marriages. In 1878 the number of causes for which divorce was allowed had advanced to nine, and the ratio to one divorce for every twenty-one marriages. In other New England States the case was even worse."[2] These are the words of a distinguished

[1] The Scarlet Letter, p. 60.

[2] "The Calling of a Christian Woman," by Rev. Dr. Dix. Appleton, New York, 1883, pp. 122 *et seq.*

Protestant clergyman. "In Vermont the ratio was one divorce to thirteen marriages; in Rhode Island, one to ten; in Connecticut the ratio was one to ten. New Hampshire showed about the same proportion, and in Maine it was even worse."[1]

"Crimes against chastity, morality, and decency have been steadily increasing. In Massachusetts from 1860 to 1870, during which time divorces have increased two and one-half times, while marriages have increased hardly four per cent. . . . . those crimes known as being 'against chastity, morality, and decency,' filthy crimes, loathsome, infamous, nameless crimes, have increased threefold."[2]

But let us cover the offensive picture. The twin sisters, free thought and free vice, are ruining what used to be the intellectual centre of our great republic. The native stock of New England is losing even its political power; and even the Athenians and Transcendentalists of Boston are now governed by a foreign fellow with the Doric name of O'Brien.[3]

What is the remedy? What will put a stop to this decadence? Not a return to Calvinism or early Puritanism, since its doctrines engendered the disease; but a return to that Church which never misconstrues nor misinterprets the Bible; that Church which tempers justice with mercy and love for sinners; which asserts the necessity of grace, yet defends the power of free will; which upholds the doctrine of original sin, yet denies total depravity and the innate wickedness of man; which interprets the rigor of the old law by the benign charity of the new; which guides the intellect from error and false lights by the staked, well-surveyed and illuminated road of dogmatic definition, and strengthens the will in its conflict with passion by the tonic graces of a divine sacramental system; that Church which gives a definite answer to every question of the inquiring mind; that Church which never tolerates divorce, nor the separation of Christian truth from the education of the child; a Church which canonizes purity, protects morality, ennobles poverty, obedience, and chastity, which she houses in her convents and monasteries; the Church which softened the manners of barbarians ruder and more cruel even than the Puritans, and converted Hindoo and Grecian sophists and poets wiser even than Emerson and Frothingham; the Church whose beauty, ever ancient and ever new, needs only to be examined to be admired and loved; the Church which Paul preached in Athens and a Catholic archbishop represents in Boston.

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[1] Calling of a Christian Woman, p. 123.

[2] Ibidem, p. 124.

[3] The present mayor of Boston, an Irish-American.

THE SOCIALISTIC REVIVAL IN EUROPE.

Contemporary Socialism. By John Rae, M.A. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

THIS century, of all others, has been disturbed by socialistic agitation. Since the great outburst of the first French Revolution, the world has been in a chronic condition of unrest. There have been intervals of peace, alternating with intervals of turmoil and violence. Whatever may be said of the agitation, it is undeniable that it has been instrumental in accomplishing some good for man. The excesses committed by some of the agitators, and the wild theories advanced by others, though they may stain and retard a cause that is good in itself, do not alter the principles of that cause, and should not be permitted to cloud the truth of it. At all events, governments have been materially changed for the better within the century by these great agitations. The whole complexion of the relations between governments and the governed has undergone a change. That change may be summarized as the insistence by the people on a proper representation in the management of themselves, and in the shaping of the laws under which they live, and in the national *acts*, as distinct from the mere personal acts, of royalty or rulers. Not all of this has been achieved, but much has; and liberties are placidly enjoyed to-day by most peoples, the demand for which, at the beginning of the century, was regarded, and naturally so, under the condition of things then prevailing, as revolution. And now, as the eventful century draws toward its close, socialistic problems of the extremest radical nature are pressing impatiently for solution.

The term Socialism has thus far been used in its broadest possible sense; in the sense defined by Webster (edition 1880), as "a theory of Society which advocates a more precise, orderly, and harmonious arrangement of the social relations of mankind, than that which has hitherto prevailed." In this sense, all honest men who wish the advance and harmony of the race, the "peace on earth to men of good will," that the angels sang at the coming of Christ, are Socialists.

There is, however, a secondary definition: "Communism;" and Communism is defined as "The reorganizing of society, or the doctrine that it should be reorganized, by regulating property, industry, and the sources of livelihood, and also the domestic rela-

tions and social morals of mankind; socialism; especially the doctrine of a community of property, or the negation of individual rights in property. (J. H. Burton.)"

This latter comprehensive definition may be taken to cover the more general acceptation of the term Socialism to-day. Yet it should not be forgotten that there is, or may be, much of the first definition embraced in the second. The truest and greatest socialistic agency in the world is the Catholic Church. In attacking it, as is their habit, socialistic agitators attack, at once, their best friend and their invincible foe: their friend in all that is just, wise, and good in their demands; their foe in all that is false and foolish. As a matter of fact, the Catholic Church, in her peculiar institutions, carries out, and has carried out from the beginning, the practice of communism in property and worldly goods. In the great orders and societies, male and female, the benefits of property (as also the pressure of poverty) are shared alike by all the community, and distributed beyond to the people for whom they labor, in the spirit of Christian charity. The General of the Society of Jesus is, personally, no richer a man than the lay brother who waits at the door or washes the dishes. The monk or nun who dies, whether of princely or peasant origin, carries nothing to the grave but the shroud, and leaves nothing behind but the memory and the purity of a good life. It is needless to dilate on the fact, accepted by all thinking men, that the Church is the great Reformer. To her are owing the greatest reforms that have affected the general well-being of man; and to her is owing the structure and formation of civilized Christian society. The doctrine of human equality and fraternity, in the highest sense of children of God and brethren of the Son of Man, emanates from her. From this doctrine necessarily flowed the abolition of slavery, that wicked and cruel institution that converted free and immortal spirits into human chattels or cattle. To the Church woman owes her dignity and freedom, marriage its sacredness and indissolubility, and the family its safety and its pillar of strength. Hers is the doctrine that the laborer is worthy of his hire, and that to defraud him of it is one of the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance.

The history of the world shows, the history of our own times shows, in many a horrid page, how often, through disregard of that doctrine, the cry for vengeance has gone up to Heaven, has been heard and answered under the free will of man. The Church was the great protector of the people's rights and liberties, when none other dared face the power of tyrants. She has ever been the teacher and the mother of the poor, the conservator of learning, the dispenser of knowledge, and the guide and guardian of enlightenment. Man cannot place his finger on any great reform within

the Christian era that is not traceable directly to the principles inculcated by and the influence of the Church. So that sincere Socialists, if the scales of prejudice and inherited misrepresentation could only fall from their eyes, would see in the Church, not their enemy, but their truest friend, well-wisher and guide, in all the real and possible reforms that they would fain accomplish. Has she not put up countless martyrs to die for the doctrines of truth and justice and Christian charity? Is not her domain full of good works? Is she not forever the preacher of peace among men? But the difference between her and the others is this: that she is content to work patiently in God's good time, by appeals to reason and charity, and by the influence of her own example. She believes in no violent or immediate remedies for rooted wrongs. Evils that are the growth of centuries must be slowly and laboriously abolished. To pluck them up by the roots is to destroy more than them.

In the old days, Rome, that is to say, the Holy Father, was the high court of appeal of subjects against rulers, and, at times, of rulers against subjects. The Protestant Reformation cut off a great portion of Christendom from that court, and thenceforth, in the Protestant section of Christendom, there was no guiding voice outside the State. If subjects rebelled, they rebelled. If princes tyrannized, they tyrannized. There was no one who could cry halt to either party. How much the people gained in individual liberty, in piety, in prosperity, by the Reformation, may be seen in the condition of European peoples at the beginning of this century, and may be seen to-day. That condition for the masses (to use the most convenient term) was wretched in the extreme. In Protestant countries, even more than in Catholic, there was tyranny on the one side, and poverty, impiety, and ignorance on the other. But not from Protestant lands alone was the power of the Church shut off. The rulers and the statesmen of Catholic Christendom entered into a conspiracy against the Church of Christ. In place of Protestantism, they took up the cry of Liberalism, under the mask of which was Atheism. Their pretence was that the Church chained men's souls, and invaded the prerogatives of state-craft. They professed Catholicity, but State Catholicity, rather than Christianity. So they chained the Church when they could, fettered her limbs, choked her voice, broke up her good works, gave free rein to the teachers of irreligion, and inoculated the minds of the ignorant with the idea that the Church was the enemy of the people and of the State, so that it came to be regarded as a badge of servility and unpatriotism to be a sincere Catholic. Thus Protestantism on the one hand, and Liberalism or atheism on the other, drew away from Christ great masses of people who ought

to be Christian, and educated them into impiety or indifference to religion. So that at the beginning of the present century Europe was to a very large extent atheist, and the one institution most hurtful to its eyes and hateful to its soul was the Roman Catholic Church.

Meanwhile social problems were secretly evolving themselves. On minds thus prepared to look into a godless future, the atheistic literature of the eighteenth century fell like sparks on powder magazines. The magazines flamed up, and the first explosion was the French Revolution. The cry for liberty, equality, and fraternity is a most noble one; but the world with horror saw what it meant in mouths that pronounced the name of God only to blaspheme it. Within a short time not only government, but society, was disorganized. A dreader tyranny than France had ever known fell upon France. The cause of liberty was pushed back instead of forward; but the rulers had received a startling shock.

This cry for an ideal liberty, equality, and fraternity, under impossible human conditions, is practically the cry of the Socialists to-day. Instead of being confined to one state or nation, they are now everywhere. They are regarded as a danger to the state, to the Church, and to society. Some of them openly proclaim their antagonism to these three necessary institutions of human life, and, with them, to property and to the family. Socialists carry on a vigorous propaganda, and it would be foolish to deny the fact that they are gaining numerous recruits. They go under different names in different lands; but, under whatever names they go, their general purpose is the same. That purpose may be described, in brief, as the overthrow of the existing order of things, and the establishment on its ruins of a Socialistic Utopia, where property shall be common, where all shall be equal, where there shall be no poverty and no riches, no rulers and no ruled, no laws, no lawmakers, no law-breakers, no nothing, in fact.

This would seem the idle dream of fools, were it not that the lot of the majority of mankind is a very hard one, that governments still are far from perfect, that the question of the laborer and his hire is forever pressing to the front, that many millions of people are weighed down under heavy grievances, not to say wrongs, and that the spirit of Christian charity, that would go far to regulate the questions between employer and employed, is dead over a great portion of the world. So, to-day, Socialism stands up as a menace in the face of nations, and all the bayonets and prohibitory laws in the universe will not and cannot put it down.

It is well, then, to scrutinize carefully this latest of the isms; to see of what it is composed, and who compose it; what it aims at, and what it is actually doing. For now Socialism, in some form or

another, is a factor in every state; though this republic is at present freer from it than other states for the sole reason that here is liberty and that the conditions of life here are more favorable than in most lands. In Russia, Austria, and Germany, Socialism is treated as treason against the state; in the countries of the Latin race it is a constant fomenter of public disturbance; in England it is a daily growing power. It has become a name of dread in the councils of the nations, and all sorts of expedients are adopted, either to hush it up or to get rid of it. But there it stands, fast and firm and grim, gathering to its fold all the disturbing and distressed elements in human society. The only true safeguard against it is a return on the part of governments, and of those untitled governments of capital that control vast masses of labor, to Christian principles; to dealing just judgments, and to endeavoring to undo the work of the past three centuries that alienated the people from Christ and from His teachings.

Perhaps the completest study in English of this most important subject is that of Mr. John Rae, on *Contemporary Socialism*. The work is admirable in spirit; very close and logical in analysis; sufficiently full in detail; calm in temper and tone; and presenting the Socialist views in the clearest and most unbiassed manner, to refute them at the end. Socialists themselves could not find fault with Mr. Rae's exposition of their theories; and in its honesty of statement and comprehensive grasp of a most diversified subject, Mr. Rae's instructive and interesting volume finds its chief value. It is impossible within the limits of a review article to go into the minutiæ of the work, which is a large one. On such matters readers must satisfy themselves, and those who read Mr. Rae will be well rewarded. Only one or two salient points will be treated here, as illustrating what the Socialism of the day really is and means.

Mr. Rae confines himself to the broader phases of his subject; for, though there are many petty groups and coteries among revolutionary Socialists, "they differ only on minor points of future government or present policy." All adhere to one or other of the two main types, "the Centralist, which is usually known as Communism, Socialism, or Collectivism, and the Anarchist," which, though like in kind, "is generally known as Anarchism, or Nihilism." Mr. Rae calls attention to the wonderful spread of Socialism throughout Europe within the last twenty years. At the English International Exhibition of 1862, "it was a common topic of congratulation that the political atmosphere of Europe was then entirely free from the revolutionary alarms which overclouded the first Exhibition in 1851." This shows how little the course of events is turned by these international symposia, as they may be

called, or by the meetings of royalties to arrange among themselves the world's affairs. Treaties of Tilsit are out of date. "It was in 1862 that Lassalle delivered to a club of workingmen in Berlin his address on 'The Present Epoch of the World, and the Idea of the Working Class.'" This was published shortly afterwards under the title of "The Working Man's Programme," and has been called by Lassalle's friends "The Wittenberg Theses of the New Socialist Movement." It was even at the same Exhibition that the germ of the International was laid, in the mutual relations established between delegates of the English and French trade societies.

This latter movement started a new order of things, conducive towards an international fraternity among workingmen. There were many able men among those workmen-delegates, who met from time to time in their own parliaments, not only to discuss questions of mutual interest regarding their various trades, but problems of a deeper kind, the relations of employers to employed, of the unprivileged classes to governments, of all the demands made by governments on those classes, of the money they earned, the taxes they paid, the representation they had in their governments, the improvement of their homes and ways of life, the education of their children, and other such matters, that had hitherto been placidly relegated to the chance good will of parliaments and governments. This, and what came from it, was not at all like the revolutionary movement of 1848 and the Socialistic schemes that disappeared with that revolution. "The communities of Owenites, St. Simonians, Fourierites, Icarians, which multiplied for a time on both sides of the Atlantic, are extinct," says Mr Rae, with truth. Those dreams and dreamers, more or less amiable in themselves, but with the most unpractical and, sometimes unconsciously perhaps, immoral theories regarding the reform of society and the regulation of the life of man, have passed away, laughed out of very existence. "The Socialists of the present day have discarded all belief in the possibility of effecting any social regeneration except by means of political authority; and the first object of their endeavors is, therefore, the conquest of the powers of the state."

Here, indeed, is the whole case stated as far as the ultimate object of Socialism goes. The aim of the Socialists is no longer to serve, to argue, to appeal, but to seize the power and rule. It was said of Lord John Russell that, so great was his self-confidence, he was prepared at a moment's notice to take command of her British Majesty's fleet or to lead the government. Your dyed-in-the-wool Socialist is ready at a moment to draw up laws for the governance and the well-being of the world. Mr. Rae states a truth worthy of attention when he says: "Out of the several sorts

and varieties of political Socialism, only one has revived in any strength, and that is the extremest and most revolutionary." Child's play is over. "It is the democratic communism of the Young Hegelians; and it scouts the very suggestion of state help, and will content itself with nothing short of state-transformation." This we see illustrated to-day in Germany. Prince Bismarck, who thinks "any stick good enough to beat a dog with," utilized the Socialists against the Catholics, when he entered on his anti-Catholic campaign. After having petted them, he found them growing dangerous. He tried to chain his hound; but the effort was useless. Socialism flourishes mightily under a rule of blood and iron, and despite all the efforts of the German Government to repress it, there were more Socialists returned to the Reichstag at the late elections than ever before. So the Government, wishing to steal their thunder, started a system of State-Socialism, in which the State plays the benevolent paternal part to the workingmen; but this, as was shown at the recent opening of the Reichstag, the Socialist deputies vehemently reject.

In France the working classes to-day hate the Republic more than they did the rule of Napoleon III., which at least gave them *panem et circenses*. "As a rule," says Mr. Rae, "the Socialists of France at the present day, like those of Germany, put their faith in iron rather than paper." In this the Socialists only take a leaf out of Prince Bismarck's own book.

"What they want is a democracy of labor, to use one of their own phrases—that is, a State in which power and property shall be based on labor; where citizenship shall depend on a labor qualification, instead of a qualification of birth or property; where there shall be no citizen who enjoys without laboring, and no citizen who labors without enjoying; where everyone who is able to work shall have employment, and everyone who has wrought shall retain the whole produce of his labor; and where accordingly, as the indispensable prerequisite of the whole scheme, the land of the country and all other instruments of production shall be made the joint property of the community, and the conduct of all industrial operations be placed under the direct administration of the State. Furthermore, all this is contended for as a matter of simple right and justice to the laboring classes, on the ground that the wealth of the nation belongs to the hands that made it; it is contended for as an obligation of the State, because the State is held to be merely the organized will of the people, and the people is the laboring class; and it is contended for as an object of immediate accomplishment—if possible, by ordinary constitutional means, but, if not, by revolution."

This presentation has a startling show, and yet it is only the other day that we heard many of these doctrines promulgated by a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, an able lawyer, a man who has occupied great positions of trust in his State and in the Congress of the United States, General Benjamin F. Butler. Not that he presented the new theory of government in this bald, simple, concrete form; but much of it was in his thought and in

his theory as expressed. In other lands and at so exciting a time so able a man would have drawn to him a large following, and created vast disturbance. Here, in this nation of workers, he is laughed at and avoided by the workers, and his assumed candidacy was one of the ridiculous features of a most important and harassing political campaign. Some of what General Butler advocated under an American veneer, posing distinctly as the candidate of labor against capital, Mr. Rae calls "Revolutionary Socialist Democracy," which he divides into two main branches—German Socialism and Russian Nihilism, the difference between which he considers rather local than founded on matters of principle. There is a division of principle between modern democrats, that which classifies them as Centralists, and Federalists, titles which fairly well explain themselves. The Centralists wish the democratic republic to have a strongly centralized form of government, while the others would leave the local communes comparatively independent and sovereign and free, if they chose, to unite in convenient federations.

Bearing in mind that Socialism is the same substance in many forms and in many places, Germany may be taken as one of its strongest and most out-spoken centres to-day. And it is a fact not without significance that Socialism in its most dangerous forms is strongest under the two most despotic of European powers—Germany and Russia. German Socialism is set down by Mr. Rae as "the creation of Lassalle." He it was who gave the vague substance shape, coherency, and a voice, and changed it from a theoretic dream into a living and working organism.

Ferdinand Lassalle was the son of parents who were strict Jews. It is singular to note how many men of Jewish descent have allied themselves with the Socialists; for the Jews, as a race, are conservative. In Russia, for instance, there is scarcely a band of Nihilists captured that has not its Jewish members, men and women. Lassalle was possessed of great natural gifts, which he cultivated and developed in the universities of Breslau and Berlin. He was taken up and seems to have been made a pet of by the literary society in those cities. Humboldt called him a *Wunderkind*. He went to Paris, and there formed a close friendship with Heine. He began his public career by taking up the question of woman's rights, or woman's wrongs, with characteristic force and vehemence, and with some success. He was a strange mixture: at once full of noble and of ignoble passions; a man of thought, of intellect, of labor and of pleasure. "Lassalle," says Mr. Rae, "would have been a great man if he had had more of the ordinary restraining perceptions, but he had neither fear nor awe, nor even—in spite of his vein of satire—a wholesome sense of the ridiculous—in this last respect

resembling, if we may believe Carlyle, all Jews." He was, he proclaimed, "revolutionary on principle," explaining that by revolution he meant transformation, or a substitution of an entirely new principle for the existing state of things; whereas reform merely meant a logical development of the principle of the existing state of things. Revolution might be carried out either peacefully or by force of arms. Like all Young Germany at the time, he was a pupil and admirer of Hegel, and was indoctrinated with the ideas of that philosopher. He took part in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and suffered on its collapse. He was brought to trial and imprisoned. He defended himself boldly, and the trial brought him fame. He was banished from Berlin, but was afterwards allowed to return. He was a strong advocate of the unity of Germany, with Prussia as the centre, and probably this may have first brought him in contact with Bismarck; but the unity of Germany was to his mind a prime necessity for the establishment of freedom and democracy. In this he may not have been far wrong.

He wrote extensively, from tragedies to pamphlets on social and political subjects. He believed in power and not in paper, and ridiculed the constitutionalism of modern Liberals. Might was right to him. He was again prosecuted and imprisoned. He now (1863) turned his attention to the congresses of workingmen which were beginning to organize into a power. He sketched a political programme for them. To elevate their normal condition political agitation was needed rather than the establishment of savings banks, benefit societies, and so forth. Universal suffrage was requisite to enable them to achieve their elevation. Workingmen were ground down under the existing economical *régime*, and especially by "the iron and cruel law of necessary wages." Their only cure was in coöperative production, the substitution of associated labor for wage labor. But this system must be introduced by state help and on state credit. The state should do for the people what it does for the large and wealthy corporations and monopolists. Ninety-six and a half per cent. of the population are ground down by the "iron law" and cannot by their own power lift themselves above it. So the State, which is themselves, must step in and help them; and universal suffrage alone can enforce State help.

Such was Lassalle's programme for the working classes. Strange to say, at the time it was received with indifference even by the workingmen, while it was universally condemned by the press. The Leipzig workmen alone received him with favor, and to Leipzig he proceeded and organized there (May 23, 1863) the General Workingmen's Association for the promotion of universal suffrage by peaceful agitation. He went on with the work; lecturing,

writing, agitating, moving from place to place. But in spite of his energy his success was small during his life-time. He was killed in a duel on August 31st, 1864.

His very death seemed to lend wings to the cause he advocated, though that death was owing to a purely personal quarrel. To-day the working classes of Germany are to a large extent impregnated with his doctrines. It is not necessary to go more deeply into them here. They had enough of surface plausibility and reasonable cause to appeal to crude intellects which could grasp rough facts and grievances, and see no serious attempt at reform on the part of the government, or of assistance on the part of the privileged classes. What is the fourth estate? asked Lassalle, and the answer was nothing. What ought it to be? Everything. The First French Revolution was a revolt of the third estate against the Crown and privileged classes. The third estate, the *bourgeoisie*, conquered, and converted itself into a privileged class; plutocracy took the place of aristocracy. The revolution of 1848 was the beginning of the revolt of the fourth estate, the working classes, against the privileges of the third. "What is the State?" asked Lassalle of the workingmen. "You are the State," he told them. "You are ninety-six per cent. of the population. All political power ought to be of you, and through you, and for you; and your good and amelioration ought to be the aim of the State. It ought to be so, because your good is not a class interest, but is the national interest."

Of course, if right and wrong be a matter of count by noses, this argument is irresistible. The greater good of the greater number is a much-used but specious phrase, one of the multitudinous cants of the day that ignorance, whether lettered or unlettered, erects into a popular dogma. Good is absolute; and as has been nobly said, "one with God is a majority." Votes do not decide goodness or badness. The only standard of good is the law of God as given through His Divine Son, and guarded and expounded in His ever-living body, the Church. Morals are founded on the doctrines of Christ, the Prophet, the Priest, the King of God's human creatures. Either this is so or Lassalle's argument is true; and the only means of demolishing the force of his argument is to reconcile as far as possible the human with the divine law, bringing a wise Christian charity to bear on the development of the human race and the afflictions of various kinds that by its very nature and constitution it is bound to labor under. Adam, after the fall, with all the world before him, was compelled for very existence' sake to labor as severely as was the fictitious Robinson Crusoe on his solitary island. The old monk's saying that Carlyle loved—"labor is prayer"—sums up the life of any well-organized Christian. All

that can be hoped from laws and human institutions is not to create a universe of idlers and impossible communists, but to assist as far as is possible to insure man's living honorably and in security by the sweat of his brow or the sweat of his brain. Place Lassalle's ninety-six per cent. in power, give universal suffrage as in France and in the United States, and is the condition of things very materially altered as affects the general status of the ninety-six? Call them by what name you please, the other fraction will rule, if for no other reason, for convenience' sake.

There is no argument here for or against universal suffrage; simply a statement of indisputable facts as affecting the millennium expected by many from the carrying out of Lassalle's ideas and of all those who advocate similar plans for the reformation or regeneration of society. Adam had to delve, and Eve had to spin, and the answer to the question of that fourteenth century Socialist, John Ball, "Who was then the gentleman?" is that Adam was the gentleman and Eve the lady. Labor, though a burden, is an honorable one; the burden of human life, in fact, of which there is no evading. If there be what are called drones in the human hive, those drones have uses as well as abuses. The idea of reducing all human beings to a dead level is alike against nature, man, and God. Let any nation or people try the experiment and level itself to-day. The levelling would be simply a process of beheading and a social disruption and suicide. It is perfectly legitimate, and right, and wise for the ninety-six per cent. to labor with all honest effort for their own improvement and advancement and for necessary reforms in the State, for the curtailment of class privileges that oppress them and hinder their progress, and so forth; but it is simply foolish for them to call upon the State, by the issue of an edict, to work social miracles and change the purgatory of centuries into the paradise of a day. Moreover, are the working classes themselves wholly without blame, and do they set no obstacles in the way of their own advancement by lack of thrift, lack of industry, lack of obedience to the moral law, and drunkenness?

Lassalle's theories sufficiently illustrate whatever there is of logical scheme and common aim and purpose in Socialism. But Mr. Rae does not stop here. He follows up all the main branches of the system,—for a system it has now become,—getting at the heart of each, and dissecting it with the disimpassioned skill of a competent surgeon, exposing in the process the disease, and, as far as possible, its cause. To follow these branches in detail is impossible here. Mr. Rae has been most conscientious in his work, and seems not to have left a stone unturned that might help him in discovering the truth. He is familiar with all the chief writers on Socialism, and with the methods of the workers in their various geo-

graphical limits. After dealing with Lassalle, he proceeds to discuss Karl Marx, his labors and his writings. From London, that European headquarters of all kinds of international agitation, Marx exercised an immense influence by his publications alone. Marx was one of the leaders of the International, the chief aim of which was the concentration of associated labor. It had accomplished much in this direction when the Franco-German war broke out. The International was bitterly opposed to the war, for its leaders foresaw the divisions in its body that would inevitably result from that war. It will take many years, and an entire new order of the universe, to eradicate nationalism out of the heart of man. At the close of the war came the uprising of the Commune in Paris. "The leaders of the International," says Mr. Rae, "were undoubtedly heart and soul with the Commune." What became of the Commune we know. Its explosion killed the International. The English members at once fell away, and what was left of it was, later on (1872), rent by a schism at its congress at the Hague. As Mr. Rae well observes: "A Socialist organization always seems to contain two elements of internal disintegration. One is, the prevalence of a singular and almost pathetic mistrust of their leaders and of one another. The law of suspects is always in force among themselves. . . . . The other source of disintegration is the tendency to intestine divisions on points of doctrine. A reconstruction of society is necessarily a most extensive programme, and allows for the utmost variety of opinion and plan."

One of the most interesting of the chapters is that on Russian Nihilism, a branch of Socialism with which we are all familiar from the series of desperate deeds that have marked and continue to mark its course. Nihilism, perhaps, might be set down as the last development of Socialism; and wild, terrible, and hopeless as it is in its aims and methods, if such a lost cause, a cause that is lost in its very essence, could be ennobled, that has been in the barbaric sense ennobled by the marvellous devotion and self-sacrifice of so many of its adherents, women and men alike. It is barbarism fighting barbarism, and Mr. Rae's analysis of it is close and keen. Especially interesting, and to most of us novel, is his exposition of the part played by woman in Russian society. Just here it is well to remark that the decadence of the Russian priesthood has destroyed a potent influence for good among the people, more especially in an autocratic and bureaucratic government such as Russia—the state yoked the church to its car; the result, as invariably happens, was that the priesthood became a degraded profession, and religion fell into mere superstition, or into gross disrepute. Bakunine is one of the prophets and leaders of Nihilism. In 1857 he was condemned to exile for life in Siberia by the

Czar Alexander II. After twelve years he escaped, more devoted to the cause than ever. Pandestruction is his leading principle in revolution. "Admitting no other activity than that of destruction," he says, "we declare that the forms in which that activity ought to express itself may be extremely varied—poison, poniard, knout. The Revolution sanctifies all without distinction." And again: "Pandestruction is a series of assassinations and audacious, or even mad, enterprises, horrifying the powerful, and dazzling the people till they believe in the triumph of the Revolution." With what zeal and devotion the Nihilists have taken up these wicked and foolish doctrines, the world has seen. They were, also, the doctrines of Mazzini, at one time the pet of London drawing-rooms and society, and to whose memory a statue has been erected in the New York Central Park. As matters stand even to-day, Russia is staggering between two terrorisms—the terrorism from above and the terrorism from below.

But, as has been said, it is impossible to go into all these matters within the limits of an article. Each chapter in Mr. Rae's book is worthy of study by those who look at the later and, on the surface, more ominous movements of the age. The air is certainly clouded and charged with dangerous elements. There is a moral dynamite abroad that needs very careful watching. It should not be forgotten that deadly explosions are as often caused by the over-confidence or carelessness of the guards as by the attempts of miscreants. In either case, the wreck to the victims is the same. Sometimes, too, these disasters are caused by over-timidity or ignorant handling. It is for statesmen to deal with these problems, and deal with them in a wise and just spirit.

How to reconcile the malcontents, who are daily increasing in numbers, and who, it should not be forgotten, are being constantly wrought upon by the most evil agencies, is really the great social problem of the age,—greater than all your canal questions, colonizing questions, boundary questions, treaty questions, and other questions that come up for international arbitration in these days of much palaver. Mr. Rae devotes one chapter to "the Christian Socialists," and it ought to be suggestive to those who are vexed by the problem before us. "The Socialism of the present day," says Mr. Rae, "is not of a religious origin. On the contrary, there is some truth in the remark of a distinguished economist, M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, that the prevalence of socialistic ideas is largely due to the decline of religious faith among the working classes. If there is only the one life, they feel they must realize their ideal here; and realize it quickly, or they will never realize it at all." This, of course, is essentially materialism, or that mode of mind that sees "the be-all and the end-all here," and that is

preached by the favorite social scientists and philosophers of the day in all lands. How this mode of thought came to capture the minds of such multitudes has been shown in an earlier portion of this article. "The fact is certain," says Mr. Rae, "that most contemporary Socialists have turned their backs on religion." And just here it may be as well to dispose of a specious objection that is often put. It is said in substance: You Catholics are always talking of the Church and of her influence for good. Had she not all these people, or their forefathers, in her hand once, when, as you claim, all Christendom was one? Why did she not do better for them, then, and why should they desert her now?

Again, this objection has been partially met earlier in the article. These worthy objectors forget that even in Catholic days there was always a conflict, more or less stubborn, between the temporal and the spiritual powers. This conflict necessarily interfered materially with the work of the Church in the advancement and development of the human race. This was true up to the rupture at the Reformation. Since that date, as already shown, the Church has been conspired against and hampered by both Catholic and Protestant powers, and the people, as far as possible, educated into hostility to her influence and her teachings. They not only try to keep her out of the school, but also out of the land.

Thus governments to-day have to fight Socialism more or less single-handed, and they fight it with the only weapon they know,—the sword. The cross they have either deserted or rejected. This atheistic movement, says Mr. Rae, is looked upon by the Church "with a natural and justifiable suspicion." Nevertheless, he adds truly: "Some churchmen, however, scruple to assume this attitude; they recognize a soul of good in the agitation, if it could be stripped of the revolutionary and atheistic elements of its propaganda, which they hold to be, after all, merely accidental accompaniments of the system, at once foreign to its essence and pernicious to its purpose. It is in substance, they say, an economical movement, both in its origin and its objects, and so far as it stands on this ground they have no hesitation in declaring that, in their judgment, there is a great deal more Christianity in Socialism than in the existing industrial *régime*."

It is safe to say that this well describes the attitude towards Socialism of a large body of Christian believers. Indeed, had not Church and State and people been antagonized by infidel statesmen, it is highly probable that by this time governments and the governed, nations one with another, and class with class, would have been moving in fair harmony under the common bond of Christ. The rich would not have looked upon the poor, nor the poor upon the rich, as natural enemies, while secret societies

would have known from the beginning that they were under the ban of the Church, and, consequently, of the whole Christian community. Thirty years ago the Christian Socialists were established in England under the lead of Frederick Maurice and other earnest men. They did excellent work, but the society finally fell through. In Germany a similar work has been taken up by Protestants and Catholics. "The Catholic group," says Mr. Rae, "deserves to be considered first, because it intervened in the discussion much sooner than the Evangelical, and because it originated a much more important movement, larger in its dimensions than the other, and invested with additional consequence from the circumstance that, being promoted under the countenance of dignitaries, it must be presumed to have received the sanction of the Roman Curia, and may, therefore, afford an index to the general attitude which the Catholic Church is disposed to assume towards continental Socialism." Germany is strong in Catholic clubs. In 1863, when the Socialist agitation assumed distinct and formidable form, Dr. Döllinger recommended the Catholic clubs to take the matter up. "These clubs," testifies Mr. Rae, "are societies for mutual improvement, recreation, and benefit, and are composed mainly of workingmen." Father Kölping's Society of Catholic Journeymen, founded as early as 1847, had in 1872 a membership of 70,000. There were affiliated clubs, numbering from fifty to four hundred members each, in various German towns. There were also Catholic clubs of apprentices, peasant clubs, benefit clubs, young men's clubs, credit clubs, literary clubs, and so forth. Indeed, the Germans, as is their fashion, seem to have converted the club business into a science, and the result of it is, to some extent, seen in the Catholic party in the Reichstag, which, under the pressure of persecution, sprang from nothing into the leading place. In 1864 the great Bishop Ketteler took up the matter and published to the world his views on the labor question and Christianity. In 1868 the Catholic bishops of Germany, in their conference at Fulda, discussed the relations of the Church to the labor question. They approved of the formation of associations of Catholic labor. In the same month there was a general meeting of the German Catholic clubs, and the result was the formation of the Christian Social Associations, or, as they are called from their patron, St. Joseph Associations. They are composed of and managed by workingmen, with clergymen and men of property and prominence as honorary members.

It would take a special article to go into the great practical work accomplished by these Catholic workingmen's clubs in Germany. Mr. Rae recognizes the worth of that work, and his general comment is, that "the Catholic movement goes a long way with

the Socialists in their cries of wrong, but only a short way in their plans of redress." The idea is correction, not reconstruction, of the present industrial system. The aid of the State is called for to assist the workman against the overwhelming power of capital, but to assist him in reason. That cry is at our own doors, and must be heard sooner or later,—the sooner the better. Bismarck at one time seemed to fear what he termed "an alliance between the black International and the red." He is a great phrase-maker, as was Disraeli; but phrases are neither facts nor things. Mr. Rae's judgment is, that the Catholic sympathy is "not so much with the Socialists as with the laboring classes generally," and the Catholic labor movement, so far as it has gone, "is meant to take the wind from socialism, whether with the mere view of filling their own sails with it or no."

As for Protestant efforts in this direction, Catholics can have nothing but good-will towards them. And here is Mr. Rae, one of their own writers, telling us that in Germany "no voice was raised in the Protestant churches on the social question till 1878"; and he adds the grim comment: "They (the Protestant churches) suffer from their absolute dependence on the State, and have become churches of doctors and professors without effective practical interest or initiative, and without that strong popular sympathy of a certain kind which almost necessarily pervades the atmosphere of a church like the Catholic, which pits itself against States, and knows that its power of doing so rests, in the last analysis, on its hold over the hearts of the people."

What a world of unconsciously uttered truth and history lies in that sentence, ill-applied though it be! Surely, if we believe in anything at all, we must believe that the most potent agencies in promoting the moral well-being of man are the agencies of religion; and the moral well-being of man, in the broad sense, is the necessary adjunct of his physical well-being. Yet here is Protestantism enslaved to the State, or, where it is not enslaved, a matter of fashion rather than of principle. And here is Catholicity, that really touches and reaches the heart of the people, looked on with suspicion and hostile eyes by the governments of the day. And here is hunger, and thirst, and disease, and all the evils that afflict the mass of humankind, knocking at the doors of government for humanity, asking for bread and getting stones in answer to its prayer. It is these evils that give its life to Socialism, and lead those to despair of help from governments who have been taught to despair of help from God. And the remedy? That is a long question, hard to solve by those who have rejected Christ and His command to love God above all and our neighbor as ourselves.

CIVILIZATION, OLD AND NEW.

TO be interested in the poorer classes is in good taste. It is, also, comprehended in "civilization." In England there is a spasmodic impulse towards the poor. About a year ago there was an awakening to the fact that the poorer classes had no homes to live in. They had shelters, but no homes. Kind persons convened meetings and made speeches; and royal princes paid visits to the "outcast poor." The result has been an increase of information in regard to the dire sufferings of "*les misérables*." By and by there will be a systematizing of suggestions. New buildings will be run up; old hovels will be pulled down; and then the committees will rest from their labors. It is a good movement, if spasmodic. That in the nineteenth century—and very close upon the end of it—English society should become interested in the very poor, is a hopeful sign that in the old age of the world civilization will not ignore charity.

A curious discussion is being raised by some philosophers as to whether civilization is the result of evolution or of wise and beneficent legislation. Yet these philosophers have not told us—what should have been their first postulate—the real meaning, the whole meaning, of civilization. The movement just referred to, the new interest in the outcast poor, helps us to get at the high-class notion of civilization, as well as at the compass of its beneficence. We do not learn much from the illustration. Our philanthropists, like our philosophers, are not "thorough." Yet, at least, our philanthropists do something, which is more than can be said of our philosophers. These last gentlemen think and live up in the clouds. Upon all subjects they begin nowhere, and they stop there. In regard to civilization, as in regard to religion, they seem to have no postulates, no beginnings. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that they have no endings. "What is civilization?" we may ask them; but they will only answer us by telling us "how it grows." And even on this point they are as speculative as they are cold. Mere theories as to civilization—as to its causes or effects—may be interesting from the intellectual point of view, but the poorer classes are unable to dine off theories, or to pay rent out of speculative philosophy. It cannot matter one pin to the roofless outcast from all home, nor even to the half-clothed or half-hungry, whether civilization be a purely natural development, in accordance with the so-called laws of evolution,—brought

about by the activity of individuals, and amplified by hereditary transmission,—or the result of legislation which secures liberty to the individual, and presents him with the opportunities of culture. What *does* matter to the poorer classes is the *nature* of that civilization which is assumed to be their true object of aspiration, and to afford to them blessings and enjoyments. Our philosophers will not define these things for us. Civilization is affirmed to have existence, and to be capable of still further development; but whether it includes anything higher than late dinners with silver plate, express trains, electric lights, standing armies, our modern theorists seem rather afraid to tell us.

If society be progressively self-civilizing—a statement which we should accept with distrust—it can only be so because the individuals who compose it are personally bent on "improving themselves." But does civilization mean self-improvement? It means popularly nothing of the sort. It means the arts of good harmony, which citizens, dwelling together, have learned from experience to be advantageous. Civilization means convenience. It means the calm and the ease which the observance of the proprieties secures to the most cultivated in good manners. To the rich classes it means luxury and repose; to the middle classes it means comfort and good behavior; and to the hardworking poor it means protection by the police and by the laws which prevent robbing and being robbed. As to the "inventions" of civilization, they are the result of business enterprise, *plus* the inherited gains of each age from the last age—that is, the gains from experience. The wonder is that, the world being so old, we have learned so very little in so long a time. The nonsense which is talked about our "enlightened age" is only to be accounted for by our vanity. Considering that we inherit all the knowledge and all the wisdom which half a dozen thousands of years have been heaping up, it is strange that the world is so full of mistakes; it is strange that no man has found out infallible politics; that, as to a religion, our newest philosophers are still searching for it; and, as to society, we have not yet housed our poor. We, accidentally, inherit the benefits which have come to us from the past industries of a very old world, and fancy ourselves a superior generation because we blunder over the uses of others' toil. But what has all this to do with civilization? Conventionally speaking, there is, unquestionably, *a* civilization; an external social refinement, or good-fellowship; there is a growing love of easiness in the material order, and of still greater easiness in freethinking. Is this, then, a true civilization? No more than money can be said to be personal merit, or good manners to be virtue or purity.

That the word civilization has different meanings—which it

would be absurd to confuse in critical estimate—is as obvious as that the highest kind of civilization is the least studied, the least cherished, in our own age. Let the Socialists have their way in substituting state for individual action, or for corporate enterprise, and they would scarcely even touch upon the question of civilization—as a Catholic Christian should understand it. The Socialist is only thinking of abstract ideas of social blessedness, so far as labor and possessions are concerned. Or again, the Evolutionist, who views biologically the development of what he accounts to be civilization—just as he views the development of religion, as well as of the whole natural order—may indulge his theories without a thought as to that higher civilization which never was, never will be, *nationally* prized. How, then, is it possible, if the highest kind of civilization be ignored by the most cultivated societies—ignored as too sublime to be attainable—that the world, in its old age, can be asked with any hopefulness to leave off talking of civilization and to practice it?

There is a material, an intellectual, and a moral civilization. The most popular of these divisions is the material. There are many men who are superlatively silly, and many who are profoundly immoral, who would be shocked if an imputation were breathed against their civilization, or who would scorn the imputation as ridiculous. Who should say that any gentleman who rides in a brougham, and who knows how to take his hat off to a lady, can be wanting in the graces of civilization, any more than in the appreciation of its luxuries? The popular idea of civilization is the whitewashing of barbarism; and barbarism means rudeness of toilet and of manner, with a contempt for the fine arts and for education. We say, arbitrarily, that a people is not civilized, because it cannot be trusted with civil liberties (some people say this of the Russians); but what we mean by "uncivilized," in common parlance or apprehension, is the not having the appliances of modern comfort, or the not having the faculty to appreciate them. Now, in all such estimates, the ancient Greeks or ancient Romans (just as they were coming to their downfall) thought very much as we now think. Nay, in some things the ancient Persians or Carthaginians were, materially, quite as civilized as we are. They were our inferiors in but little save inventions. So that to say that civilization, materially, is anything to be proud of, or to aspire to, is really to lay claim to being barbarously self-indulgent; and this is most certainly to be uncivilized. No, civilization is not material; or, at the best, it should be so accidentally.

Pass we then to intellectual civilization. Now, here again we find it difficult to say that, intellectually (save only in the enjoyment of opportunities), the modern peoples of Europe are superior

to the contemporaries of Socrates, Cicero, or Virgil. But let us come down to much later contrasts, to the contrast between the "Middle Ages" and our own age. Take away the art of printing out of the world, take away the *accidents* of invention, and are the peoples of modern Europe more appreciative of wisdom, of genius, of industry, of individuality, than they were in the days, say, of the Crusaders, or when Michel Angelo sketched an outline for St. Peter's? The boast of modern enlightenment—which, of course, means civilization—is the boast only of the *possession* of extraordinary means of education, not of the *using* them to the utmost advantage. A thousand newspapers, or the same number of public libraries, do not make a people intellectual. And here we come to the question: If to be civilized, intellectually, does *not* mean to possess vast opportunities, what is that spirit which should animate the intellect so as to justify the claim of civilization?

Assuming that there is a material, an intellectual, a moral side to the just apprehension of being "civilized," what can be understood by the word "moral"? The answer may be found in Catholic history. All that has been grandly done in the last nineteen centuries has been done by the inspiration of faith. The history of the Church is the history of civilization. As Macaulay put it: "The history of the Catholic Church joins the two great ages of human civilization. No other institution is left standing which carries the mind back to the times when the smoke of sacrifice rose from the Pantheon, and when camelopards and tigers bounded in the Flavian amphitheatre. The proudest royal houses are but of yesterday when compared with the line of the Supreme Pontiffs." And this institution, the Catholic Church, has given the *motive*, or object, to intellect, which was precisely what was wanted for civilization. Take a most familiar example of the blending of a natural heroism with a supernatural. The mere mention of the Knights of the Temple, of St. John of Jerusalem, of the Teutonic Order, of St. Raymond, recall to us the union of the most robust martial spirit with the spirit of robust faith and robust virtue. Without exaggerating the merits of the Crusaders—which, doubtless, were often marred by a natural vanity—there is enough of "true zeal" in their chivalry to compel us to call their motive "ineffectual." Take a still grander illustration of the same motive —though acting in a different groove, and with different temper— the monastic life of learning and of piety. Now, here we have the intellect devoted to three agents, each of which is the highest of its kind: first, the cultivation of the highest learning; next, the cultivation of the highest virtue; and thirdly, the charitable protection of the weaker and poorer classes against the tyranny or the impiety of feudal lords. The abbeys and the priesthood were

the homes and the pattern of the highest civilization possible to men; just as, in a quite different groove, the spirit of Christian chivalry—in what we may call the second half of the Middle Ages—chose an object which, in faith and elevation, is proved to have been the noblest that was practical. The Crusaders did not know all the great things they were doing for the after history of both religious and civil life; but this did not lessen the grandeur of the object, which, intellectually, was eternal and sublime. And just as chivalry and charity were blended—at least in purpose—in the spirit of the Catholic Crusaders, so let it be noted—for it is most appropriate to our subject—that the same blending was characteristic of monasteries. We are accustomed to pride ourselves at this end of the nineteenth century on the magnificent civilization of our public hospitals. The pride of the boast is quite justified. Yet, in the Middle Ages it was the exception for any monastery to be without a public hospital for all comers. "Public beneficence" was twin-born with the monastic life. Just as the Crusaders were both chivalrous and charitable, so the monks defended the weak against the strong, and nursed every wayfarer who fell sick. And here let a few features be noticed, very rapidly, of what may be called the true, as contrasted with the modern and spurious, civilization.

It was just at the time when the ages of faith were fully ripe in all parts of the Christian world, but when civil society was beginning to fall away from its old allegiance and chivalry and devotedness, that there broke over Germany and England, and subsequently over almost half of Europe, that most detestable revolution, the Reformation. Protestantism broke the unity of civilization. Civilization was at its height when Erasmus was examining into what he could find of all the sources of knowledge; when Columbus was discovering a new world; when Vasco da Gama was doubling the Cape; when Ferdinand Cortez was penetrating a new continent; when the standard of Castile was floating at Oran, and the Mussulman had been driven from Granada. In Italy philosophy was deeply studied. Spain was, perhaps, the queen of martial enterprise; and the Pontiffs were blessing the ships that took out armies of missionaries to many a new country of the known world. And here let one great fact be noted. Centuries before these days the Catholic Church had crushed slavery; for, having begun by improving the condition of slaves, and then gone on to obtain their enfranchisement, she ended by excommunicating all persons who indirectly took part in slave-traffic. The Council of Orleans, in 549 (a thousand years before the time of Paul III., who, like Urban VIII., and Benedict XIV., prohibited the practice of slavery), decreed that all slavery was anti-Christian. This was the true spirit

of civilization. But, on every other point of civilization the Catholic Church had led the way. Women, by Catholicity alone, became socially the equals of men. The indissolubility of marriage, by Catholicity alone, became elevated into a Christian dogma. Education, as every writer of any eminence has confessed, was carried to its highest point by the Church. The individual, the family, society, were, by the Church alone, sanctified; and all the world was included in one bond of brotherhood—the highest achievement of civilization. To the old world the exact opposite was civilization. To the Greek or to the Roman all strangers were barbarians; to the Catholic all strangers were brothers. And one word must be said as to civil government, for it is but little apprehended by the majority of Protestants how the Church has fought the battle of "the people." The Catholic teaching was always this (and Suarez maintained it against a king of England), that princes received power "mediately" from God, but "immediately" from the people whom they governed. Rousseau's peevish saying, "Man is born free, and he is everywhere in fetters," might be rendered with perfect truth, "Every Catholic was always free, but heresy and schism destroyed freedom." Briefly, before the time of the Reformation civilization had made all the progress which, humanly speaking, was possible to it. Protestantism perverted its course. The progress which has been made in any sphere of civilization, during the last three hundred years, has been made in spite of, not by the aid of, Protestant ideas, and has been a heritage of the Catholic civilization.

Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon, and Beza,—so, too, Grotius, Papin, and Leibnitz,—all confessed that *after* the ruinous Reformation, learning, both in universities and outside them, fell down to a very common-place degree. And as to what we understand by "ideas," never, since the period of the Reformation, has philosophy soared as it did before it; never have painters, or architects, or poets, grasped the "supernatural idea." The spirit of faith, which touched with fire the old artists, has dwindled into compliments to "modern thought." In all the "religious" paintings of the Middle Ages, every one who has intuition must detect an "idea,"—which now seems quite lost to our best painters,—the "idea" of a supernatural purity. This idea was a realization by faith. Yet, not only did artists realize, they painted. They could not have painted had they not been able to realize; and had they lived in Protestant England, they could not possibly have realized the "idea" of virgin purity, out of Protestantism. Could Murillo have thought out his Catholic subjects with the Thirty-nine Articles for his theology? or could Dante have imagined his *Divine Comedy* in the atmosphere of a modern parsonage-house? or could Michel

Angelo have chiselled that exquisite "Agony," which is in St. Peter's, had he been "inspired" by heresy and schism? And one word must be said as to Shakespeare. His Catholic genius ran riot in Protestant revels. Shakespeare was a "product of the ages of faith," though accidentally living under Protestant rule; nor is it possible to conceive of his combination of greatnesses as having been fathered by "modern thought." He linked the old world with the new. Nor can modern civilization claim *him* for its son any more than it can claim St. Thomas Aquinas, or St. Augustine, or the mighty architects who built Catholic cathedrals. The motive, the object, was wanting to modern piety, modern talent, modern genius, modern "faith." *Waste* was begotten of that rebellion, which killed the motive, the object, of civilization. For ideas, men took up with speculations; for profound study, they took up with controversy; for divine faith, they took up with human caprice; for Christendom, they took up with national churches. Protestantism contained the principle of dissolution, in that it shivered the unity of civilization; so that, whereas, in the Middle Ages, a Spaniard or an Englishman, travelling to any Christian country, was certain to grip the hand of a brother Catholic, from the time of the Reformation he was timid in expecting sympathy from some new-born disciple of a new sect. Civilization stood still under such a shock. It has never recovered its deep purpose, and now we have to fall back on a fictitious philanthropy, and on the complacency and shallowness of philosophers, in the absence of the motive, the object, the intensity of a civilization which *began* in Catholic unity.

Yet there is one point on which modernism so prides itself that it is difficult to shake the delusion: "Liberty, religious and civil, was born," says a modern writer, "of the Reformation, which proves that the Reformation was civilizing." Civil liberty, on the contrary, was born of that protection which the Holy See always gave to suffering peoples, taking their part against half-civilized tyrants, whether kings, feudal lords, or heresiarchs. As to religious liberty, two reflections may be made. The first is, that in most of the struggles between professedly Christian princes, religion has been "used" (as it was used by the late Czar) as a pretext for robbery or injustice; just as Cromwell used religion as a pretext for regicide, and Queen Elizabeth used religion as a pretext for hanging (and also for disemboweling and quartering) about forty Catholic priests and two hundred laity; so, in all ages, ambitious princes have made religion responsible for crimes which necessitated a good excuse, and which the Pontiffs and the priesthood could not prevent. The closest student of history, who "reads everything on both sides," is often puzzled to assure himself which side was

sincere; which side was telling lies to the Pontiff; which side was cloaking infamy with religion, which side was the more cruel, the most merciful. De Maistre, in his masterly treatise on the Inquisition, shows how absolutely necessary it is to know *everything* to form a judgment on all historical scandals. Meanwhile, this one remark must be hazarded: that Protestants are the last people in modern history who ought to presume to claim the title of "civilized" on the ground of granting others religious liberty; for, as Hallam and Macaulay and Guizot have stated,—and, indeed, every historian of any note,—it was persecution *alone* which established Protestantism; so that Protestant religious liberty is *not* civilized.

But, leaving the historic points to one side (since a whole book would not suffice for even a summary), has the new "liberty," it must be asked, made civilization more lovely, more generous, more heroic, more Christian? One word will suffice to sum up modern civilization, and this is that hateful word selfishness. Just as true civilization is all summed up in "charity," so false civilization is selfishness. A few words can demonstrate this truth. If most people were unselfish, it would be impossible that society should contain entire classes which are miserable; it would be impossible that whole classes should be driven to crime through the ignorance or the incentives which are preventable; it would be impossible that sectarianism and selfishism and atheism should be fomented by the *examples* in high places; in short, it would be impossible that this so-called civilized age should be, as it is in truth, so uncivilized. The whole philosophy of civilization was once summed up in the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." In obedience to that principle, all society would be civilized; whereas, society as a whole is uncivilized. So that it comes to this: that, in individual civilization must be found the civilization of communities; whereas, almost the whole world is so horribly selfish that civilization means the worship of self. Before the Reformation, the *principle* of unity, *plus* the sublime object of Catholic life, made civilization and charity to mean one thing; after the Reformation, the *principle* of disunion, *plus* the weakened objects of the human will, made civilization and selfishness to be inseparable. This is the general statement of the whole truth. It is only in general terms it can be stated. Individual exceptions prove nothing. The present age is an uncivilized age, because it makes materialism its chief good, while caring little for those who have *not* that good. In 1884 it suddenly occurs to English society that hundreds of thousands of the English poor are not housed. While esteeming material blessings above all other blessings, society esteems them chiefly for "Number One." Thus, both in

principle and in practice, civilization has dropped to paganism, or, to what is much the same thing, living for self. Intellectually, civilization has lost its object, and, therefore, morally, has lost its grace and its heart.

THE CLASSICS IN MODERN HIGHER EDUCATION.

A College Fetich. An Address by Charles Francis Adams, Jr. Third Edition.

The Greek Question. "Popular Science Monthly," November and December, 1883.

The Question of a Division of the Philosophical Faculty. By Dr. A. W. Hoffman.

Ueber die Bedeutung der Sprache und des Sprachunterrichts für das geistige Leben. Von Professor E. Zeller.

ONE of the most striking characteristics of our age is its spirit of unrest. This spirit manifests itself everywhere and among all classes. It animates the inventor, the speculator, the reformer, the anarchist. It prescribes the changes of our bonnets and of our medicines. It inspires scientific progress and political revolutions. It has undermined the nobility of birth in Europe, and is now assailing the aristocracy of money. It has shaken thrones, threatens the long immovable foundations of the rights of property, and strikes at religion itself. Whilst it has called into life a thousand improvements, it respects nothing, however hallowed by age or authority. Where property, society, political institutions, and religion are daily made the subject of novel speculation, experiment, and attack, it would be strange if the old system of higher education alone escaped unassailed. Nor has it been an exception to the rule.

For thirty years back, voices have been heard demanding the partial or complete discarding of the classics in the gymnasia, the colleges and universities of the nineteenth century. At first few and feeble, these voices gradually grew in volume and strength until the modest petition swelled into a loud, in some cases a furious, chorus of demand. At the college commencement, at the society anniversary, among the doctors of science and the masters

of the modern languages, in the weekly, the daily, and the monthly publications, in America and in Europe, we meet with denunciations of classic teaching. The study of the classics, so say its opponents, is a "great chronic scandalous failure, the one pre-eminent and historic failure of the so-called liberal education, in which there is more repulsiveness and more hatred than in any other kind of study, mathematics not excepted;" it is a "superstition" and a "college fetich." Strong language, this, and positive. Is it founded in fact? Is it true that the training under which the world has progressed for the past four hundred years, under which all, or nearly all, its great men were prepared for their life-work, was a failure, and that the world's advance in science and art was gained, not because of its system of education, but in spite of it? If strong assertion were proof, there could be no doubt, and we must root out the superstition and dethrone the fetich. But though in war it may sometimes be wise generalship to burn our ships, and trust to fortune and our good swords, this is not true in science and learning. To burn the ships which have carried us so far, and which have seemingly enabled us to achieve results so grand that not a few of our friends grow dizzy with self-admiration,—to burn these ships before reason and experiment have proven incontestably that the balloons and air-ships which are to replace them are safe and manageable, were midsummer madness. It is, therefore, the part of wisdom to examine the grounds of these charges, to see whether they are well founded or merely the visions of honest but misguided fanatics. We are not educational Bourbons; we do not shrink from change because it is change; but, on the other hand, we do not believe that all change is improvement. Before we disgrace a servant, who appears to have done his duty for many years, let us see whether he had really become useless, or rather an obstacle; let us examine whether there is any candidate for his place worthy of confidence, and able to perform the work he is supposed to have done. We shall approach this inquiry calmly and dispassionately, try to hear both sides fairly, and leave the reader to judge for himself.

It has been stated that this new crusade is directed against the classics, that is to say, against the study of both Latin and Greek. Let us be precise. The majority of the educational reformers, whose opinions we are examining, make little or no distinction between the two languages. Even those who for the present confine their attack to the Greek, use arguments which tell with equal force against both Greek and Latin, as will appear further on. Indeed, there is little reason why the non-Catholic of to-day should discriminate in favor of the Latin. Not so for the Catholic; to him the Latin is not a dead language, said to be admirably adapted

to be the vehicle of mental discipline; it is the living language of his Church, and has to him a practical importance far exceeding that of French, German, or any other modern language. However, in the remarks which follow, we abstract wholly from this special character of the Latin, but base them solely on its availability as an educational instrument.

To inquire intelligently whether classics are entitled to a prominent place in the higher education of our day, we must first find the answer to another question. What is the aim or purpose of higher education, of a college course? Without knowing this, we have no standard by which to measure the value of the means employed. Fortunately there is practically no difference of opinion on this question. All, or nearly all, are agreed that its object is to prepare the student for life in a general way, to so unfold his faculties and powers as to make him not a specialist but a symmetrically developed man, to fit him not only to take up any profession with success, but to take the broadest views, to form the most intelligent opinions, to entertain the noblest aspirations, and to have the highest ideals. Listen to Mr. C. F. Adams, Jr.: "I am no believer in that narrow scientific and technological training which now and again we hear extolled. A practical and too often a mere vulgar money-making utility seems to be its natural outcome. On the contrary, the whole experience and observation of my life lead me to look with greater admiration, and an envy ever increasing, on the broadened culture which is the true aim of the university." According to this view, those studies are best suited to the college course which are best suited to bring out in the student the *power* to use his intellect, his reason, his imagination, his judgment, his taste, his powers of observation, his memory,—in short, all his faculties to the best advantage. The studies pursued need not, of necessity, be of practical application in after life. As the young gymnast, to secure the sound and symmetrical development of his body, does not swing the blacksmith's hammer, nor use the carpenter's saw, but has recourse to parallel lines, and cross-bars, and trapezes, which he will never use in after life, so the student, to bring out the powers of his mind, may, nay must, if needful, pursue studies which have no further practical aim. We say no "further practical aim," for we should carefully guard against the common error, that only such instruments are practical as show an immediate, visible effect. Hence, if the modernists, so we shall for brevity's sake call the opponents of Latin and Greek, denounce the classics as dead languages, which few do and few can learn to speak, this reproach, if true, would prove no more than if the classicists condemned astronomy because few persons in practical life calculate eclipses or transits of Venus, or analytical geometry,

because, once an alumnus has his diploma, he never more dreams of the asymptotes. To convict of failure a study or an educational system, you must either prove that it has not and cannot have in it the means of drilling the learner's mental powers, or you must show that experience, correctly and honestly interpreted, convicts it as useless.

One more principle we must lay down. As the best tool, if ill-handled, is useless, so the best educational scheme, if badly carried out, must result in disappointment. A correct system should, therefore, not be made to answer for incompetent teachers or bad instruction.

Tested by these standards, have the modernists proved the study of the classics a failure? To do no injustice, let us consult, and, where possible, quote the very words of the advocates of modernism. Nothing that has been said or written during the past few years has so challenged public attention in this country as an address delivered by Mr. C. F. Adams, Jr., in July, 1883. It has been generally understood as an attack upon the study of the classics, and especially of the Greek. Hundreds of articles have been written on it from this point of view; and yet, after a careful perusal, it would be hazardous to say that Mr. Adams has really attacked classical training. He tells us, in so many words: "I have no wish to attack it (*i. e.*, the dead learning, or the study of the classics), except in its spirit of selfish exclusiveness."[1] "I have no light or disrespectful word to utter of the study of Latin or of Greek, much less of the classical literature. While recognizing fully the benefit to be derived from a severe training in these mother tongues, I fully appreciate the pleasure those must have who enjoy an easy familiarity with the authors who yet live in them." (P. 11.) "I object to no man's causing his children to approach the goal (*i. e.*, a true liberal education) by the old, the time-honored entrance (*i. e.*, the classics). On the contrary, I will admit that, for those who teach it well, it is the best entrance." (P. 10.) "I am not speaking at all of Greek, thoroughly studied and lovingly learned. Of that there cannot well be two opinions. I have already said that it is the basis of the finest scholarship." (P. 17.) "We are willing—at least I am willing—to concede a preference, and a great preference, to the dead over the living, to the classic over the modern." (P. 31.) Is this the language of an opponent of the classics? If so, what could an advocate say in their favor that would be stronger? Mr. Adams makes several of the above quoted remarks, "so that I (he) shall be misunderstood only by such as wilfully misunderstand, in order to misrepresent. With such I hold no argument." Surely, to rank Mr. Adams as an op-

[1] A College Fetich, p. 10.

ponent of the classics, or for that matter of Greek, is a delicate and a dangerous step. Moreover, much of what is said throughout his address is directed not against the study of the classics in itself, but against the manner in which he was made to study them at Harvard thirty years ago. If, as he assures us, the Harvard men of his day "were compelled to acquire a confessedly superficial knowledge of two dead languages, if they passed examinations in Latin and Greek that did not set at defiance the science of cramming, if they were made to neglect their mother tongue, if the slipshod methods accepted in Latin and Greek were also accepted in other studies, if a prominent feature of the instruction in the classics was unintelligent meaning," then, indeed, Mr. Adams and his fellow-students are entitled to our deepest sympathy. If the facts were as he states, we should not wonder at his demanding reform, radical reform, in the methods of instruction, so that future generations may have opened to them "the best entrance" to the "goal of a liberal education." But Mr. Adams will have none of the bests. Like Medea, he sees and approves what is better; but he chooses the worse. Side by side with the unstinted eulogy measured out to the classics in the passages given above, we read as follows: "I cannot myself profess to have any great admiration for Latin literature." (P. 16.) John Adams's endowment of an academy, where Latin, Greek, and Hebrew were to be *thoroughly* studied, was "fetich worship, pure and simple." "In these days of repeating-rifles she (Harvard College) sent me and my classmates out into the strife equipped with shields and swords and javelins. We were to grapple with living questions, through the medium of a dead language. It seems to me I have heard somewhere else of a child-cry for bread being answered with a stone." (Pp. 28, 29.) "But are those transcendent beauties really there (in Greek and Latin literature)? I greatly doubt it. I shall never be able to judge." "I am free to say that, whether viewed as a thing of use or as an accomplishment, as a source of pleasure or as a mental training, I would rather be familiar with the German tongue and its literature than be equally familiar with the Greek. . . . . What I have said of German as compared with Greek, I will say of French as compared with Latin." (Pp. 37–8.) After digesting this anthology, let the reader say under what flag the speaker sails. To us he furnishes one of the most marvellous instances of mental bipolarity which it has been our fortune to meet. It is hard to say whether, like Balaam, he went forth to curse and broke out into blessing, or whether, unlike that noted prophet, he set out to bless and ended in cursing. On the one hand, the study of Greek is the best basis of the finest scholarship; on the other hand, it is a fetich and a stone. Are we to infer that a fetich and

a stone are the best basis of the finest scholarship? We confess that, so far from misunderstanding Mr. Adams, in his duplex attitude towards the classics, we have not even understood him.

So much is certain, however, that, whether Mr. Adams really thinks Latin and Greek the best entrance to a true liberal education, or whether he really prefers German and French to Greek and Latin, he wants no classics, or at least as little classics as possible, for himself and his children. Most people prefer the best wine, Mr. Adams the inferior quality; and why?

Mr. Adams himself tells us that his preference is based on his own experience and that of his family for the past century and a half. As one swallow does not make a summer, so the experience of one man, or of one family, out of thousands, nay millions, cannot furnish the ground-work of a valid indiction. Mr. Adams is too frank and too well-trained a man not to suggest this himself. So this experience, whatever it consists in, by itself can prove neither one thing nor the other. Such as it is, however, it seems to prove to us the contrary of Mr. Adams's inferences. We will state it. Mr. Adams's grandfather, John Adams, received a classical education. The training he received at college enabled him to become a successful teacher and lawyer; he espoused his country's cause in the Revolution, and rendered it distinguished service, both at home and abroad, as envoy to France. He ranked so high as a statesman that he was found a worthy successor of the Father of his Country. All this he achieved in virtue of his talents and his education. But his education did not enable him to appreciate Isocrates and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, at the age of seventy years, after long neglect, nor to speak French, at forty-two, as the diplomatic representative of America. No doubt it would have been pleasanter to the elder Mr. Adams had he been a French scholar. That he would have been a better diplomatist with French and without the classics, it is easy to assert, but as impossible to prove as it is to prove the contrary. On the whole, if a man's success is at all due to his education—and both classicists and moderns hold this—Mr. Adams certainly had no fault to find with his classical training.

Mr. John Quincy Adams's case comes next. He was no less successful as a diplomatist and a statesman than his father; he, also, had studied Latin and Greek at Harvard, but then he had also picked up some living languages in Europe as a boy. As his father made his mark as a diplomatist without French, it is not self-evident that Mr. John Quincy Adams would have failed without it. Men speaking French have been unsuccessful diplomatists, and the same can be said of men who have had a classical education. We modestly suggest that an able man with a good training would

succeed with or without French, as experience has proved more than once. No doubt a knowledge of French is a decided advantage in a diplomatic career; but that, without it, his grandfather would have been tongue-tied at St. Petersburg, as Mr. C. F. Adams, Jr., hints, does not follow. What inference, for or against classical training, can be drawn from a career like that of Mr. J. Q. Adams, would puzzle the ordinary mortal. Still, even he is made to point a moral; for his education is criticised, on the one hand because he did not read Greek in after life, and on the other hand because he did read Latin. This knowledge of Latin, it seems, and not the prevailing taste, led the old gentleman to indulge in an affectation which he seems to have transmitted, in some faint degree, to his grandson—the affectation of, at times, airing his knowledge of Latin quotations.

Whilst Mr. J. Q. Adams enables his grandson to have a fling at the classics, because he did not "keep up" his Greek, Mr. C. F. Adams, Sr., did keep up his Greek, but the Greek fares no better at the hands of our critic. The Greek caused him "to lose the step of his own time"; it prevented him from becoming "a wiser, a happier, and a more useful man." Such is the language of the son, who is President of the Union Pacific R.R., we believe, concerning the father, whose services, as the representative of the United States at the Court of St. James during the civil war, have met with unanimous and hearty commendation. If success be the criterion, then C. F. Adams, Sr., with his love of Greek, need not shun comparison with his son. His career as a whole is an honor to his Alma Mater, and certainly does not countenance the charge that his education unfitted him, or fitted him ill, to play his part in the drama of life.

Even the younger Charles Francis Adams, despite his own opinion to the contrary, seems to us to show that the time honored classical training has not lost its virtue. It may seem presumptuous to set up our opinion on this point against Mr. Adams's, but we are told that no one is a judge in his own case. Here is the story of Mr. Adams's experience. With the exception of some independent reading in English literature, he owes his intellectual training to the college course established at Harvard thirty years ago—a course largely made up of the classics and mathematics. How did this training serve him? He first studied law; as appears, successfully. Being called to fight for his country's cause in the field, he made an honorable record for himself during the civil war. When, at the close of the war, he returned to civil life, he changed his profession, and devoted himself to what he calls "a specialty in connection with the development of the railroad system,"—some scientific pursuit, we infer. A course of training

that prepares a man to become, successively, lawyer, soldier, and railroad scientist, certainly does not fossilize the mind; it seems to have rendered Mr. Adams's mind remarkably elastic. It must have unfolded, drilled, and strengthened all its faculties; for, to pursue successfully the three avocations mentioned would, ordinarily, be beyond the powers of a mind that had not been so developed and invigorated. Mr. Adams has not a word of recognition for the services thus rendered to him, which he includes, it must be presumed, among the "impalpable essence" effects of classic training. He only remembers that it did not teach him French, or rather, that it did not enable him to speak that language fluently in a public assembly. "Representing American educated men in the world's industrial gathering," he wails, "I have occupied a position of confessed inferiority." We have read of German and English, and we are proud to say it, American *savans*, who, though not masters of French, did not occupy a position of confessed inferiority at the world's scientific gatherings.

A more serious and, if well founded, more damaging charge against his classical education, is the rhetorical assertion made by Mr. Adams that Harvard sent forth most of her graduates unable to follow out a close, sustained line of thought, and to express themselves in clear, concise terms. To determine the validity of this accusation, we must be certain, first, that the facts are accurately stated, and next, that they are correctly explained. Far be it from us to suggest that Mr. Adams would wilfully mis-state any fact. But when we study his mental habits, and find that in one place (p. 4) he assures us that "the college course was a pleasant sort of vacation, which he would be very sorry not to have enjoyed," and, on another (p. 28), that he studied Greek (which elsewhere he informs us was a nightmare to him) with patient fidelity, we must either infer that the patient, faithful study of Greek was a pleasant vacation, or suspect that facts unconsciously shape themselves to his mental ken according to the needs of his argument. But allowing that, in the present instance, there is no delusion (and students of his pamphlets will, perhaps, concede this in Mr. Adams's own case), why blame the classics, which, we are told, were only superficially studied, especially when every other branch of study was learned no more thoroughly?

So much for the experience of the Adams family. We hold that it is an argument in favor of classical training, as far as the experience of a few individuals can be called an argument. In reality it only supports the experience of thousands of others, to whom the mental strength and elasticity acquired by the study of Latin and Greek proved the means of becoming successful men, and sometimes of attaining fame. Let the reader review the roll

of honor in England, and where were her greatest statesmen, scholars, and scientists trained? At her great classical schools. What education prepared the political and intellectual heroes of Germany—a Stein, a Scharnhorst, a Metternich, a Bismarck, a Gœthe, a Lessing, a Schlegel, a Humboldt, a Liebig, a Ganss, a Kant, and a thousand others,—to achieve fame? The classical education of the Gymnasium. Who, aside from her military heroes, are the intellectual leaders of France? Ask her Bossuets, her Racines, her Corneilles, her Descartes, her La Places, her Mirabeaus, her Talleyrands, her Guizots, her Thiers, her Montalemberts, and her Lacordaires; they will tell you, the alumni of her classical schools. And here, in our country, most of those whom we honor as national benefactors, most of those in whose intellectual achievements we glory, grew up under like educational influences. Beginning with John Adams, we name Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, John Quincy Adams, Webster, Calhoun, Van Buren, Sumner, Benton, Irving, Longfellow, Emerson, Hawthorne, Holmes. To-day, the American people, untrammeled as it is by traditions, and unfettered by prejudice in this regard, strong though be its leaning to the self-made candidates for political honors, numbers among its senators, its representatives, and its governors, an overwhelming proportion of college-bred men; that is to say, of men trained for their present positions by the study of Latin and Greek. Here, then, we have the experience of four nations, all tending to establish the same thesis, all bearing witness to the value of classical training.

For Greek, especially, we have another argument, also based on experience. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, Manuel Chrysoloras, at the invitation of the Signory of Florence, in 1396, introduced true Greek learning in Italy. The foremost Italian minds of that day, lay and clerical, flocked in swarms to become his scholars. They, in turn, became enthusiastic apostles of the newly-recovered learning, and thus greatly contributed to the intellectual movement called the Renaissance.

Now, in the opinion of those best fitted to judge in our age,—of men, too, of whom it would be presumptuous to say that they are not in sympathy with it,—what was the influence of the study of Greek in Italy and, through Italy, in Europe? Listen to Mr. J. Addison Symonds ("*Renaissance in Italy*," ii., p. 112): "The study of Greek implied the birth of criticism, comparison, research. . . . It stimulated the germs of science, suggested new astronomical hypotheses, and indirectly led to the discovery of America. The study of Greek resuscitated a sense of the beautiful in art and literature." Burckhardt, in his work on the "*Renaissance in Italy*," after insisting "that it was not the revival of antiquity alone, but

its union with the genius of the Italian people, which achieved the conquest of the Western World" (vol. i., p. 239), remarks that "it is idle to ask if this cause (*i. e.*, humanism) ought not to have stopped short in its career of victory, to have restrained itself deliberately, and conceded the first place to purely national elements of culture." In his opinion, therefore, the national movement, the beginning of which was marked by the powerful genius of Dante, was not only modified, but to a certain extent overborne, by the new influence exerted by the study of classic literature, and especially by Greek. Lastly, Dr. Draper, in his "*Intellectual Development of Europe*" (p. 469), tells us that "Greek literature, forced into Italy by Turkish arms, worked wonders." Though, as a historian, Draper is far from being a model, yet we have cited his judgment as being that of a scientist, whom the modernists will certainly not charge with being behind the age. The study of Greek, consequently, was a powerful force, shaping the current of men's thoughts, developing their intellectual powers, and opening up new and correct views in literature and art. If it be true that the greatest works of man's genius in every branch of literature and science are undying in their influence, then Greek and its literature, though not to us a new revelation, as it was to the Italians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, must still be endowed with potent mind-fashioning power.

So far Mr. Adams's argument from experience; his proposal to substitute for the study of the classics a practical command of the modern languages we shall say a word about later on. For the present, we shall turn to consider the objections made to the study of the classics by many scientific men. We say "many," because in Germany, in particular, some of the most distinguished representatives of science have raised their voices in favor of the old-time training. Nor does this surprise us. On the contrary, we are amazed at the attitude of a school of scientific men, of whom Professor Youmans, of the *Popular Science Monthly*, is a good type,—men who condemn not only the study of the classical language, but inform us that "no kind of culture degenerates so readily into stupid mechanical routine as that of language." ("*College Fetich*," p. 70.) We are amazed at them, because, even as men of science, they, above all, should be the ardent champions of the study of language. They pose as the devoted students of nature, as the ardent advocates of all that familiarizes us with its phenomena. Of course, the higher something stands in the order of nature, the more claim it should have on their attention and to their enthusiastic study. Now, these gentlemen tell us that man stands at the head of all nature. They may be evolutionists, and trace man's pedigree through never-found links to the mere cell-

beings, that differ but little from the slime of the earth,—all the same do they recognize man as nature's greatest and crowning achievement. Surely they should advocate, above all, the study of him who is the crown of nature and re-echo the poet's line:

"The proper study of mankind is man."

Above all, they should plead for the thorough, the loving study of that which, according to their own teaching, is the characteristic that distinguishes man from the brute, that which makes man a human being, namely, language. Where, then, should we look for stronger, warmer champions of the study of language than among the men of science? And, of course, among all languages they should single out that one as especially worthy of the most careful study which is acknowledged on all sides to be the most perfect in its structure,—the Greek. But the unexpected, we are told, always happens, and so we behold the very men denounce the study of language whom right logic would lead to recommend it above all others.

But what are the grounds of this opposition? the reader will naturally ask. Of course, those physicists who are broad-minded and clear-minded enough to see that nature does not end where it refuses to submit to the test of the balance, the microscope, and chemical reaction, cannot share in this opposition, for it is based largely upon the idea that language is something apart from, nay, almost opposed to, natural science. Only this explanation can account for such assertions as: "The old method (of education) occupied itself mainly with the study of language; the new method passed beyond language to the study of the phenomena of nature." As if language were an "unnatural" phenomenon. But let us hear the pundits of the *Popular Science Monthly*. "Professor Cooke," says Mr. Youmans, "struck the keynote of this discussion when he remarked in his article on the 'Greek Question' in the last *Monthly*: 'A half century has wholly changed the relations of human knowledge, and the natural sciences have become the chief factors of our modern civilization.'" "*Le roi est mort, vive le roi*," is the shout of these gentlemen; and if lusty lungs and loud assurance could create facts, the reign of religion, of morality, and of law would be replaced by the reign of science, and the decalogue by dietetic prescriptions. We yield to no one in just and sincere admiration of the achievements of modern science. No one appreciates more fully the grand discoveries in astronomy made by means of the spectroscope and telescope, the wonderful revelations of the microscope, the striking progress in the philosophy of physics, and the remarkable engineering feats of our days. They have unveiled new marvels of the power and wisdom of God;

they have extended man's mental horizon; they have added new grandeur to his conceptions. But that, in consequence of these discoveries, law, morality, and religion have ceased to be the chief factors in our civilization, is a discovery far ahead of our age, and, we think, of any age. For we fail to see how the social fabric, or the political fabric, can ever be made to rest chiefly on the laws of natural science. Indeed, if we compare our civilization with that of fifty, or, to oblige the learned gentlemen of the *Popular Science Monthly*, of a hundred years ago, we fail to see any warrant for their proclamations. What was right then is looked upon as right now; and what was wrong then is still held to be wrong. Our ideas of property, of the rights of government and of the governed, are but little modified, and the changes again can neither be debited nor credited to natural science. Law and theology are studied very much as of yore, and even in medicine we see little, if any, change in the method of study. Above all, man's passions and feelings, his faith, hope, love, fear, envy, hate, and greed, are the same as of yore. It is true that we use lucifer matches, whereas our great-grandfathers used the flint, and that among us gas or electricity takes the place of sperm-oil and candle. It is true that, owing to the advance of agricultural chemistry and the progress of mechanical discovery, we reap fifty-fold where our grandfathers reaped ten-fold. It is true, in fine, that we move with a rapidity rivalling the winds, and dispatch our thoughts to great distances in a few instants. But all these things do not constitute human life, or human society; they influence human life and society in little more than their externals. And so with the grand assertion falls the grand inference, and the classics are safe, if Professor Cooke has struck the keynote of the "Greek Question."

Before dismissing Dr. Youmans we must, however, look into some few assertions with which he seeks to bolster up his cause. It seems extraordinary that an evolutionist should tell us that the new knowledge (natural science) came, not by the old method of study, but by new exercises of the mind, contracted with previous habits, when it is the cardinal principle of the evolutionists that the new is but the development of the old, and when it is a fact that long before Bacon of Verulam, and long before Youmans of New York, experiments and observations were made, verifications, inductions, and classifications worked out, and physical hypotheses constructed. It is not true that any absolutely new exercise of the mind gave rise to the new knowledge; but, as time rolled on, practice made perfect; there were more observations and experiments to be utilized, and new experiments were made in greater number; where one man cultivated the field of science before, a hundred do so now, and such drudgery is now spared to the really

great man, and delegated to underlings. Hence the great and successful advance of modern science; the "brand-new" exercises of the mind exist in the cerebral convolutions of Professor Youmans.

Nor is it true, as Dr. Youmans says, that "the old method has for its end lingual (*sic*) accomplishments;" it is an unfounded assertion, and those who are acquainted with the course of history know well that no system, the end of which is even the prettiest and most skillful prattle and babble, and whose "results are barrenness," could last for four centuries. In further contrasting the old and the new method, Mr. Youmans implies that a scientific training especially, and far more than the classical education, fits the student for dealing with the problem of life. At first sight this appears plausible. The common mind, largely soaked in the material tendencies of the day, thinks at once of steam engines, artificial manure, new methods of lighting, of heating, of assaying, improvements in all kinds of manufactures. Science rises before him at once as the genie of fortune-making. And surely it would be the greatest rashness to deny that it has made—and, we may add, unmade—the fortunes of many. The effects it has produced are visible to the eye of the senses. But on the other hand, because they strike the eye of the senses they are likely to appear magnified and exaggerated, and this seems true also of the training acquired by natural science; its results are visible and material, and therefore impress the imagination far more vividly than the results of a classical or philosophical training, the results of which appear only to the eye of the intellect. Yet, after all, the activity which constitutes by far the greatest and most important portion of our lives, the actions on which depend the welfare and happiness of our family, our social and our political relations, lie almost wholly outside of the sphere of natural science. We love, and woo, and wed, and are not influenced in the slightest by considerations of brachycephalism or dolichocephalism; we choose our friends and never ask how much nitrogenous and how much albuminous food enters into their constitution; we choose our presidents and are astonished when their weight in avoirdupois is made a matter of discussion. In all these things what determines our selection are qualities beyond the reach of balance and microscope, and surely a mistake in the choice of a wife or of a friend is as likely to be serious as a lack of skill in determining plants, or insects, or minerals. Even to the business man, scientific knowledge is generally not of primary importance. No doubt, the brewer and sugar-refiner depend for their success largely on correct scientific methods, but when they manufacture, and above all when they sell their goods, much also depends on the right

selection of their agents, and a correct judgment of the character of their customers. Indeed, it may be said without too much risk, that even to the sugar-refiner the knowledge of sugar is hardly more important than the knowledge of men. How to acquire this knowledge of men—what is the best means? No doubt it is useful by means of scientific training to learn to make a skillful use of our eyes, our ears, our touch, our senses, in short. It is well to observe the physical phenomena about us, to notice the form, and color, and size, and weight of the plants and stones and animals around us. It is useful to group them by their resemblances and differences. But, after all, men do not act like sticks and stones, and the only way to learn to know man is to study man, and to study what is specially and characteristically human; and here we are again led to the study of language and of the thoughts it embodies.

We see, then, that the study of natural science, which Professor Youmans and other no doubt well-meaning enthusiasts recommend as a substitute for the classical training, instead of developing all the student's faculties completely, develops only some of them, and those only inasmuch as they deal with the material world. The far more important world of mind and spirit this method neglects. Indeed, "natural science," says E. du Bois Reymond, a distinguished German scientific professor, "like every other activity so pursued, narrows the field of view. . . . . Where it is exclusively dominant, the mind is apt to grow poor in ideas, the imagination in pictures, the soul in sensitiveness, and the result is a narrow, dry, and hard mode of thought deserted by the muses and the graces." Our friends of the *Popular Science Monthly* are themselves capital instances of this narrowing tendency of natural science when too exclusively pursued. All that is good they see in natural science, and outside of science nothing that is good. In their eyes not only the study of the classics, but the study of all language, degenerates into stupid mechanical routine. Contrast with this the broad, liberal spirit of the classicists. They were in sole undisputed possession of the academic field, when natural science first lifted up its head. They did not regard it as an enemy, nor as a rival, but as a fellow-laborer in the field of culture. They recognized that it developed a side of our mental activity untrained by classic studies, the power of observation by the senses; and, many years back, they gave to natural science a place beside the classic learning.

But it is time to see what the advocates of the old classic training have to say in its behalf, and to examine whether or what there is in the study of Latin or Greek that makes it an efficient instrument of mental training. By way of introduction, let us see

what is language, and of what service it is to the human mind. Language, as all know, consists of words, and words are signs. Signs of what? Of things? No; but of our ideas or conceptions of those things. You may speak of "red," and I may speak of "red," and yet we may speak of very different colors. To the rude farmer a "scholar" is one thing, to the college professor another. To understand each other correctly, therefore, "men must not only hear the sounds called words, but know what they represent in each other's minds, and, as much as possible, how far they correspond to the things outside of their minds. Now, these words with this double relation are most important to us all. By their means we communicate with each other, and, if we observe the workings of our minds, it will be found that by their means we communicate with ourselves; that is to say, we think and judge and reason mentally. Many ideas are almost begotten of their word-signs, and most ideas are made clearer by them. We shall not go so far as to say that we cannot think and reason at all without words, but as a matter of fact we seldom do so. Without language our mental activity would be exceedingly limited. Whether in theology or philosophy, in science or art, or even in business, words play an all-important role. In truth, to know precisely what ideas correspond, and to know well the things which words designate outside of the mind, would be to banish half of our misunderstandings, and to accumulate vast stores of most solid and practical knowledge. But it is not only the crude words that thus reflect the workings of men's minds, but even their modifications, their declensions and conjugations, their very position. All these contribute to express our mental operations; not only our perceptions, but our judgments and our reasoning. Terminations and prefixes are often marvellously subtle means to express certain conceptions. Take, for instance, the comparative suffix, *er*. To what shifts must we resort to say, "James is taller than John," without using the suffix, *er*, or the word, *more*, which contains that suffix. In short, these words, with their grammatical modifications of all sorts, are, so to say, audible photographs of the action of our mind, that mind which is our intellectual life, the treasure-casket of all our acquirements and enjoyments, and the God-given instrument whereby we are to support and defend ourselves. To study language, then, is to study the science of the mind and its intellectual operations; in other words, to study logic, and at the same time to acquire mastery over an instrument absolutely necessary to success in our intercourse with our fellow-men.

There are two ways of learning a language,—1st, mechanically and almost unconsciously, as the child does, and as some adults learn foreign languages; and, 2d, scientifically or grammatically,

as we learn Latin and Greek at school. How much even the first method helps to unfold the mind, no one can fail to have noticed who has seen a child learn to prattle its mother-tongue. Every new word gained is an idea cleared up and stored away ready for use when needed. What was in a state of flux becomes fixed, and dreamy visions become well-defined knowledge. Then the first sentence becomes the stimulus to hundreds of others, each quickening and strengthening the budding power of judgment. But the child learns to speak by imitation and almost unconsciously. Because by this first method we learn languages unconsciously and by imitation, it has not a like stimulating power for elder children, or adults, in whom the first mental awakening has already taken place. No doubt even so it reveals new features in their mother-tongue, clearing up, limiting, and defining much that was blurred and indistinct. But, after all, the mechanical method of learning languages has, as chief result, the power to handle a new means of intercourse with others. Hence, too, we do not find that populations who have acquired this power—such as certain districts of Germany and Switzerland, on the French border—are noted for exceptional mental power or adroitness.

It is far different with the second or scientific method of acquiring a language. Show us a man who has learned not only to understand or speak a second language, but also to know why every word and every form are used, and we will show you a man with an active, open-eyed mind, who perceives rapidly, judges correctly, and reasons quickly. Why is this so? We have only to analyze his training to grasp the reason. Place before a student a moderately hard sentence in Latin or Greek. What will he do? Firstly, he observes the words composing it and notices their forms, picking out nouns and verbs and adjectives, identifying the cases and other accidents. What is this but cultivating the mind's powers of observation? Having finished his inspection, he addresses himself to the solution of the problem before him; for every sentence to be translated is a problem to be solved, in which the meaning is the unknown quantity. By reasoning on their forms, he infers that certain words belong together; he has recourse to the dictionary, and balances the *pros* and *cons* of the meanings there set down, and thus exercises his judgment. Next he proceeds to combine the subjects and predicates and the various clauses, until he arrives at the meaning sought for. But the end is not yet. He must now go back to the preceding sentence and look forward to the following one, in order to verify his translation. Thus the mere translation according to grammatical rule has called into play his powers of observation, of reasoning, of combination or invention, of judgment, and taught him that even

then his results must be verified. In his reasoning, too, he will have occasions both for deductive argument and for induction; for every rule of grammar is the conclusion of an induction, and the proper way to teach the beginner the more common rules is to lead the pupil to notice the examples and to draw the rule as the inference. Again, by selecting his English words carefully, he gains a nicer and fuller insight into the power of his mother-tongue and its vocables; nay, at times, when he comes across words for which his own language has no equivalent, he has found an idea foreign to the genius of his own people, and thus he enlarges the field of his conceptions. As the sentences increase in difficulty, higher and higher powers of combination and invention, more delicate insight, more skillful reasoning, are called into play, and, moreover, the student's moral qualities are drawn upon. If he be made of the true metal, increasing difficulties will call forth not only subtler reasoning, greater versatility, and more ingenious combinations, but increasing determination, until, having triumphed over every obstacle, he tastes the sweets of intellectual conquests. To this add the power of expression gained by a faithful, close, idiomatic reproduction in the vernacular of the thoughts and language of the original; for, surely, if we can express the thoughts of others suitably and well, we will not fail in the expression of our own ideas. Finally, a really intelligent and complete translation of the original includes, of necessity, a reproduction of its literary beauties. Emphasis must be matched by emphasis, figure by figure, always having due regard to the genius of the mother-tongue. Adroitness of expression, logical force, pathetic power, sublimity,—all must be brought home to the translator's mind and copied in the version. Surely, such a course of drill repeated again and again on different subject-matter cannot fail to nurture the student's literary taste, to enliven his imagination, to vivify and brace his logical faculty. All these advantages are derived from a mere careful and intelligent translation. But to master fully his author, the student must understand all the allusions which he meets with, be they in the domain of history, geography, archæology, ethnology, customs, laws, religion, art, or science. A loving study of all these features will confer new interest on the writer, will enable the scholar really to understand the people whose literature he peruses, broaden his mind and widen his sympathies, so that even when, in later life, he becomes a specialist, he will not be a narrow-minded one, but will always feel that, though to him his profession goes above every other, there is no profession, no branch of human knowledge, that has not its attractions, that does not render service to mankind.

And here it may be well to state that of late more and more

stress has been laid on these historical features of classic study. Look at a Latin or Greek text-book of to-day, and you will be struck at once with the wealth of illustrations that adorn it. Works of ancient art, homely tools, musical instruments, portraits of old heroes, arms, plans of battle, all contribute to clear up the text, to interest the scholar, to inspire him with a taste for art and history, and to store his mind with a living knowledge that will leaven his intellectual life, and be a source of enjoyment and advantage for the rest of his days.

Such, then, are some of the benefits to be reaped from a thorough, loving study of the classics. But, it may be asked: Could not like benefits be derived from a study of modern languages? For ourselves, we have a high estimate of the practical value of the modern languages to the man of letters as well as to the business man. Nor is this wonderful; it may be said to be a tradition among educated Catholics. For as long back as thirty years ago there was hardly a Catholic college in the land in which a course of French or German was not an integral part of the academic curriculum. Still, if, as is admitted on all sides, the training and drill of the mental powers be the end of higher education, it must be confessed that, in this respect, the modern languages are not the peers of the classical languages. Why not? If, as Mr. Adams wishes, they are to be learned so as to be spoken fluently, then they must be learned mostly on the imitative plan, and that, as we have shown above, does not, and cannot, develop our mental faculties as the scientific study of language does. But even if studied on the same plan as the classics are taught, they are far inferior to the latter for purposes of intellectual drill. For, in the first place, they are far easier. Their constructions, and their accidence, or rather lack of accidence, are largely cut after the same pattern. Rarely, very rarely, will the student be called upon to invent and try combination after combination in order to find the meaning of a sentence, rarely to cultivate that intellectual dash, determination, and perseverance that are such admirable means of shaping the character. A great number of the forms having died out in the modern languages, words belonging together are always placed near each other, and hence the scholar need not be constantly on the alert to discover the endings that show which words go together. Besides, the very fact that these languages are close to ours in time, in degree, character of culture, and often, to a great extent, in vocabulary, leave them less to teach us than a language remote from ours in all these respects. We must, therefore, conclude that their very difficulty makes the classic tongues more powerful means of drilling the mind, more fitting instruments of education. We may, indeed, never learn to read Greek as fluently

as German, and yet derive more profit therefrom. But the greater ease with which we read modern languages is often only apparent. Thousands hear Shakespeare performed at the theatre, and go away convinced that they have understood him throughout. Thousands read the bard of Avon in their closet, they pass from page to page, and seldom or never meet with a stumbling-block. And yet how many passages have not puzzled, and do not to this day, after centuries of research and volumes of commentaries, puzzle the Shakespeare scholar. In like manner, in reading French or German, the general parallelism of construction in these languages with the English construction makes it needless to be too precise in looking up words and forms; we quickly catch the general meaning, and often make conjecture take the place of scientific study. Thus is generated in us gradually a sense that we understand when we do not understand, that we know when we know not. A dangerous, unscientific, self-inflating, self-deceiving state of mind. To this temptation the student of the classics is rarely exposed; even in later life there is no danger of such self-deception, as appears so clearly from Mr. Adams's account of his grandfather's Greek experiment in old age. In reading the classics, any scholar of average intelligence will be in no doubt whether he knows or does not know. The Delphic Apollo declared Socrates the wisest of the Greeks because he knew that he did not know; to know that they do not know is denied to many modern oracles, who would do well to have recourse to the classics.

We cannot do better than to reinforce these remarks by citing the opinion of one of the foremost scholars and thinkers of Germany, Professor Zeller, of Berlin, on the educational value of Latin and Greek. "Latin grammar," says Zeller, "by its strictness and logical correctness, is as excellent a means for the general training of the mind as Roman law is for its juridical training, and, in this respect, it can no more be replaced by any modern language than the pandects can be replaced by the *Code Napoléon*. The Greek language combines, with the transparency of its logico-grammatical structure, wealth of words, mobility of construction, the power to accommodate itself to every need of expression, a full and clear formation of its sentences, and a euphony, which is as unique as is the classic perfection of Greek art. All the mental faculties and powers, which the formation of language demands and the study of language develops, are equally stimulated by the Greek tongue." And here we may suggest the answer to a riddle that greatly puzzles Professor Youmans and his friends: "How could the Greeks, who studied no foreign language, arrive at such perfection in almost every branch of literature and thought?" Because they

learned and spoke and studied the Greek language. Were the modern languages as perfect images of all that is logical in the human mind as the Greek, were they as rich in inflections, had they the same subtle means of expressing the most refined shades of thoughts and the nicest modes of action, the same capacity to form compounds, the same mobility of construction and adaptability,—qualities which, while adding to the power of expression, demand close attention, logic and precision of mind, insight into the relations of the various thoughts composing a sentence, a fine sense of their relative importance, and an ear sensitive to the most delicate harmonies of language,—then, indeed, we might achieve what the Greeks accomplished without having recourse to any language but our own mother tongue.

That the classics are superior for mind-training purposes to natural science and the modern languages, does not lack the support of practical experience. Many years back there were established in Germany, along-side of the old-time *gymnasium*, the curriculum which consists mainly of classical and mathematical studies, a new kind of high-schools called *Realschulen*, destined to prepare young men for commercial pursuits or the polytechnic schools. Their course was gradually enlarged until it occupied the same length of time as that of the gymnasium. The chief differences between the two classes of schools was that the *Realschulen* discarded the study of Greek wholly and lessened the Latin instruction, these branches being replaced by additional time given to mathematics, natural science, and the modern languages. The graduates of the *Realschulen* were at first debarred from entrance to the university. About 1870, in spite of protests from several sources, the Prussian government ordered that these graduates be admitted to the philosophical department of the universities. Henceforth the graduates of both classes of schools worked side by side, and afforded an excellent opportunity to compare the relative merits of the classical and the modern training. In 1880, after a ten years' trial, the philosophical faculty of the University of Berlin reported to the minister of Public instruction its opinion on the question whether the graduates of the *Realschulen* were fitted to pursue a university course with the *gymnasium* graduates. It was decidedly adverse to the efficiency of the modern training in developing and drilling the mind and its powers. Even the representatives of science and the modern languages in the Faculty joined heartily in this judgment. The science professors reported that the *Realschulen*, though starting with more extensive knowledge of their subjects than their classically trained fellow students, soon fell behind the latter. In specifying the deficiencies of the students trained by the modern system, the various instructors

complain of their dulness of comprehension, their lack of independent judgment, of a clear consciousness of their own scientific capacity and of sure insight into the growth of man's mental life, their want of self-knowledge and their defective power of expression; the very results we should expect from our analysis of the two systems. Attempts have not been wanting to belittle this experiment. It has been said that the experiment, being concrete, did not affect the abstract question of the superiority of classics or science; but all experiments are concrete, and their concreteness does not destroy their value; it only requires us to be careful in interpreting their results. The honesty, or rather the impartiality, of the respective professors has been questioned; though it seems strange that thirty-six gentlemen of various pursuits, which would naturally lead them to take different views on the question submitted, gentlemen famed for their insight and their integrity, should all be stricken by the same prejudice. And if it be true that the *gymnasia* have the advantage of greater age, the upholders of the *Realschulen*, as well as their chosen instructors, should naturally shine by their greater enthusiasm in a new cause. Certainly this experiment, as well as the experience of the past three centuries, totally subverts the position of the anti-classical radicals of the Youmans type, confirms the arguments that have been presented above, and warns us not to give up what, tested by experience, has proved useful, and fly to ills we know not of.

We have sought above to convey an imperfect idea of the peerless qualities of the Latin and especially the Greek, as instruments of training the faculties of the mind. But the study of the classics bestows advantages of a different kind on the scholar. We all know the great educational benefit derived from travel, how it opens and stimulates the mind, how it broadens our views and removes prejudice, and finally how, whilst it excites our admiration of what is good in foreign lands, it also confirms our love of home and country. A classical course is in reality an excursion into a different world, the world of the ancients, and affords us most of the educational advantages which intercourse with the best and wisest people in foreign lands would confer. This consideration alone will explain why men with a classic training are so much less narrow minded than those without this advantage. Besides, we must not forget that our travels are most productive of intellectual fruit, if they take us, not to lands and nations most like our own, but among peoples as unlike ourselves as possible, provided, of course, that they are bright and cultivated and enlightened. Hence, we shall gather more fruit from the study of Latin and Greek than we could reap from the study of modern literature; for whilst more remote from us in time and place, the Greeks were superior

to modern nations in brightness and culture, and above all in freshness of intellect.

One more argument, and a weighty one, must be presented in favor of the maintenance of the classical studies. No man, it will be allowed on all hands, can truly lay claim to be educated unless he understands, if not perfectly, at least measurably well, the nature, the source, the rise, and the development of our present civilization. To such an understanding it is of great importance that the student should have investigated with especial care and minuteness the sources and early course of that stream of culture which has come down to us so wonderfully widened and deepened. As the direction and force and character of our rivers is largely determined by the physical peculiarities of the land in which is their source, so the current of human civilization greatly depends for its power, tendency, and results, on the places and peoples where they rise. Now, aside from religion, which, heaven-sent, came to us from the East, all the other elements of our culture must be traced back to the Greeks and Romans. To the latter, of whose national mind their language, with its strict rules, is the perfect image, we moderns owe the basis and principles of our law; for, without the Roman law, neither the German law, which is its direct offspring, nor the common law of England, nor yet the *Code Napoléon*, would be possible. From the Greeks, on the other hand, we have received an almost controlling impulse in philosophy, in the plastic arts and in literature, as well as the beginnings of our science, our medicine, and our music. Of most of these varied branches of human learning this wonderful people laid the foundation, at least in their literary and artistic form; many they carried to a marvellous degree of perfection. In philosophy, for instance, many of the latest modern schools are, after all, nothing but revivals of long-abandoned Greek systems, and in the belles-lettres, and in art, it would be rash to say that the nineteenth century, with the example of Greece, and the experience of two thousand years to guide it, has equalled, much less surpassed, old Hellas. But it is useless to dilate on what all men of culture know and admit. It may be asked: Cannot we acquaint ourselves with these masterpieces of Greek genius, and thus understand the sources of our culture, by means of translations? We might almost as well ask: Can marble, even if carved by the hands of Phidias or Michel Angelo, can any material but flesh and blood, give us an adequate, or, for that matter, an approximate idea of the living, breathing human being? Our modern hard, mechanical forms of speech can never reproduce the original, or convey to one unacquainted with the Greek, even a faint idea of what Homer, and Sophocles, and Aristophanes really are. Moreover, in the

translation we have the ancient author filtered through a modern mind, a process that must inevitably destroy much of the ancient fragrance, and give to the product an incongruous flavor of modernism. No; the only way really to understand the ancients is to go to the ancients themselves, to study the classic languages and literature. If we do so, Rome will reveal to us the genius which made her the lawgiver of the civilized world; and Greece bestow on us what she bestowed on victorious Rome when the latter sat down at the feet of conquered Hellas, and what she bestowed a second time on the modern world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Catholic Church has always rated the classic learning, Greek no less than Latin, at its true value. In the days of the revival of learning, under such Pontiffs as Nicholas V. and Leo X., the Church was the foremost patron of the classics. To-day, whilst with the elasticity given to her by her divine Founder she urges upon her bishops and priests the cultivation of true science, true to her usual conservatism when there is question of what is right and good, she stands forth the champion of classic learning. Disappointed railroad men may join with too enthusiastic advocates of science in denouncing the study of the Greek. American bishops recommend the study of science, but at the same time decree that their theological students shall prove that they have enjoyed the advantages of a thorough training in Greek classics. The reason is not far to seek. The Church alone, in the nineteenth century, free from its spirit of unrest, judges old and new alike, according to their merits.

THE HOLY FACE OF LUCCA.

FEW things are more remarkable in the Italy of the present day than the difference between the government and the mass of the people in their attitude towards religion. To judge by the Parliamentary debates at Monte Citorio or the common course of the higher officials, one would be inclined to think that hostility to the Church was the dominant feeling of the nation. To mix with the people, more especially in the country districts, and observe the hold which religion has on every part of their daily life, and how their feelings and faith alike cling to its observances, one would say that devotion to Catholicity was their most marked national characteristic. In Italy, as in some other countries, the politicians are one thing and the people another. How it happens, in countries possessing representative institutions, that an active minority, often insignificant in its numbers, should be able to shape the policy of the government in opposition to the feelings and wishes of the people, we do not propose to discuss here. That it often does so happen in other countries as well as in Italy, is an undoubted fact. Even American communities, with which the charge of indifference to their own interests is not usually connected, have found themselves fleeced with impunity by small gangs of audacious politicians, whom they were powerless to shake off. We might as fairly charge the New York taxpayers with sympathy for the extortion inflicted on them by political rings, as assume that the Italian people sympathize with the anti-Catholic policy of their government. At the present day, as in former times, it is round the Church that the popular national life of Italy really centres. Her shrines are still the chief centres of art; her festivals are celebrated with an enthusiastic devotion in striking contrast with the popular indifference towards the official public displays, or the noisy demonstrations of political partisans, and her influence is willingly recognized in all the events of the popular daily life. Thus it may often happen that a deputy is denouncing the Church as the national enemy in the Assembly at Monte Citorio, while the district he is supposed to represent is solemnizing a Church festival with the most enthusiastic devotion. Such demonstrations are a prominent feature of Italian life at the present day as in the past. A striking instance was the centenary of the Holy Face celebrated in the September of 1882 in the ancient city of Lucca.

Among the many shrines of Catholic devotion in Italy, few,

except Loreto itself, are more honored than that which is known as of the Holy Face (Santo Volto) of Lucca. The crucifix which bears that name is a work of the earliest times of Christianity, if it is not, indeed, the very first work of Christian art. In its present abode its history goes back almost to the beginning of the Middle Ages, before most of the modern nations of Europe had come into existence, or Charlemagne had been crowned Emperor of the West. From Palestine, where it had been made, it was transported to Italy in 782, and thus, in September, 1882, it was the eleventh centenary of its installment that was celebrated in Lucca. What the fountain of Lourdes is to our own times, the crucifix of Lucca was to mediæval Europe during many centuries. From every part of Italy, as well as from the countries beyond the Alps, pilgrims flocked thither in thousands, and its fame was spread throughout Christendom. Popes and emperors came to pay their devotions before it. Its name was honored by chapels and altars in the most distant countries, France, Spain, Germany, Bohemia, Flanders; and even the distant regions of Northern Europe, Poland and Lithuania, thus testified their veneration through a long series of ages. The Abbey of St. Denis, the first of the great Gothic buildings of France, contained an altar dedicated to the Holy Face of Lucca in the early Middle Ages, and similar shrines yet exist in Vienna, Madrid, Bruges, and many other cities of Catholic Europe. Students of English history may recall that it was "by the Holy Face of Lucca" that the half infidel king, William Rufus, gave the most solemn attestation of his often-doubted pledges, during his bitter quarrel with St. Anselm. In Italy, its own seat, the veneration for the miraculous crucifix was almost unbounded. Its name was a household word in daily devotion, and Lucca and its crucifix were inseparably united in the public mind. Dante in his great poem speaks of it as familiarly as he does of the baptistery of his native Florence, and St. Catherine of Sienna records her deep devotion to it in the most heartfelt terms. The Republic of Lucca, from the eleventh century, stamped its representation on its coinage, which continued to bear it long after the independence of the city had passed away, and it was only removed by the late government of Tuscany the year before its own downfall.

At the present day, though the "Holy Face" has been removed from the ensigns of government, it has lost nothing of the veneration with which it has ever been regarded by the people. Twice in the year, in May and September, it is exposed to the public gaze, and each time it receives fresh demonstrations of the popular devotion. During the rest of the year it is closely veiled, and even its chapel is locked and carefully guarded; but the occasions

of its opening are the most cherished festivals of the whole population of the province as well as of the city. In the approach of danger, or the pressure of misfortune, it is the centre to which individuals and the public alike come to seek the divine protection. A massive gold lamp, hanging before the door of its shrine, testifies to the faith of the city which, in our own times, offered it as a public expiation to avert the visitation of cholera with which Lucca was threatened. But a proof more striking by far than any material offerings, however rich, of the veneration in which the sacred crucifix is held by all classes of the population, even after the changes of more than a thousand years, was given by the wide enthusiasm and intense devotion displayed at the festival of September, 1882.

The fourteenth of September, the day known in the Calendar as the Exaltation of the Cross, is the great festival of the year in the sanctuary at Lucca. On the late occasion, however, a single day was wholly too little for the popular celebration, which extended over five days, from the Sunday preceding the anniversary. To a stranger, the scene all through was most remarkable. On the Saturday evening the preparations began through the province. Every village and hill-top around the ancient city was brilliantly illuminated as far as could be seen from the city walls, which now serve the peaceful purpose of a popular promenade. The varied effects produced by the fires, which, in some places, wound up the sides of the hills like glittering serpents, in others blazed up in masses of such dimensions as to suggest a great conflagration; while each village was marked by peculiar arrangements of its own illuminations, and the colors of its lights were wonderful. The church bells were vigorously sounded everywhere, and were mingled with the discharge of muskets and small cannon and the constant display of rockets and other fireworks to break the silence of the night. Every one seemed awake and on foot, both in city and country, and no American Fourth of July could surpass the enthusiasm everywhere displayed. At an early hour of the following morning, bands of pilgrims from the country round began to pour into the city on their way to the Cathedral, where the sacred image was to be exposed to the public veneration. Confraternities of both men and women, representatives of trades and factories, and parochial and village deputations, each numbering from fifty or sixty up to three or four hundred, continued to arrive in succession, all walking in regular order, and chanting hymns or else reciting the rosary aloud. The Cathedral, in spite of its size, was soon densely filled, and all the other churches of the city were called into requisition to contain the numerous worshippers both from town and country. The High Mass at the Cathedral, which was

celebrated by the Archbishop, commenced at seven o'clock, and was followed by a general Communion. So great was the number approaching the rails that the Archbishop and two assistants were engaged in administering the Holy Sacrament for fully an hour and a half, though many had already received without waiting for the conclusion of the mass. The crowds in the various parochial churches were, in proportion, scarcely less dense than in the Cathedral, and in all the spirit of devotion on the part of the congregations was equally well marked. After the close of the Communion the sacred image was unveiled to the popular view; and from that time until late in the afternoon, its chapel was constantly filled by bands of pilgrims succeeding one another in orderly rotation and all displaying the strongest marks of devotion. Each deputation made an offering at the shrine, which usually took the form of a quantity of wax candles for use in the ceremonial, though offerings in money were made by some parishes. Chalices, medals, and other votive gifts in gold or silver, to be used or suspended in the sanctuary, were also presented by some of the pilgrims. Amongst others, the operatives of a woollen factory in the city presented a frame containing a golden crucifix and two medals, the employees of the tobacco manufactory a frame containing the letters Alpha and Omega in gold relief, and a village deputation offered two silver lamps. Shortly after five in the afternoon, the Coadjutor Bishop of San Miniato, near Florence, mounted the pulpit and preached at length on the subject of the Holy Face and its relations to Christian art, to history, and to religion. The ordinary prayers of the Triduo were recited at half-past six, after which the crucifix was covered, and the religious ceremonies closed for the night. The whole proceedings were marked by the utmost order and solemnity, and it was impossible not to recognize the thoroughly religious spirit which pervaded the crowds engaged in them all through the day. Clergy and laity, city and country alike, seemed wholly engrossed in the religious exercises.

On Monday, instead of lessening, the throng of pilgrims seemed to increase. Their bands were arriving incessantly, with chanting of hymns and recitation of prayers, and taking their way to the Cathedral. Nor was the pilgrimage for many of these villagers by any means a mere pleasure promenade. Some deputations were travelling the whole night on foot, and that, too, while the rain came down in torrents. But wet or dry, tired or fresh, the newcomers bent their way towards the Cathedral, and there, sometimes, had to wait long for the time of their admission to the oratory of the sacred crucifix. There was no uncertainty about the earnestness of devotion of these Luccese countrymen and women. They came to perform a solemn religious act, not as a matter of recrea-

tion however innocent, and they cheerfully faced the troubles that awaited them. The confessionals were thronged in all the churches of the city. The crowds coming in from the country to the festival filled all the hotels and private lodgings, and many were unable to obtain beds at any price. Still, the following days showed no falling off in the number of the visitors, which was greatest on the final day of the celebration.

The order observed on the three days between the opening Sunday and the concluding day of the festival, was much the same throughout. The image was uncovered at an early hour of the morning, and each succeeding half hour was set apart during the day for particular villages or parishes. However, the number of the pilgrim bands was too large to be all thus provided for; so, occasionally, two deputations entered the chapel together. The number of delegations that arrived was little short of forty a day, often numbering three or four hundred persons each. All brought offerings, most commonly wax lights and flowers, with occasional votive gifts of gold or silver, and also money at times, though rarely. On each day a pontifical high mass was sung at half-past ten by one of the neighboring bishops, and vespers were chanted at four in the afternoon, after which followed a sermon and subsequently the prayers of the Triduo, after which the crucifix was covered for the night.

The villages around had been the most prominent actors in the outdoor rejoicings on the first day; but on the eve of the great day the citizens of Lucca itself began their display. Public illuminations of the walls and streets were ordered by the municipality, and many of the private citizens prepared to take part in the work by decorations of an elaborate character. Transparencies of the sacred image were to be seen everywhere, and devices of various kinds in gas, colored lanterns, and electric lights were brought into requisition to do honor to the occasion. Unfortunately, the weather was awfully bad. Incessant rains and high winds, though they did not prevent the influx of the country visitors, compelled a postponement of the municipal illuminations and also diminished considerably the private displays. After vespers on Wednesday a public procession was organized in the Church of San Frediano, which proceeded to the Cathedral to offer the homages of the city to the Almighty at the sacred shrine. Cardinal Martinelli, three archbishops, and five bishops, with the canons of the Cathedral and the members of the other collegiate chapters of the city, took part in the procession. The decorations of the Cathedral itself were of the most elaborate kind. In Italian fashion the walls and the fronts of galleries were covered with hangings of rich materials, and the ordinary lights were increased by numerous chandeliers and lamps.

The chapel in which the crucifix hung was a perfect sea of light, as the procession approached it through the densely packed congregation. The sacred music all through the festival, though somewhat florid to a northern taste, was of a high order of excellence, as might, indeed, be expected in Italy.

The chapel in which the sacred crucifix is preserved is erected within the Cathedral in the northern aisle. Its form is octagonal, with columns of the composite order wrought of the purest white marble at each angle. The columns stand on a plinth of the same material, inlaid with a band of red porphyry. Three doorways, filled with iron gates of an elaborate pattern, and two windows occupy five of the eight sides. Two of the remainder are filled with slabs of red marble covered with inscriptions, but on the exterior of the side behind the crucifix is a marble statue of the marytr St. Sebastian attached to the trunk of a tree. Above the columns runs a cornice of classical outline, having its friezes richly decorated with festoons and masks of marble. The parapets above the cornice are in the form of semicircular shells, behind and above which the roof rises in a dome surmounted by a tall lantern of octagonal shape. The sides of the lantern are occupied by long windows, and the top is crowned by a ball and cross. Though rich and varied, there is nothing of the rococo style of ornament to mar the beauty of this graceful edifice. The latter part of the fifteenth century, in which it was built, was perhaps the best period of modern Italian architecture, alike removed from the slavish adherence to purely classical forms of Renaissance art, and from the extravagance that marked the work of its immediate successors. The richness of the materials used throughout is peculiarly Italian, and gives the whole the appearance of a giant reliquary. The dome is covered with plates of majolica of various colors and designs. The shell-shaped lunettes above the cornice, and the moulded ribs of the dome are richly gilt, as well as the volutes in the composite capitals of the columns and the mouldings of the cornice, their metallic lustre contrasting with the pure white and deep red of the marbles below. The interior of the chapel is even richer than the outside, especially in the variety of its marble lining. The sense of beauty in color, and the skill to apply it harmoniously to building, has alway been common in Italy to a much greater extent than in the other countries of Europe. It finds abundant play in this shrine. The pavement is tessellated with marbles whose names are scarcely known to northern builders, as the green marble of Genoa, the yellow of Surina, and red porphyry. Gold is abundatly used on the walls, yet not so as to hide the beauty of the marble panellings. The altar is a table of Silician jasper, upheld at the sides by kneel-

ing angels in gilt bronze. The steps above the altar table are of the purest oriental alabaster.

The popular enthusiasm reached its height on the anniversary day. The high mass was sung by Cardinal Martinelli, and the vespers in the afternoon by the bishop of Massa Carrara. The country deputations continued to arrive after the high mass, as on the former days, in spite of the rain. The festival was closed at half-past seven by a *Te Deum*, chanted by alternate choirs; but even after this the illuminations, which had been abandoned the day before, prolonged the excitement to a late hour of the evening. Nothing occurred to mar the harmony of the proceedings throughout the festival, which showed so strikingly the hold which Catholicity has on the Italian people, even amid the revolutions that have agitated their land in recent years.

The celebrated crucifix, the anniversary of whose arrival in Lucca so many centuries ago was thus honored by the entire population, is indeed a most striking object even apart from its historical associations. Its form is altogether peculiar, and bears no resemblance to any known school of art, yet its singular beauty leaves a deep impression on every beholder. The figure of our Lord is life-size and clothed with a tunic of eastern fashion reaching to the ankles and wrists, the whole carved of cedar wood, and fastened with nails to a cross of planks not much higher or wider in the arms than the figure. The ends of the top and arms of the cross are widened into circles, and the feet, instead of being crossed, as in most modern examples, are nailed separately to the shaft. There is no inscription above the head, but a circular band is attached to the back of the cross, almost in the form of the well-known Celtic crosses of Ireland. The circle, however, in this case, is not complete, but the lower ends of the band are terminated in the form of fleurs de lis near the sides of the figure. In some other details the execution of the crucifixion is also peculiar. The arms are extended at full length at right angles to the body, and, what is more remarkable, the head is not encircled with the crown of thorns, which are never absent from the crucifixes of modern patterns. It may be remembered that though the Gospel speaks of the crowning with thorns of our Lord and of his going forth so crowned to be shown to the people, it makes no mention of his having continued to wear the thorny crown during his agony on the cross. The most ancient crucifixes were without it, although a later custom has made it appear almost essential. The hair of the crucifix of Lucca flows down in long waves on the shoulders and on the cheeks, the separated locks meeting below the chin. But it is, above all, the face which rivets the attention and commands an involuntary reverence by its strange and awful beauty.

The eyes are partly open, the lips closed, but not compressed, and the whole expression so full of life and of a wonderful combination of sorrow and suffering with divine power as to be perfectly startling. We know of nothing to compare with it in the whole of sacred art, and as we gaze on it we perceive the full fitness of the feeling which gave to the sacred image its name of the Holy Face.

Such as has been described is the crucifix of Lucca in its original condition; but as it appears in its shrine at present, it is covered with ornaments offered by the devotion of successive ages. The head is encircled with a gold crown, richly jewelled, which was solemnly put on in 1655, and a collar of similar design was, at a later period, placed around the neck with a breast-plate thickly set with diamonds dependent from it. The figure is, moreover, covered with a close-fitting dress of black velvet, richly plated with gold ornaments which form a girdle round the waist and a heavy fringe at the bottom. The feet, in which the color of the wood is still preserved with wonderful freshness, are cased in silver slippers having crosses on top, which are kissed by the pilgrims on solemn occasions, as the cross is during the devotions of Good Friday, in all Catholic churches. A silver cup or chalice is placed on the step of the altar below the feet. Maniples, richly embroidered with gold, have been placed on the arms. The workmanship of all these ornaments is of the most artistic kind, and they are valuable as evidences of the popular devotion; but it may be open to question whether the effect produced by the beauty of the statue itself is in any way enhanced by its extrinsic decorations.

Great, however, as is the interest which attaches to this crucifix, for its strange form and extraordinary beauty, it is as nothing in comparison to the historical associations which surround it and connect its origin with the very foundations of Christianity. According to the general belief, the Holy Face is no merely artistic conception, however grand, but a faithful representation of the lineaments of our Lord as He hung on the Cross on Calvary. The hand which carved it was guided by actual recollections of the most familiar kind, and was, indeed, that of one who actually aided in taking down our Lord's body and laying it in the tomb from which He was to rise triumphant on the Third Day. Its reputed artist is no other than that Nicodemus who, with Joseph of Arimathea, obtained the privilege of giving burial to our Lord's body from Pilate, and whose interview by night with our Saviour, at an early time of His mission, is recorded by St. John. After the Resurrection, Nicodemus, having incurred the hostility of his fellow-countrymen on account of his adherence to our Lord, retired to the village of Ramleh, in Palestine, and, during his resi-

dence there, he was inspired to preserve in wood the features of his Master as they had been indelibly stamped on his memory on Calvary. The hostility of the Jewish population, alike to Christianity and to art, naturally suggested a considerable degree of secrecy, both in the execution and subsequent preservation of such a work. Accordingly, though the belief in its existence was widely spread among the Christians of Syria, its place of concealment, during many ages, was known only to a very few guardians. The custody of the sacred relic was handed down from generation to generation without enlarging the circle of those in the secret. The long continued persecutions of the Roman emperors and the subsequent Arian hostility to the Catholic Christians, as well as the invasions of the Persians and the Saracen conquest of Palestine, in the seventh century, all contributed to maintain the concealment of this earliest work of Christian art down to the close of the eighth century.

Such is the early history of the famous crucifix as preserved by tradition. Containing much that is strange, it offers nothing inconsistent with the natural course of human events, and the amount of credibility which attaches to it must be determined by external evidence. It is different with the evidence itself, which involves events of a wholly supernatural character connected with its arrival at the place, so far removed from its origin, where it has now been enshrined for eleven centuries. The degree of credit to be attached to its early history, thus shrouded in eight centuries of concealment, must of course depend on the miraculous character of those events which in its case take the place of the ordinary historical proofs. In the same way as the miracles that are now being performed at Lourdes are fairly regarded as proofs of the vision of the Blessed Virgin to the peasant girl of the Pyrenees, which preceded and foretold their occurrence, so the truth of the visions which revealed the origin of the crucifix of Lucca, as it has been just told, must rest on the evidence of the miracles which followed in direct connection with them. At this point again the ordinary rules of human evidence are called in. An undoubted supernatural manifestation of the divine power is the strongest proof that can be offered of the truth of any statement, but the fact that such a manifestation has been actually made in a past age, or in a distant place, can only be established by the common laws of human evidence. That an occurrence is an extraordinary one, warrants a stricter inquiry into the evidence on which it rests; but if that is found satisfactory, it furnishes no reason for rejecting it. On this principle, conformable alike to Catholic faith and common sense, we shall first describe the events which accompanied the

arrival of the celebrated image in Italy, and afterwards examine the evidence of their actual occurrence supplied us by history.

The history of the removal of the crucifix from Palestine to Lucca is told by Leboin, a writer of the eighth century, who himself took part in it during a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, whither he accompanied the Piedmontese Bishop Gualfrid, in 782. Leboin was archdeacon of the diocese, and his work, of which copies exist in numerous libraries at Rome, Paris, Padua, and elsewhere, was written at the time when the occurrences were before the public mind, in a manner which precluded the possibility of a false statement of facts. According to Leboin, Gualfrid, during his visit to Jerusalem, was directed by an angel to go to the house of a Christian there, and obtain the image long concealed in a grotto beneath. At the same time he was informed of its history and origin such as has already been told. Gualfrid accordingly went to the place indicated, accompanied by his companions in the pilgrimage, and with much difficulty was admitted to the hidden crypt by its guardian. The Bishop and his companions finally induced the latter to resign its charge to them that it might be exposed to public veneration in a safer place. The difficulty of transporting it in safety was, however, so great that after long and anxious consultation, its new possessors took the resolution of placing it in a covered boat, and sending it adrift on the Mediterranean in the confident hope that the same power which had made its existence known to them would guide it to the place chosen by Providence for its reception. The crucifix was accordingly carried down to the small port of Jaffa, where the bishop procured a boat, within which the precious relic was placed, amid numerous lights and ornaments. The hatches were then planked over, and the whole exterior covered with pitch in imitation of the ark of Noah. The boat was set adrift, amid the prayers of the pilgrims. It at once took a rapid course, as if guided by a superhuman power, and was soon lost to the view of the Bishop and his companions.

Unguided by human means, the boat with its freight passed in safety from Jaffa to the shores of Tuscany, where it appeared before the port of Luni, a now ruined town. There it halted as strangely as it had arrived, and made no approach to the port, though both wind and tide combined to carry it in. The fishermen of Luni put off to board the strange craft, but during two days it baffled their approach as if by instinct. The Lombard governor of the town was soon informed of the extraordinary vessel on which no person appeared, and which yet seemed to move self-guided in utter indifference to the force of wind or waves; but neither he nor the municipality could form any idea of its meaning. They were suddenly surprised by the arrival of the Bishop of Lucca, accom-

panied by a large number of the clergy and citizens of that place. The Bishop had received a supernatural warning of the arrival of the hitherto unknown image, and a description of its character and origin similar to that previously given to the pilgrims in Palestine. The Lunese were still engaged in their fruitless efforts to seize the vessel, but either in despair of success, or out of respect for the words of the Bishop of Lucca, they gave up the attempt, and allowed the Bishop and his companions to advance in procession to the edge of the sea. The vessel, which had hitherto kept off in spite of the power of the elements, now immediately approached the shore. The deck, when opened, showed the sacred crucifix and some other relics, such as the Bishop of Lucca had been informed of them by his previous vision. One of these relics, a vase, containing the sacred blood of our Lord, was presented to the Bishop of Luni. The crucifix itself was borne in solemn procession to Lucca, and there installed in the church of St. Martin, on the northern side of the basilica, in the year 782.

The account given by Leboin, from which the foregoing history of the arrival of the crucifix in Lucca has been drawn, bears in itself strong evidences of truth. He carefully distinguishes between the facts which he had himself seen, and those which he had learned by hearsay from the Syrians, and he hides nothing of certain occurrences which were likely to excite considerable animadversion at the time. The piratical habits of the Lunese, who, like the Cornish fishermen of a century ago, were wont to regard wrecked vessels as lawful booty, and also the threats used by some of Bishop Gualfrid's companions towards the Syrian guardian of the sacred image, when he first refused to admit them to its hiding-place, are facts of this kind which would scarcely have been introduced into a fiction devised to mask an imposition on the public. The publicity attendant on the arrival of the crucifix itself in Luni, and the rivalry for its possession between the people of that town and Lucca, were such as to defy imposture, had such been attempted. Moreover, in place of being contradicted, the detailed statement of the Lombard archdeacon, who, it will be observed, had no personal connection with the city which thus acquired the celebrated crucifix, is corroborated by contemporary legal documents attesting the veneration which was attached to it immediately on its installation. Donations of lands and monasteries, made to the church in which it was placed, are still preserved in the Luccan archives, with the dates of 797, 798, 800, and subsequent years. Moreover, the veneration which attached to the Holy Face, and the publicity given to all the facts connected with its arrival in Italy, far from decreasing as the novelty wore off, increased enormously with the passage of time. Lucca became the

centre of pilgrimages from all parts of Europe during the following centuries. The fame of the miracles wrought at its shrine, in constant succession, contributed to this result no less than the sacred character of the image itself. Such was the influx of pilgrims to Lucca during the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, that no less than thirteen hospices were founded within its walls for their free accommodation, according to the custom of the Middle Ages, when travelling was far from being the matter of merely time and money that it is at present. Nor were these all, for similar erections were raised in the villages around, and on the roads leading to the city where rich and poor were sheltered alike by the charity of the founders.

Among the pilgrims who, in succession, came to pay their homage to the Holy Face of Lucca, it is remarkable to find several of the German emperors who were bitter political foes of the Holy See. Henry the Second, Henry the Third, and Frederick Barbarossa were amongst those who thus testified their veneration for the sacred image. The list of Imperial visitors commences with Louis the Third in 901, and closes with Charles the Fifth more than six centuries later. For Catholics the reverence paid to it by successive Popes is the strongest testimony to the historic authenticity of the facts connected with the sacred image. The Holy See is proverbially cautious in giving its public approval to miraculous events. Yet no less than eight Pontiffs have come on pilgrimage to the shrine of Lucca. Alexander the Second, in the eleventh century, was the first who thus stamped it with his approbation, and his example was followed in subsequent ages by Pascal the Second, Calistus the Second, Eugenius the Third (the pupil of St. Bernard) Urban the Sixth, Gregory the Twelfth, Paul the Third, and, finally, our late Holy Father Pius the Ninth. That a devotion of so peculiar a character should have received so general an approbation during a long course of ages is, even in a purely human point of view, one of the most remarkable facts in history. "Time destroys fiction while it confirms the judgments of truth," was the maxim of pagan philosophy. That eleven centuries have passed over the shrine of Lucca, without lessening the veneration with which it has been regarded from the first, is a striking illustration of the axiom as applied to the history of its origin.

The miracles connected with the Holy Face of Lucca are not, however, confined to those immediately relating to its first appearance in Italy. Through the whole course of its history it has been, like the fountain of Lourdes at the present time, the centre of almost countless supernatural manifestations. Its chapel is filled with the memorials of such events. Votive offerings of

the most varied kind, and often accompanied by the strongest attestations, testify to the numberless cures of diseases and deliverances from dangers of every kind that have been wrought through its instrumentality. One of these is of so strange a kind as to deserve being recorded, even in our limited space. Attached to an iron grating hangs an executioner's axe, whose history is given by an inscription attached to it. In 1334 a citizen of a neighboring town, unjustly condemned to die, was miraculously preserved on the scaffold itself. The headman's axe refused to perform its deadly office, and fell with all its force on his neck three times in vain. It rebounded from the flesh without leaving even a mark. The execution thus suspended was afterwards followed by a pardon, and the escaped victim attributed the miracle to having vowed a pilgrimage to the shrine of the Holy Face in case of his deliverance. The axe which had failed to do its work was presented to the shrine and has remained there since. A similar event is told by another inscription as having occurred in the seventeenth century to a native of Marsiglia. But to enumerate the miracles recorded here would require volumes. Many favors acknowledged by votive offerings cannot be regarded as miracles in any public sense, but the number that actually have a public, and, evidently, superhuman character, is enormous. Comparatively few, even of well-informed Catholics among us, ever reflect on the number of distinctly miraculous events that have been constantly occurring within the Church at every period of her history. We are far from attributing faith lightly to such events. Rumor, as we all know, far outstrips fact in the production of miracles; but no unprejudiced investigator can fail to be struck by the number of events, inexplicable except by supernatural interference, that are attested by the clearest evidence. Why such events should occur more numerously in particular places, or in connection with particular persons or objects of devotion, it is beyond the province of human reason to explain. The fact is, that they do so occur. The evidence of it is irresistible in such places as Lourdes or the shrine of the crucifix of Lucca.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON. Collected and Arranged by *Henry F. Brownson.* Volume XIV. Containing the Writings on Development and on Morals, and Some Miscellaneous Essays. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher. 1884.

The nearer the republication of Dr. Brownson's works, collected and arranged by his son, Henry F. Brownson, approaches completion, the more evident their very great value becomes. Orestes A. Brownson was a "born" critic and essayist. His native intellectual gifts were strengthened and developed through a course of Providential circumstances which eminently qualified him for the task he undertook, or which, rather, was Providentially devolved upon him. Naturally honest and sincere, closely observing, reflective, acute, and logical, in spite of early disadvantages, or, perhaps, as is often the case with minds of unusual strength, because of them, he thought and studied profoundly and acquired a knowledge accurate and exact of prevailing lines of thought, and of metaphysical and philosophical ideas and theories, which few scholars of far higher pretensions to erudition have attained.

His knowledge, too, was not simply speculative or theoretical. It was personal and practical. He knew schemes of philosophy and metaphysical systems, not merely by studying them at a distance and from the outside, but by entering into them, adopting them, and testing them exhaustively. Of nearly all of those which he has analyzed and criticised, he might have truly said:

> . . . "Quæquæ ipse miserima vidi
> Et quorum pars magna fui." . . .

By the providence of God he was led in his earnest quest for truth successively through Presbyterianism, Methodism, Unitarianism, and various forms of pure Rationalism and Socialism, to the very verge of Atheism, trying and testing practically and experimentally their interior spirit and fundamental principles. Then he was brought back, step by step, through various systems of thought and belief until he found the truth, and with it rest and peace, in the Catholic faith.

There was scarcely any form of modern heresy and error with which he was not personally and experimentally familiar. He first examined and scrutinized them, not as an opponent and enemy, but as a believer and a friend. Only when he found them delusive and false he abandoned and denounced them. His writings furnish constant evidence of this. And this alone, and apart from his genius, would give value to his analysis of those false systems of thought and strength to his testimony against them.

But, along with all this, Orestes A. Brownson carried to his work a degree of straightforward, heroic (we can call it nothing else) sincerity and honesty, as well as a keenness and precision of analysis, that qualified him beyond anyone else, of the present century in Europe or America, whose name we can recall for the special and important work he set himself to perform.

This comes out much more clearly in Brownson's writings, as they

are now collected, arranged, and republished, than it did in the pages of his *Review*, powerful as it was in its day. Persons who have an unbroken, complete series of the successive numbers of *Brownson's Quarterly Review* are greatly mistaken if they suppose that in it they have a full collection of Brownson's writings. Many of his most important papers were given to the public through other channels and in other ways. Those, too, that appeared in his *Review* follow each other in the order of time and as various circumstances suggested. But his son and posthumous editor, Henry F. Brownson, has collected *all* his most important writings, and has arranged them rather in a logical than a historical order. This gives an additional value to *Dr. Brownson's Works*, as now republished, through the strength which one article, following another in the order of thought, gives to that which succeeds it.

Of this the volume now before us, the fourteenth, is a fair example. The twenty or more papers of which it consists were written and published at different times, and as various occasions called them forth. Yet throughout the greater number of them there runs a close connection of ideas; so that each succeeding paper in the volume might be regarded as the logical sequence of that which precedes it.

Thus the first eight articles, taken together, form a very able and profound criticism and refutation of the theory of development, as attempted to be applied to Christain doctrine and morals. Of these the first six deal immediately with the theory which was formulated by Newman in his once famous "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine." The work itself has in great degree passed out of notice, but its fundamental thought has found lodgment in many minds and helped to give vogue and prestige to very pernicious errors. Though written, at least in greatest part, when Mr. Newman was still a Protestant, though in transition, consciously or unconsciously, to Catholicity; and though it is an attempt to defend Catholic doctrines on grounds which no Catholic can consistently accept, so far as we can see; yet it found great favor, not only among Protestants of a "Romanizing" turn of mind, that is, Protestants who wished to find excuses for holding Catholic doctrines and yet remaining Protestants, but was also held as a convenient theory for defending the Catholic religion, by a large number of very able men who became zealous converts from Puseyism. It was defended, too, if not advocated, by the *Dublin Review* as a theory that was not, at least, forbidden to Catholics to hold, and which might smooth the way for Anglicans to enter the Church.

Dr. Brownson took alarm at once. In a paper, which is the first in the present volume, he thoroughly analyzes and dissects Mr. Newman's theory, pointing out the fundamental fallacies on which it is built up. Mr. Newman assumes, at the commencement of his Essay, that *Christianity* "*may legitimately be made the subject matter of theories.*" But Dr. Brownson conclusively shows that this is a false assumption. Whether Christianity is divine or human is not a question of opinion or of theory, but of fact. And so of all the other questions Newman raises, to illustrate and support his assumption. Christianity, itself, is a fact not only in the world's history, but in itself. Consequently, if received at all it must be received not as a theory, but as a *revealed* fact. Brownson further shows that in his "Essay on Development" Mr. Newman was misled by adopting the method of the so-called "Inductive Philosophy," and is guilty of the logical sin of stating as conclusions what his premises do not contain; and that it is impossible by any logic to conclude the unknown from the known.

He then points out a still more serious fault of the *Essay*. It assumes that there *have been real variations in Christian doctrine;* that *the Church at first received no formal* revelation; that as the Israelites went forth from Egypt into the desert "in haste," so, too, the Church went forth into the world with her "dough unleavened," her creed incomplete, her understanding of her faith imperfect; ignorant, at least in part, of the precise truth she was to teach respecting every article of faith she was authorized to teach; that new definitions of faith are new developments, and that thus the Church grows in her belief and apprehension of the truth; that before she defines an article of faith the Church herself does not clearly and distinctly apprehend what, on the point defined, is the revelation she originally received.

To point out that no Catholic can consistently hold this theory is needless. It differs but slightly and as to the form in which it is worked out from that of Neander and other German rationalists.

Dr. Brownson further shows that Newman, when he speaks of the recipients of the divine revelation, seems always to have in his mind the *ecclesia credens*, and to forget the *ecclesia docens*. He appears to have never heard that Almighty God gave His revelation to pastors and teachers qualified from the first to teach it in its purity and integrity; but that he threw it upon the great concourse of believers for them to receive and make the most of, as well as they could. "The time at last came," said Newman, "when these recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments." But this view, if followed out, would suppress entirely the proper teaching authority of the Church, competent at any time to declare infallibly what is the precise truth revealed; or, at least, would raise the *ecclesia credens* above the *ecclesia docens*. It would reduce the office of the *ecclesia docens* to that of defining from time to time the dogmatic truth, which the *ecclesia credens* has gradually worked out from her implicit feelings or belief The supernatural assistance would then attach to the *ecclesia credens* and superintend the elaboration by it of doctrine, rather than to the *ecclesia docens;* and if it attached to the *ecclesia docens* at all, it would be only so far as would enable it faithfully to collect and truly to define what the *ecclesia credens* elaborates.

Again, Mr. Newman in his *Essay* proceeds on the assumption that Christianity can be abstracted from the Church, and considered apart from it, as if the Church were accidental, and not essential in our holy religion. "Christianity," he says, "though spoken of in prophecy as a Kingdom, came into the world as an *idea*, rather than an institution, and has had to wrap itself in clothing, and fit itself with an armor of its own providing, and form the instruments and methods of its own prosperity and warfare."

Dr. Brownson dissects this fallacy and shows that it is not only theologically and historically false, but that it rests on the assumption that ideas, in themselves considered, are active and potent, and may "take unto themselves hands, build the temple, erect the altar, and instaurate the worship of God." He proves that ideas, not concreted, not instituted, are not potencies, not active, but are really to us as if they were not, and that the ideal must become actual before it can become operative. Moreover, if it be assumed that Christianity came as an idea and was developed only by the action of the human mind on it, "the institutions with which it is clothed, the authorities established in its name, the precepts enjoined, and the rites prescribed, are all really products of the human mind; and instead of governing the mind, may be governed,

modified, enlarged, or contracted by it at its pleasure. The Church, then, would be divine only in the sense that philosophy or civil government is divine.

Following up this branch of his subject; Dr. Brownson says that Mr. Newman's own definition of *idea*—a habitual judgment which the mind forms of that which comes before it—strips Christianity of its essential divine character and makes it purely human; and resolves it, in its last analysis, into naked deism, or, at best, mere Quakerism.

Regard for space prevents us following Dr. Brownson further through his criticisms of the "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine." What we have already given is sufficient to show the keenness and exhaustiveness of their analysis of Newman's learned but dangerous *Essay*.

This paper a few months afterwards was followed by another, equally able, on the same general subject, elicited by an American reprint of Northcote's "Difficulties of Anglicanism." It is a work which measurably refutes the pretensions of Anglicanism to possessing any of the "notes" of Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity, by which the Church proves her divine origin and character. But as a defence of the Catholic religion it is open to the objection of following the same line of thought Newman adopted in his theory of the development of Christain Doctrine.

In his criticism Dr. Brownson does full justice to the learning and piety of the author, and the admirable style and spirit in which he wrote, but points out the defects of his work, growing out of the un-Catholic theory which underlies it. He then again adverts to Newman's theory of development, and, on still other grounds than those stated in his first paper, he proves that it is irreconcilable with the Catholic faith.

The *Dublin Review* opened its pages to defenders of the development theory, who undertook to show that Dr. Brownson had misunderstood the *Essay*, and to refute him on other grounds. In the three papers immediately following the one we have last referred to, Dr. Brownson answered their attempted refutations. These papers are as remarkable for their perfect candor and manly honesty as for the learning, logical ability, and clearness of thought which they display.

In the next paper—"Morris on the Incarnation"—Dr. Brownson, after pointing out the leading defects of the book, examines and criticises the general method of disputation and discussion adopted by the Oxford converts. He regards their writings as wanting in aggressiveness, and seemingly constructed too much on the idea that the Catholic religion needs defence or apology. This brings Dr. Brownson again to a consideration and criticism of the general mental posture, logic, and philosophy of the school, if such we may call it, that was formed in England, by converts to Catholicity from Puseyism or Tractarianism. Doing full justice to the learning and ability, the zeal and piety of English converts, he regards their writings as faulty; well intentioned, evincing unquestionable learning and ability, and an earnest zeal and piety that cannot fail to command respect, yet wanting in sound logic, in true philosophy and in a clear apprehension of the fact that conversion from Protestantism to the Faith involves not only "a putting on" but also a "putting off"; an abandonment of previously held errors as well as embracing their new-found faith. The paper is a very able and acute disquisition upon the errors of judgment which cling to converts from Protestantism, and especially to those from English Tractarianism long after they have, with entire honesty, accepted and embraced the true faith.

The six papers we have thus far noticed, taken together, form the

keenest and profoundest analysis both of Newman's theory of development of doctrine, and of the general mental posture of the Oxford or Tractarian school of English converts that has ever been made, so far as our knowledge extends. It thus, too, has more than a historical interest and value. For the questions involved in the development theory of Newman are still raised and agitated; and the theory itself, under changed forms, is employed in defending many erroneous opinions respecting religion and morals, and the fundamental principles of society.

Having thoroughly discussed the development theory as it obtained vogue in England, Dr. Brownson next turned his attention to a form of the same theory that was formulated in this country, chiefly by the Rev. John W. Nevin, D.D., then President of a Protestant Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, Pa. It started from a different point of beginning and differed in form and substance materially from Newman's, yet it involved the same fundamental false principle. It scouted Newman's notion that Christianity started merely as an *idea*. It insisted that Christianity, from its very beginning, was a *fact*, a *living*, *supernatural*, DIVINE FACT in the world. But it held that what that fact *involved* was *evolved* in the course of time, by a process of historical development. It held that the doctrines of Christianity, the articles of the Christian faith, as well as discipline and ritual, were all, and in their entirety, comprehended in the revelation of Christ, but undeveloped. They were *involved* in it, included in it in germ and possibility, as the germ of the acorn includes within itself the possibility of becoming the oak, by following the law of its growth and assimilating to itself the elements necessary to its growth. It regarded the Church of the Middle Ages, not as Protestants commonly regard it, as a corruption of "Primitive Christianity," but as a "legitimate development" of it, and insisted that the only possible ground on which Protestantism could defend itself from the charges of novelty, heresy and schism, was to show that it was a genuine continuation of the Church of Christ evolved from the Church of the Middle Ages by a process of legitimate historical development. The idea, common to the English Tractarians and the non-Episcopalian Evangelicals (though held by them in very different ways), that "Primitive Christianity" was the type of Christianity for all time, was scouted by the formulators of the Mercersburg "Historical Development" theory as an empty dream, a "fond delusion." They held that what each age needed and required was not "a repristination of Primitive Christianity,"—which was an absurdity and impossibility—but a continued development of new truths or at least of new aspects of truths, which Christianity indeed included from its commencement but to the clear apprehension of which it could only arrive through a process of evolution or development.

This theory met with violent general opposition from the Protestant sects of our country. They regarded it as essentially "Romanizing." At the same time it rallied around the leading promulgator of the theory a little band of zealous followers and defenders, who gradually became known as the "Mercersburg School," now almost forgotten. They insisted that it was the only basis on which Protestantism could be successfully defended; that the Church as a visible fact in the world's history must be continuous and indefectible, or else Christ's promise has failed —a thought too impious to be entertained even for a moment—and that Protestantism, to maintain its claims, must prove itself to be a genuine historical development of what "Primitive Christianity" contained in germ and partially developed, and of what was still further, but only partially and under other aspects, developed in Mediæval Christianity;

and that Protestantism itself was but one aspect of Christianity and that a temporary one, yet by further developments visible Christianity would still further evolve itself into higher and more perfect forms.

The theory in the particular form in which it was put forth by its chief formulator is almost forgotten, but it is easy to trace many of its leading ideas in the rationalistic speculations of various Protestant writers of to-day, who dissolve Christianity into mere naturalism.

Brownson saw the inherent fallacies of the theory from the first, and ably refuted it in several papers. The article in the volume before us deals mainly with it as logically and historically non-consecutive. It meets Dr. Nevin on his own chosen ground. Over against his Protestant opponents, Dr. Nevin strenuously declared:

"The Christianity of the second, third, and fourth centuries, we say, was progressively of the same general order throughout the entire Christian world, and in this character it differed altogether from modern Protestantism, and led fairly and directly towards the Roman Catholic system of the Middle Ages. In proof of this simple historical assertion, we point to facts. It is purely a question of history in the first place, to be either granted or denied as the truth of the facts may seem to require. Is the general proposition true as a historical fact, or is it not? If not, let this be shown by proper evidence. But if it be true, what then? . . . . We are bound to look it firmly in the face; and when the question is then asked, *How is this fact to be construed against the claims of Protestantism?* it should be felt to be one that is entitled to some bold and manly answer. . . . . Protestantism *must* be historical, to be true. To say that it is not the continuation of the previous life of the Church, of one substance, though not of one form with what this was *in all past ages*, is at once to pronounce it anti-Christian and false."

But what Dr. Nevin signally failed to do, and what it was necessary for him to do, to make his argument historically complete, was to show that Protestantism was such a continuation. With a wealth of learning he proved the substantial identity, and historical continuity of the Church of the Middle Ages with that of the first centuries. But there he stopped short. He made no effort to prove that Protestantism was the historical continuation of Mediæval Christianity. He insisted that it must be, or else it was a schism and heresy. But he made no effort to resolve the dilemma in which his argument placed himself and all other Protestants. He simply *assumed* that Protestantism *must* be such a continuation, but made no attempt to prove that, in fact, it was.

Brownson, in the article to which we are referring, exposes with consummate ability this fatal defect in Dr. Nevin's argument.

"Saint-Bonnet on Social Restoration" forms the subject of the eighth and last paper, in the volume before us, on development theories. The work Dr. Brownson criticises was very able and interesting. It probed to the bottom our social, moral and economical wounds, traced them to their origin, and prescribed the only possible remedy—a hearty return to Christian faith and the practical observance in every department of life of Christian principles and maxims. But some of the author's premises were unsound, and in the development of his subject and the application of his principles he pursued to a great extent a line of thought similar to that of the "Essay on the Developmant of Christian Doctrine." These defects in the work Dr. Brownson exposes, and in their exposure gives an exceedingly able and lucid disquisition upon the origin of human society and the principles and laws of its progress.

The space we have already occupied forbids our noticing in particular the many remaining articles contained in the volume. They are on

subjects of profound importance and are immediately and directly related questions of deep practical concern to-day respecting the fundamental principles of morality, of society, and kindred subjects, as their respective titles indicate: "Hildreth's Theory of Morals;" "Jouffroy's Ethical System;" "Rights and Duties;" "Ward's Philosophical Introduction;" "Lecky on Morals;" "Madness of Anti-Christians;" "Charity and Philanthropy;" "The Reformation not Conservative;" etc.

Following these critical articles, are four admirable papers; severally, on Bishop Fenwick, Archbishop Hughes, Archbishop Spalding, and Count de Montalembert. They are not biographical sketches or memoirs, but careful and profound analytical studies of the distinctive characteristics of the subjects of the several papers, the influence they exerted, the special work they did, and the manner in which they did it. As giving an interior view of the characters and work of the three Prelates named and of Count de Montalembert, we know of nothing more interesting or valuable.

The last three papers of the volume are critical studies respectively of the "Questions of the Soul," and "Aspirations of Nature," by Rev. Father Hecker; and of the "Meditations of St. Ignatius."

Volume XV. contains the first part of Dr. Brownson's political writings. From a statement in the editor's Preface to this volume, we infer that the collection now in process of republication will extend through three more volumes. These writings cover a period of nearly forty years, from 1837 to 1875. When the earliest articles were written, Dr. Brownson was a radical both in religion and in politics. Consequently there are many erroneous ideas in these early articles, which the author afterwards repudiated and earnestly combated. Yet even along with the errors there are important truths clearly stated and ably defended. The political theories of Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, etc., are critically examined and thoroughly refuted. Dr. Brownson establishes the divine right of government, and the providential constitution of the State as anterior to the written constitution. He shows that the divine right of government is the real basis of individual freedom and of lawful authority; that the unrestrained will of the sovereign, whether the sovereign be one or many, and whether the government be monarchial, aristocratic, or democratic, is despotism; and that there is freedom only where this will is limited and restrained.

The papers on the "Origin, Ground, and Constitution of Government," and on "Political Constitutions" are profound studies of their respective subjects. Other papers in volume XV. are able discussions of public measures closely connected with the history of our country. The volume concludes with a very interesting article on Ireland and Daniel O'Connell.

Life of Right Rev. John N. Neumann, D.D., of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Fourth Bishop of Philadelphia. From the German of Rev. John N. Berger, C. SS. R., by *Rev. Eugene Gramm, C. SS. R.* New York, Cincinnati & St. Louis: Benziger Brothers, 1884.

The opportunity of possessing a biography of Bishop Neumann, afforded by the publication of a second edition of the work before us, will be gladly availed of by very many who personally knew that saintly Prelate or knew of him by the testimony of others. Twenty-two years have passed since his death, but he still lives in the hearts of thousands, and his name and memory are held in benediction. Indeed as time rolls on the conviction of his holiness seems to strengthen and the estimate

of his attainments in Christian virtue to become higher. And this, too, though, as far as was possible and consistent with his Episcopal office, his life was a hidden one and, in his great humility, he concealed his deeds from the eyes of all save God alone.

The diocesan archives, according to the testimony of the writer of his Life, contain little calculated to throw light upon the subject. The missionaries who labored with him, comparatively few in number, were too much occupied with the care of souls to record their own trials and labors or what they knew that he endured and accomplished. Yet God, when in His wisdom he sees that it is well to preserve the memory of one of His faithful servants, provides for this. Consequently sufficient material has been collected from which the Life of this Holy Bishop can be clearly portrayed. From the members of his immediate family, his brother and sisters, from those who knew him in his childhood and early manhood, from his fellow class-mates and the Professors who instructed him in the Theological Seminary at Prague, and from other sources of knowledge abundant reliable information has been obtained, showing his intellectual brightness, his rapid progress in knowledge, as well as his deep piety and shining Christian virtue while yet a youthful aspirant for the priesthood. His letters, too (comprising a large correspondence), and his journal, in which his most secret thoughts and spiritual experiences are faithfully recorded, throw a clear light upon his labors, his trials and his interior character.

The work before us, plainly was not intended to be a Life of Bishop Neumann, merely as Bishop of Philadelphia and during the few years he labored there with eminent fidelity to the trust committed to him. It was, evidently, written with the purpose of bringing clearly into the view the entire life and character of its subject. It commences with a sketch of the surroundings of Bishop Neumann at his birth and in his childhood, records the Christian virtues of his parents—for the divine blessing frequently descends visibly from parents to children—and the Christian lives of his brother and sisters, several of whom entered the religious state, and one of whom for many years held the office of Superior-General of the Sisters of Charity of St. Charles Borromeo, and discharged the duties of that office with distinguished fidelity and efficiency.

The work then describes the youthful student-life of Neumann in the elementary school and at the Seminary, his exemplary piety and consistency of conduct, his diligence in study, his devout performance of religious duties; the trials and sufferings which even at that early period of his life he was called to endure. It then vividly depicts the difficulties which arose against his ordination to the priesthood, and his emigration to the United States where he had aspired from early youth to labor as a missionary. These difficulties grew partly out of the peculiar ecclesiastical rules and laws of his native country, and partly out of Neumann's family circumstances. They seemed for a time insurmountable, and were a severe trial to faith and patience. But Neumann's faith and conviction as to where duty called him never wavered, even when the obstacles seemed insurmountable. He persevered, and God providentially opened the way, when it appeared to be entirely closed.

Then, the work before us describes young Neumann, not having received sacred orders in his native land, landing in New York, virtually penniless, finding his way to St. Nicholas' Church, kindly received by its Pastor, and charged with the duty of giving regular instructions in Christian Doctrine, then ordained by Bishop Dubois, and then at his entrance upon the duties of his sacred office met with questions as to

the *licitness* of his ordination (though its validity was admitted), which questions, however, were soon happily solved. Almost immediately on his ordination, the young Priest was sent by Bishop Dubois to labor among the German Catholics of Western New York.

The field of labor assigned to him was, at that time, almost a wilderness materially, and spiritually. The country was sparsely settled, and the Catholics were separated from each other at great distances and with roads scarcely passable except on foot in winter and spring, and in summer on horseback. The condition of the German Catholics was even still more deplorable than that of the English-speaking Catholics. They were isolated from the others by their language, were far fewer in numbers, and even poorer as respects their material resources. The non-Catholics of this region were far more numerous than the Catholics, and were rude, ignorant, superstitious, and bitterly prejudiced against Catholics. In this missionary field Father Neumann labored for four years in poverty, and with apostolic zeal. The history of his labors, his self-denial, his intense desire to save souls and guide them in the right way, as narrated in the work before us would be incredible, did we not know how the love of Christ constrains His chosen servants to endure all things for His sake.

After four years of faithful, zealous, self denying labor, bearing abundant spiritual fruit, though amidst countless difficulties, Father Neumann's health broke down. At the same time his previous convictions that he ought to enter a religious society ripened into a certainty. Accordingly he applied to be received into the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, and on the 16th of September, 1840, received permission from its Superior to enter the Order. The Right Rev. Bishop Hughes, then Administrator of the Diocese of New York, after repeated refusals, being reluctant to lose the services of so faithful a missionary priest, gave him his discharge. As incidentally yet closely connected with the main purpose of his work—to depict Father Neumann's apostolic zeal—his biographer here devotes a chapter to describing the special mission and labors of the "Redemptorists" in the United States. He then follows Father Neumann for the space of twelve years, first through the term of his novitiate, then as a simple missionary priest, then as one of the two Consultors to the Superior of the Redemptorist Order in America, and then as Vice-Provincial of the Order. In all these positions he was alike humble, mortified and obedient to the rules of the Order, and consumed with a desire to win souls to Christ.

Father Neumann loved obscurity. But "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted." The Divine purpose sought him out. He was appointed Bishop of Philadelphia by the Holy See, that diocese having become vacant by the translation of Bishop Francis Patrick Kenrick to the Archiepiscopal See of Baltimore. With tears and earnest entreaties Father Neumann endeavored to escape from the responsibilities of a Bishop. But it was not to be. Obedience was laid upon him, and he obeyed.

The next eight years of his life—the term of his Episcopate—are well described in the work before us. His zeal for religion, his unsparing labor; his solicitude for his Clergy and the Religious Orders in his Diocese, his introduction of still other Religious Orders; his fervent Pastoral Letters and discourses; his special love for children; his meekness, humility and ardent piety are vividly depicted.

Bishop Neumann, as described by his biographer, was not only indefatigable in his labors, but also systematic in their performance. He drew out a map of his vast diocese on which each parish was accurately marked

out. He visited the hospitals, asylums, and convents and personally acquainted himself with their temporal and spiritual condition. He visited regularly every parish throughout his diocese. His custom was to visit the larger annually, the smaller and more remote once in two years. When making these visits he spent several days in each parish, instituting a minute inquiry into their actual condition, and endeavoring to remedy as far as he could any abuses or evils that existed. These visits partook, too, somewhat of the nature of a Mission. He catechised and preached and gave special instructions to the children. Wherever there was no church edifice and it was possible to erect one, he encouraged the people to undertake it. During the five years of his Episcopate more than fifty new churches were opened and blessed.

The completion of the Cathedral, commenced by his predecessor, was a subject of earnest desire and he labored earnestly to accomplish it. A few weeks after his installation he issued a circular soliciting contributions in aid of the continuance of the work of erection, and from time to time he so pressed the subject upon the attention of the faithful, that in 1859 he had the satisfaction of seeing the keystone of the dome placed in position and the cross erected upon its summit.

Bishop Neumann was ardently interested in the subject of Christian education. In his first Pastoral letter he says: "Our Catholic youth can be saved only by Catholic schools." The same sentiment and in almost the same words was repeated in his first sermon after his installation. Nor were these declarations mere words devoid of earnest intention.

Within a month he invited the Pastors of the several congregations and several prominent laymen to meet at the Episcopalresidence for a conference on the subject of Catholic schools. In opening the conference he expressed his firm conviction that "for Catholic children Catholic schools are an absolute necessity in order to educate them in the faith, form them into good and useful members of the Church and of society, and secure their eternal salvation." The Bishop's sentiments were warmly approved by the assembly. Resolutions looking towards the establishment of parochial schools were adopted, a committee was appointed to consult on the best means to employ; and the Secretary of the meeting was directed to notify all absent Pastors and request them to attend the next meeting. This meeting was held a few days later and was a full one. A "Central Committee for the education of Catholic Youth" was appointed, of which the Bishop was President. It was the business of this committee to deliberate upon a practical method of instruction, and by the collection of monthly contributions to assist in the maintenance of schools in parishes that were unable to support them. Meetings were held every month at the Bishop's residence, and the proceedings were forwarded to every Priest in the diocese. The Bishop was invariably present at these meetings unless other imperative duties prevented it. In such cases he was careful to notify his Vicar-General to attend in his place and preside over the meeting.

But Bishop Neumann not only thus promoted in a general way the establishment of parochial schools. He interested himself in their details, frequently visited them, and endeavored to secure thoroughness of system in them, as regards instruction and discipline. The result was that a healthy emulation arose among the several schools, the teachers and pupils of each striving to be able to furnish the Bishop with solid proofs of its excellence.

This work was not carried forward without encountering difficulties and opposition, open or covert. But Bishop Neumann was not discour-

aged by them. He knew how to pray and labor and how to wait. If the difficulties in the way of immediately accomplishing his object seemed to be insurmountable, he waited patiently till a change of circumstances arose. If they consisted simply in a dread of labor and expense, his prudence and energy discovered means to overcome both. His biographer narrates an example of this; he had repeatedly enjoined the Pastor of one of the largest parishes in Philadelphia to establish a Parochial school, and was as often met with the reply, "It is impossible just now." At last the Bishop rejoined, "If it is indeed impossible for *you* to establish a school, I shall have to look for another to fill your place, who willfind it possible to secure a Christian education for the children of that parish." The Rev. Pastor promised to make the effort himself. He set to work, built a large school-house, and opened it with an attendance of a thousand children on the very first day.

The result of Bishop Neumann's holy persistent zeal in promoting the establishment of Parochial schools became quickly visible. The number of schools, and attendance upon them increased rapidly, so that a few months before his death Bishop Neumann could say: Almighty God has so blessed the work of Catholic education that nearly every church in my diocese has now its school. The falling off in attendance at the public schools became so noticeable that it attracted the attention of the public press. The following appeared in one of the daily papers of the time: "We regret to see that the most esteemed denomination in this city has withdrawn its confidence from the public schools," etc.

Besides the parochial schools Bishop Neumann gave earnest attention to the industrial schools and the academies and colleges that were already in existence, and encouraged the creation of new ones. Under his fostering care, St. Joseph's College was established in Susquehanna County; and three new academies for girls, one in the above mentioned county, one in Reading and one in Philadelphia; also an industrial school for girls; St. Vincent's Home; St. Vincent's Orphan Asylum; and a Hospital, under the care of the Franciscan Sisters.

The orphans were dear objects of Bishop Neumann's solicitude. He was a true father to them. He delighted, too, in visiting the hospitals and alleviating the sufferings of the poor sick by loving words and tender sympathy.

Nor did he neglect institutions for the promotion of higher education. He was interested with his whole heart in the work of training candidates for the Sacred Ministry. He strove with holy zeal to sustain and increase the resources and efficiency of the diocesan Theological Seminary, previously established. Seeing, too, that it was important that young candidates for the priesthood should pursue their studies and receive their training under ecclesiastical rule in the diocese in which they were to labor, he entertained the desire and idea, from the very beginning of his Episcopate, of establishing a diocesan Preparatory Seminary. He had to wait for seven years before his plan became practicable. But at the year before his death he had the happiness of seeing its realization commenced by the purchase of an eligible property for that purpose. He had a high estimate of the holy office of the priesthood, and believed that most thorough preparation was necessary before entering on its functions. In one of his Pastoral Letters he insists that to properly qualify a Priest "to instruct the ignorant, strengthen the doubting and wavering, guide the faithful, preach and defend fearlessly the truths of our holy faith," a period of "ten or twelve years" is necessary, "devoted to scientific branches, especially ecclesiastical science."

The latter part of the work before us is occupied with an account of

Bishop Neumann's private Christian life and virtues, his death, and obsequies, his reputation for sanctity, and the many cures and other special favors piously believed to have been obtained from God by prayers at Bishop Neumann's grave, and by invoking his intercession.

THE FAITH OF CATHOLICS CONFIRMED BY SCRIPTURE, AND ATTESTED BY THE FATHERS OF THE FIRST FIVE CENTURIES OF THE CHURCH. With Preface by *Right Rev. Monsignor Capel, D.D.*, Domestic Prelate of His Holiness, Leo XIII., Member of the Congregation of the Segnatura, Priest of the Archdiocese of Westminster. In three volumes. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1885.

Monsignor Capel has done great service to the cause of truth in presenting the public in this country with an American reprint of Rev. Father Waterworth's renowned work. It takes up and conclusively disposes of the accusation that the "Roman Church" has departed in her belief and doctrine, from the faith and teaching of the Apostles and their immediate successors. This is a charge which High Church Episcopalians, Evangelical Protestants, and those of the various schools of rationalism unitedly make against the Holy Catholic Church. For, though Evangelical Protestants professedly uphold private interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures as their only authoritative rule of faith, and professedly discard all other means, except as secondary and subordinate, to arriving at a knowledge of divine revelation, yet in practice they find it impossible to follow out their professed rule. Nor can they deny that Christians, in the first centuries of the Christians taught by the Apostles and their immediate successors, must have known what the Apostolic doctrines were, and that the writings of those Christians, many of which have been preserved to us, must be accepted as evidence of their faith and practice.

And even rationalistic Protestants who do not deny even the naked fact that Christianity is a divine revelation, are compelled to admit that Christians of the early ages of the Church must have known what doctrines and practices the Apostles taught.

The question, "What was the belief of Christians in the first centuries of the Christian era?" is a crucial one to all who professedly regard Christianity as a divine religion. Indeed, if the true answer to it is proved to be, "It is the same that Catholics now hold and ever have held," it constitutes a challenge which even deists and atheists cannot ignore or evade. It calls upon them to explain consistently with their unbelief, how it comes that this faith, unchanged and unchanging, is today, as it quickly became immediately after its first promulgation, the most active, all-pervading, potent fact in the world's life; not in one country only, among the people of one language or race, or in one age only, but in all ages and amongst all peoples; all else constantly changing, it alone remaining unchanged.

And the question answered in the work before us is one, too, which has a special interest in our own country and at this particular time. Nowhere else in the world is the Catholic Church more free to carry out its mission. It is not recognized, it is true, by either our Federal or our State governments. But it is unhampered by Concordats and other limitations of secular governments. Prejudices exist against it, and its members are a minority of our population. But prejudice may be overcome by constant exhibition of the truth, and even a minority may be allowed its proper degree of liberty, if sound reasons can be shown for its existence; and this minority is increasing in numbers and in power more rapidly than the population of our country.

Moreover, there never was a time nor a country—at least not since the close of the Middle Ages, and the revolt in Europe against authority, spiritual and temporal, miscalled "The Reformation"—when and where such attention is given to the action of the Church, and its position in relation to questions of vital importance to society and good morals, as is now given in our own country and at the present time. We need only specify as examples of this the references constantly made in secular newspapers, and even in Protestant pulpits, to the position occupied by the Church with respect to the subjects of marriage and divorce, the proper observance of Sunday, the true nature of civil authority as exercised by the State, of civil liberty as claimed and enjoyed by the individual, the relation of Christianity to public and private morals, etc.

The pronouncements of the assemblies and synods of various Protestant sects and the personal speculations of different Protestant ministers on these subjects, are published as matters of news by our leading daily newspapers, and are forgotten in a week. But the Encyclical Letters of the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, the Acts and Decrees of its Councils, their Pastoral Letters, and those of Archbishops and Bishops receive yet wider publication, and are referred to and commented upon, and their bearing upon different subjects vitally connected with religion and morals and the interests of civil society, are felt to demand most serious consideration, not only by Catholics, but by all classes of non-Catholics.

The question, too, constantly mooted by the non-Catholics of our country is: Are these utterances—so just, so wise, so timely in their relation to religious belief and disbelief, to good morals, to the evils which afflict society and their effectual remedy—the outcome and practical application of what has always been the belief and teaching of the Catholic Church? Or may they be attributed to a wonderful superior shrewdness of the rulers of the Church, changing their doctrine, and adapting their utterances to the religious, moral, and social wants and needs of our time and country?

The answer to these questions is found in the work before us. The faith of Catholics to-day and in the United States, as elsewhere, is the same that it was always and in all ages from the days of the Apostles until now, and will be in all subsequent time.

For these reasons, we regard the American reprint of the "Faith of Catholics," one of the most valuable and important contributions to Catholic literature in the United States, that has been made for many years, or, we may say, well could be made.

Nor is its value confined to the reasons we have given above. It should find a place in the libraries of all intelligent Catholics, not merely for controversial purposes, and as furnishing an answer to those who ask them for "a reason of that hope" they entertain, but also for the purpose of confirming their faith, by having at hand the evidences that their belief is identically the same which the Christians of the first ages of the Church, who were instructed by the Apostles, held and testified to despite of cruel persecution, and sealed with their blood.

Of the intrinsic merits of the work it is scarcely necessary for us to speak. The task of gathering the body of evidence it presents was undertaken by the Rev. Fathers Berington and Kirk in the early part of this century. Their book found such favor that, after it was out of print, the Rev. Father Waterworth undertook to republish it. In order, however, more fully to accomplish the objects comprehended in this design, "it was thought necessary to read the entire works of the Fathers and

ecclesiastical writers of the first five centuries, to give an entirely new translation of nearly all the extracts—especially those from the Greek writers, and to use such other aids as numerous authors have furnished towards distinguishing the genuine from the spurious or doubtful works of those early ages of the Church. To that labor four years of severe study were devoted." The original work was also considerably enlarged, and instead of a mere selection of passages from the writings of the Fathers of the first five centuries, a digest of their evidence was made, by arranging the extracts from their writings under distinct titles. Taken collectively, these extracts comprise almost every passage in the early Church Fathers that touch on the controversies of the present age between Catholics and non-Catholics.

In carrying out his purpose, Father Waterworth adopted the following plan: First, he states in distinct proposition, as briefly but comprehensively as possible, the articles of Catholic belief. Each proposition is then followed by passages of Scripture (chiefly from the New Testament) that confirm it; and then the authorities from Scripture are followed by copious extracts from the Fathers of the first five centuries of the Church.

The editor of the reprint before us—Monsignor Capel—has now given Father Waterworth's work to the American public with a number of corrections, and has added a chapter from the admirable work of the learned Bishop Ullathorne on the Immaculate Conception, a translation of the First Dogmatic Constitution of the General Council of the Vatican, and a chronological list of the Popes of the first five centuries.

History of the Catholic Church; For Use in Seminaries and Colleges. By *Dr. Heinrich Brueck*, Professor of Theology in the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Mentz. With Additions from the Writings of His Eminence Cardinal Hergenröther. Translated by Rev. E. Pruente. With an Introduction by Right Rev. Mgr. James A. Corcoran, S. T. D., Professor of Sacred Scripture, Moral Theology, etc., etc. Vol. I. Einsiedeln, New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers, Printers to the Apostolic See. 1885.

The diligent careful study of the history of the Church necessarily forms an important part of the course of instruction and training which those who are to enter upon the office of the Sacred Ministry of Christ and discharge its functions, should receive. For in the "History of the Church" are displayed the unfolding of the divine intention in establishing His Kingdom on earth, and the manner and way in which that Kingdom has spread itself in all previous ages and among all peoples; its relations to all those various peoples, to secular governments, philosophy, literature, art, science, human industry, and all the multifarious concerns of civil society; and also the interior development of the Church in regard to its constitution, doctrine, worship, etc.

The need, therefore, in the English language, of such a work as this, of which the first volume is before us, has been widely and deeply felt. Nearly all the manuals of Church History that up to this time have been published in English fail to meet the want, from one cause or another. Some of them are entirely too voluminous. Others are defective in method and arrangement, breaking the continuity of the narrative by discursive treatment of particular topics, or treating at too great length, and with too much minuteness, subjects which, however interesting to advanced scholars as subjects for special investigation, would consume too much of the time of students of seminaries and colleges, and divert their attention from the general course of Church History. Still others are intended for popular use rather than for students.

Owing to these causes an English text-book on church history for use in theological seminaries, combining sufficient conciseness with sufficient clearness, accuracy, and precision, has been up to this time a great desideratum.

The want, we believe, will be supplied by the translation of Dr. Brueck's work. Its author is Professor of Theology in the Ecclesiastical Seminary at Mentz, and has attained high distinction as an accurate and profound scholar. His work has received favorable recognition from learned reviewers in Germany and other European countries, and has already been introduced into a number of Catholic Seminaries. An eminent European critic and scholar characterizes it "as uniting historic accuracy and scientific keenness, and an incomparable clearness, and a conciseness that avoids everything superfluous, with a thoroughly ecclesiastical spirit and great precision when treating of doctrine."

In endeavoring to give a concise yet truthful representation of the principal events in the history of the Church and their relations, the author bestows his chief attention upon subjects of greater importance, treating more briefly questions which, though interesting to historical critics or others engaged in special researches, are yet of minor importance. Thus the work is an admirable compendium, in which the several topics receive consideration proportionate to their relative importance.

As English-speaking Catholics naturally require a fuller consideration of Church History connected with their own countries, the translator has introduced such changes and additions as would satisfy this demand. In so doing he has made judicious use of the valuable historical researches of Cardinal Hergenröther and other distinguished Catholic Church Historians, and has also made such other changes as would better adapt the work for use by English-speaking students.

Numerous notes at the bottom of the pages furnish the reader with the historical sources and authorities, which confirm the statements of the text, and also direct him to the works through which he may prosecute his studies of particular subjects more extensively and minutely. Vol. I., which is before us, brings the "History of the Church" down to the death of Pope Boniface VIII.—1303. It divides the times of which it treats into two epochs. The first epoch extends from the Birth of Christ to the Sixth Œcumenical Council, the third at Constantinople, in 680. This Epoch is divided into two Periods, the first of which comes down to the time of Constantine the Great, and the second to the year 680. The Second Epoch extends to the death of Boniface VIII., and is also divided into two Periods, the first extending to the Pontificate of Gregory VII. (1073); the second to the death of Boniface VIII., in 1303.

The chief events in the history of the Church during these epochs and periods are considered and exhibited, first, with reference to the exterior condition of the Church, and secondly, with reference to its interior condition. The subjects treated of in each period are further subdivided under the several general heads of the "Spread of Christianity," "Church and State," "Constitution of the Church," "Development of Doctrine" (with a statement of the chief heresies and schisms opposing each doctrine), "Worship and Discipline." Added to the body of the work, as appendices, are a chronological list of the Popes, a chronological list of the Œcumenical Councils of the Church, and a chronological table, exhibiting the contemporaneous Popes, Emperors, and important events.

Preceding the body of the work is an "Introduction," by Right Rev. Monsignor James A. Corcoran, S. T. D., which is a model of concise-

ness and clearness, and which compresses into brief compass an immense amount of information respecting the sources of Church History and the works that have been published upon it. This "Introduction," as we learn from the publishers, is as yet unfinished, its completion having been prevented by the demands upon Monsignor Corcoran's time, made by the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore and the work of preparation for it. The remainder of the "Introduction," we presume, will appear in the second volume of the History.

The work is published with the *Imprimatur* of the Most Rev. Peter Richard Kenrick, Archbishop of St. Louis, and is dedicated (presumably by permission) to the Most Rev. P. J. Ryan, Archbishop of Philadelphia. The fact of its thus having the threefold approval, express or implied, of the two distinguished Prelates just named, and of Monsignor Corcoran, distinguished in Europe as well as in America for his extensive, accurate, and profound erudition, and whose long and varied experience as teacher of Church History, as well as of other branches of Sacred Science, eminently qualify him to decide upon the merits of text books, are a sufficient guaranty of the excellencies of this work.

Ancient Religions and Modern Thought, by *William Samuel Lilly*. London: Chapman & Hall. 1884.

W. S. Lilly's "Ancient Religions and Modern Thought" richly deserves the encomium of praise which has been freely accorded to it by critics. It displays a very extensive erudition, considerable scholarship, and unquestioned literary ability. Nor is this all. These gifts, whenever found in an unstinted measure combined in one writer, suffice by themselves to make his productions well worthy the careful attention of the reading public. But there is in this volume that which displays at once a great familiarity with the subject, a clear perception of the drift of the tendency of the age, and of the relationship true religion holds towards this current. Mr. Lilly correctly observes that the existence of the supernatural forms the keynote of the whole problem of unbelief, and, of course, a world, denying the reality of all that is supersensible, necessarily denies also the soul's existence, and hence its immortality. Correct perceptions are so rarely met with in discussions of this momentous issue of our days, that the clear and perspicuous mode of presenting this phase of modern cultured thought strikes the reader with unalloyed pleasure and not less great force. An excellent synopsis of the Eastern religious systems and a careful noting of the true positions these creeds occupy in the history of the world, go far towards convincing the reader that the author has succeeded in discharging a difficult task in the spirit of real and not feigned impartiality.

But, in spite of the many and great excellencies of this work, and in spite of our honest belief that it stands in the front rank of books on this grave topic of our times, there are some points on which it seems to us the author is neither clear to himself nor, on that account, able to clarify the reader's notions. In the first place, the existence of God is not a thesis open to doubt, as the physicists themselves furnish abundant proofs of the reality of an order above and beyond nature, and as, moreover, a cogent philosophical and irrefragable argument on that point exists, apart from any assumptions of theology. In the second place, the immortality of the soul, a necessary sequence of the preceding fact, admits of a much stronger proof than has been furnished by Mr. Lilly. It seems to us that his statements of the negative side are fuller, and cover more ground, than the replies he makes for the positive side. And, as these are precisely the points on which light is so much needed

for a proper understanding of true religion, it is much to be regretted that this remarkable work does not enter more fully upon them.

Again, while reading the remarks called forth by the analysis of Eastern creeds, and the very well selected quotations from the documents by the unearthing of which our times have gained much insight into the religious life of the major part of this globe's population, some inferences, which strongly suggested themselves to our mind, have either been overlooked or else not made as irrelevant to the subject. Buddhism, it seems to us, should be considered as the very strongest confirmation of Christianity. The fact of a primordial revelation is the one upon which Christianity and Judaism rest alike. In the course of time these truths became corrupted, but then, where the second revelation in the person of Christ was not made, it seems the fundamental ideas were preserved in greater purity and held with greater tenacity than in the world which proved the first field of true religious expansion.

Again, Mohammedanism, far from being an original creed, presents to us merely a strange mixture of Christian tenets and Eastern fantastic ideas, welded together under the magnetic influence of a really great man aided by the unrelenting power of the sword. True, the estimate society is in the habit of bestowing upon Mohammed and Islamism is quite erroneous in the majority of cases. But the view held by Mr. Lilly corrects only some misconceptions in regard to it, and leaves it to be inferred that Islamism stands forth as an original creed of the world on the same level as Christianity, Buddhism, etc., which, as Mr. Lilly himself best knows, is an altogether erroneous belief.

These critical remarks may, perhaps, seem too severe, but a work which discusses the most vital subject of all, one that is of paramount import to every human being, must be criticised on every weak point, if subject to criticism at all. Nor do these suggestions impair in any way the high value which this volume deserves in contemporary literature. They purpose merely to indicate shortcomings which, in an undertaking of this kind, appear almost unavoidable, because the minds of no two men run exactly in the same line.

LIFE OF ST. CLARE OF MONTEFALCO, PROFESSED NUN OF THE ORDER OF HERMITS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Translated from the Italian of the Most Rev. Lawrence Tardy, formerly Vicar-General of the Augustinian Order, by *Rev. Joseph Locke, O. S. A., permissu superiorum.* New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers.

The subject of this biography died in the odor of sanctity in the year 1308, and within eighteen years afterwards the entire tedious process of her canonization was completed. Nothing remained but for the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church to issue his declaration. This he had determined to do, but circumstances, not his will, prevented him. The cause then lay unnoticed for more than four centuries, when it was taken up, and again laid aside for no apparent reason, as Benedict XIV. himself remarked. Finally, and after the lapse of six centuries, it was brought to a successful issue under our present gloriously reigning Pontiff, Leo XIII., who canonized St. Clare on September 11th, 1881.

Clearly, this was Providential. God, in His far-reaching wisdom, saw that the spirit of mortification and the love for the Cross of Christ, which were the leading characteristics of St. Clare's life, were just what are now needed to remedy the evils of our times. Knowing, as He does, "the times and the seasons," He chose to reserve her canonization till the moment when her example would do most good.

We heartily commend the work. Its perusal will tend to inspire, what is so much needed, a spirit of detachment from the world, and of charity and self-mortification.

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